Exhibit 25

| | Page 1 |
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| 1 | IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT |
| | IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA |
| 2 | CIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION |
| 3 | CASE NO.: 2019-017627-CA-01 |
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| 5 | ROBERT A. SUGARMAN, Individually and as |
| | Personal Representative of the Estate of |
| 6 | MARILYN WENDY SESKIN, |
| 7 | Plaintiff, |
| 8 | v. |
| 9 | JOHNSON & JOHNSON, |
| | JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER |
| 10 | INC., f/k/a JOHNSON & JOHNSON, |
| | CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC., |
| 11 | and PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC., |
| 12 | Defendants. |
| 13 | / |
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| 17 | Miami-Dade County Courthouse |
| | 73 West Flagler Street |
| 18 | Miami, Florida 33130 |
| | Friday, February 9, 2023 |
| 19 | 9:32 a.m 4:37 p.m. |
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| 23 | This cause came on for hearing before the |
| 24 | Honorable William Thomas, Circuit Court Judge, in |
| 25 | Courtroom 13-1, pursuant to notice. |

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(Hearing proceedings commenced at 9:32 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right, folks. You all can be seated.

Let me tell you what I've been doing. We have our 200 jurors, which is good news. We didn't reserve a courtroom, which is the bad news.

So I have been back there trying to contact the judges who did reserve the courtroom to see is your case going, is it not. And I also requested they give us a courtroom -- if no courtrooms are available here, I asked that they give us a courtroom over at the children's courthouse just for jury selection. And nobody can tell me anything right now. So I've been trying.

I even went downstairs and I looked at the courtrooms, well, maybe we can use this courtroom; no, that's too small. So that's where we're at.

It doesn't change anything for purposes of our pretrial. We still need to do all these pretrial things, but it could potentially impact what happens on Monday.

Now, the worst that could happen is that we have 200 people, we keep them downstairs, we bring them up at 25 at a pop, we disqualify all those who can't stay here for the time period that is

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required -- that gets rid of a lot -- with the thought that we could get down to about seventy people that you all can question, and then we can go from there. But again, I'm talking to you in hypotheticals because I don't know what's going to happen. That was the original plan. So that's what I've been trying to deal with this morning.

I get a little frustrated because Andrew, who was an excellent JA, he left, but he knows if you order 200 jurors, you can't do that in this courtroom, so you always order a larger courtroom when you order 200 jurors. And he didn't do it, and by the time it had already been done, all the other judges, the larger courtrooms, the judges are starting trials on the same day.

I'll let you know when I know what courtroom.

And so, logistically, I don't know if they're going to give us a problem walking 200 people to the children's courthouse. It shouldn't be.

All right. Where do you want to start?

MR. OLIVER: Well, Your Honor, we were going to hear the motion regarding Plaintiff's motion to exclude Publix's expert. However, as you know, Publix is no longer in this case, so I believe either we pick or they pick.

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Page 7 1 THE COURT: We start with the plaintiff, then we go to the defendant. We'll go until we've 3 resolved everything. 4 MR. OLIVER: So plaintiff will start with 5 Dr. Permuth, Jennifer Permuth. It's a motion to exclude under Daubert. 6 7 Do I need to go to the podium, Your Honor? THE COURT: Wherever you're comfortable, sir. 8 9 MR. OLIVER: Okay. I quess the question I 10 have, I know at the beginning of the last hearing, Your Honor had not had a chance to read some of our 11 12 paperwork --13 THE COURT: I did. I got your emails. Thank 14 you. MR. OLIVER: Okay. 15 So you have read the motion to exclude Dr. Jennifer Permuth? 16 17 THE COURT: I have. 18 MR. OLIVER: Okay. So let me start at the 19 beginning. I'll try to be brief. And obviously, Your Honor, if you have a question, just interrupt 2.0 21 me and let me know specifically. 2.2 Essentially, what defendants would like 2.3 Jennifer Permuth to do in this case is testify that 24 Dr. Seskin has a gene mutation that increases her

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risk for ovarian cancer. The problem with that is

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Dr. Permuth has absolutely no methodology --

THE COURT: Counsel, I'm listening to you, I'm just trying to get the computer to turn on.

MR. OLIVER: That's okay.

And I want to be really clear. She has the genetic testing. The genetic testing mutation that she has is c.456+A>T. That is the mutation that the testing identified.

And what the testing said about that was current and limited data suggest women who carry one FANCC mutation may have an elevated risk of developing breast cancer, which we knew, and that's mainly due to BRCA 1 and 2, which Dr. Seskin did not. The next sentence says, "Correlation between FANCC mutations and increased risk of other cancers is not yet known."

And Dr. Permuth, at her depositions, agreed that the correlation or the risk between this mutation and ovarian cancer is not yet known. She didn't do that research herself. Nobody has done that research.

What she does is she relies on a handful of papers. Those papers are merely talking about this family of genes and saying we need to do further research, and by the way, we've identified some

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women in the historical record who have ovarian cancer and also have this gene mutation and there may be four or five of them.

THE COURT: I'm sorry to cut you off. As I was looking at this, the part of this that -- well, even if that is true, why can't you just point that out during the cross-examination?

MR. OLIVER: Well, Your Honor, the reason we can't -- I mean, we could point that in the cross-examination if Your Honor allowed it and if Daubert allowed it, but Daubert doesn't now, under Florida law, does not allow pure opinion testimony.

And in fact, if you look at her -- and this part you may not have seen because it was an addendum to her report, but what she wants to say, she wants to couch her opinion in qualifying language that says this could have been suggestive of a substantial causing factor. And she puts it on a risk chart and she doesn't put talc on her risk chart and she says this is the thing.

The problem under Daubert is that they have the burden of proving that she has a sound methodology and they have to have something other than her speculative opinion, which this is her opinion, she doesn't have anything to back it up

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THE COURT: So what you're saying is that it's not as if she's coming in and testifying that she had this gene, and because she had this gene, she is -- it's definitive that she is at a higher risk.

MR. OLIVER: That's right.

THE COURT: She is saying that, okay, she had this gene and that could have, and the problem with that "could have" is that the research is still undeveloped.

MR. OLIVER: That's right. And she admits the research --

THE COURT: To a reasonable degree of scientific --

MR. OLIVER: She can't say that. And Your Honor has ruled in Rolle v. Burke, and I believe that that is not an acceptable opinion under Daubert, that's obviously consistent with all of the Daubert law.

That is essentially where we are with that. I want to be clear about something: Plaintiffs tried to be very narrow with our Daubert motions. We are not saying Dr. Permuth can't testify. She does have opinions, for example, about the validity of the talc studies. If she wants to testify to that,

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she can. What she can't do is come in and present a risk chart to the jury that says this woman has an elevated risk of ovarian cancer because of this gene when there is literally no science whatsoever that establishes that.

And I'll leave you with this: She relies on a paper, a number of papers that talk about this issue. And those papers, at the end of their conclusions, explicitly state we, the authors of this paper, cannot use this -- and they are not about this mutation, about a lot of mutations -- to establish, nor have we tried to establish the risk relationship between ovarian cancer and this group of genes. We haven't done that because we don't have enough information. We need more information. We are saying this should be studied more.

And Dr. Permuth, when she was questioned at her deposition, she agreed with that. If we said -- for example, if I wanted to cross her and say, "What is the risk?" She would say, "I don't know." And you rely on this paper, and in this paper, the authors who wrote this paper you rely on say they don't know because they didn't have enough information.

So that's where we are on that. It's very

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narrow. She shouldn't be able to say there's a risk when there's no risk. That's just not true.

THE COURT: But does anybody say there's no risk?

MR. OLIVER: Yes. Actually, so this is interesting. We questioned defendant's own other experts, and Dr. Felix, who is a pathologist, he was questioned about it. He reviewed the patient's risk factors and said I'm not aware of a genetic risk at this time with this patient. He had the records.

There is another one of defendant's doctors, I can't remember if it's Osann or Saenz, who said the same thing, that this is unknown. And this is --

THE COURT: Can you help me understand, when you say it's unknown, what I'm trying to understand is that I thought the whole purpose of all of this is that when you isolate this gene, this gene is there, that -- I was going to use correlation, but I don't want to do that. There is no correlation.

MR. OLIVER: I can explain.

THE COURT: Having this gene alone, does it put you at a higher risk?

MR. OLIVER: No. No. Actually, this is a great question. So BRCA 1 and BRCA 2, which your

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Honor may be familiar with, do raise a woman's risk for ovarian cancer and breast cancer dramatically.

And those genes were tested for and Marilyn Seskin was negative for those genes.

BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 are related to and part of the FANCC family, which Dr. Seskin had, but within the FANCC family, for women of Ashkenazi Jewish heritage, you have to go down and actually identify the specific deleterious mutation, right? So if you have BRCA 1 and 2, she could absolutely testify to that.

She got the testing, and the medical record says, yeah, you got the testing and you have this mutation. That mutation simply means this is a mutation in your gene sequencing that causes some things that interfere with cell regeneration.

That's the best I can do as a nondoctor, right.

We don't know what that means. We don't know if it leads to cancer. We know in BRCA 1 and 2, it does, but this isn't BRCA 1 and 2.

THE COURT: And there's been no additional studies to actually say conclusively it --

MR. OLIVER: That's right, absolutely. And I want to read from her treating physician. Her treating physician, her surgeon, defendant cited

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his testimony in their motion, he said there was further study.

Well, when I asked him this question, I said,
"To your knowledge sitting here today, is there any
research establishing that there is an association
between FANCC, the family, and ovarian cancer?"

"I'm not aware of any. I know that it's being studied."

"So sitting here today, you don't know of any article or study establishing a causal connection between FANCC and ovarian cancer, do you?"

"I do not."

So I want to leave you with this, Your Honor. You asked, well, isn't this a cross-examination question. You know, defendants could ask my doctor on cross-examination. They could use this genetic testing and say she had this gene mutation. Of course, my expert is going to say she did, I'm aware of it, it doesn't cause a rise in ovarian cancer.

I'm not saying they can't use her medical records. I'm saying if they are going to use an expert and offer expert testimony, that expert has to have a solid basis in methodology for her opinion, and in the case of Dr. Permuth, she simply

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THE COURT: So I don't understand. Are you saying that you have no objection to them testifying that she has this unique mutation? But the problem is that you're saying that they can't explain that --

MR. OLIVER: I mean, it's a fact that she has the mutation, but --

THE COURT: Without explaining what it means, it doesn't have any --

MR. OLIVER: That's right. And under Daubert, their burden. They wanted to cross my expert and say she had a gene mutation, and he says she sure did, you know what Dr. Chan is going to say? He's going to say there is no risk associated with that, that we know of.

THE COURT: There is no known.

MR. OLIVER: And what he'll say, interestingly, you know, he counsels people to get protective surgeries, take oophorectomies and that kind of thing if they have BRCA 1 and 2. He is going to say there is no guidance for me to do that. I can't tell a woman -- if a woman has BRCA 1 and 2, I can recommend protective surgeries, which is a huge deal, right.

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If she has this gene mutation, I can't do that because we don't have an established --

THE COURT: All right. Who is responding to this one?

MS. SCOTT: I am, Your Honor. If you don't mind, Your Honor, I've prepared a couple slides just to walk us through. It might be because I'm an English major, it's easy for me to have pictures to go with the science. I'll hand this to Your Honor and I have a copy for Mr. Oliver as well.

MR. OLIVER: Thank you.

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THE COURT: All right. Nobody is questioning her qualifications.

MS. SCOTT: Yes, no one is questioning her qualifications, and we are going to go a little bit out of order, Your Honor, if you don't mind. I just want to take a step back and do some table setting on what the standard actually is here.

So if we turn to slide eight where we talk about our standard, our burden -- non-burden, actually, as a defendant in this case. We don't have the burden to conclusively prove that anything was the cause of Ms. Seskin's cancer.

What we are allowed to do under Florida law is to provide an alternative cause, a possible cause.

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To say that we have to show some sort of conclusive connection between this genetic mutation and her ovarian cancer impermissibly shifts the burden to the defendants. And as the Third DCA in the Union Carbide Corp. case that I've cited here on the slide shows, that's reversible error. And so if you think about what the standard is under Daubert --

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm crunching up my face because it's almost like you're saying there is one Daubert standard for the plaintiff and a different Daubert standard for the defense. There still has to be a scientific basis for the opinion. You just can't go and find somebody and say, you have that gene, and this is what that gene generally or what we believe that gene does, and because without any research, without anything, say that's possible; therefore, ladies and gentlemen, you'll find against the plaintiff, find that they didn't meet their burden because they didn't prove -- remember their standard -- within a reasonable degree of medical probability that this injury occurred as a result of this, all because we are saying there is all these other things that are possible, but are

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you saying these other things are possible within a degree of medical certainty?

And if you can't say it within -- if you have somebody saying all these things are possible within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, I agree, but you just can't make it up.

MS. SCOTT: And that's not what we are doing here, Your Honor. The Daubert standard applies to both sides equally, right? So they need to be qualified. Undisputed.

The only issue is: Is it helpful to the trier of fact? That's undisputed. What is at issue here is her methodology, and she did have a methodology and it was a reliable one. If we point to --

THE COURT: No, the only issue here is whether or not her opinion is supported by the scientific community, and what I'm hearing is that everybody is saying that this all needs to continue to be tested. Nobody -- the scientific community is not saying conclusively -- this is what they're arguing -- they are not saying that you can correlate this mutation to a higher risk of cancer.

And if you have somebody that says, oh, yes, you can, you can correlate the mutation to a higher risk of cancer, then this is easy. Then I'll deny

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the Daubert motion, I'll let your expert testify because they don't challenge your expert's qualifications.

But they are saying to me -- and I think your paper suggests it as well -- that your witness is not coming in and saying there is a direct correlation. Your witness is coming in and saying, well, these things are possible.

MS. SCOTT: She is saying more than it's possible, Your Honor. She is saying it's biologically plausible, which is a term of art in the science. She is also saying that it is biological plausible that it can contribute to her --

THE COURT: Here is the only question I asked you: Can she say that that this mutation correlates to cancer within a reasonable degree of scientific probability? Because if she can't, if you're telling me that she can come in and say maybe, possibly, probably, and you're telling me Judge Thomas, that's enough, then I'm going to commit reversible error.

If you're right, it's going to be reversible error and they are leading me into it so they can't complain later because there is no way I'm allowing

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you to introduce evidence that simply says maybe, possibly, plausibly, unless you can say at the end of it, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

MS. SCOTT: And I think that's ultimately where we get at, Your Honor, because not only is Ms. Permuth basing her opinion on her 20 years of experience in genetic counseling and studying epidemiological studies, there is peer reviewed literature that does support this connection. fact, we cite excerpts from that literature in our brief.

THE COURT: Cite one peer reviewed literature that says there is a correlation between the mutation and cancer.

MS. SCOTT: We have cited in our brief the Kobayashi paper, which says that there are mutations of Fanconi Anemia genes, which describe the FANCC mutation that Dr. Seskin undeniably had, that have been demonstrated to cause breast cancer and ovarian cancer susceptibility in cases from non-BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 families.

And I do also think it's important to take a step back and talk a little bit about the science because I think it's been glossed over a little bit. As I mentioned, as an English major, it's not

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my favorite part of the discussion, but if we go to slide four, Your Honor, we talk about what FANCC is. I wanted to pause briefly on that, what the mutation is that she has.

It's called FANCC. It's one of 22 genes that make up the Fanconi anemia family or class of genes. And these genes, when functioning properly, they repair double breaks in our DNA that generally occur during the DNA replication process. And so when functioning properly, these genes repair those double-strained DNA.

When they're not functioning properly, they don't. And so these Fanconi Anemia genes, like BRCA 1, BRCA 2, there's five -- there's 11 Fanconi anemia genes there are cancer susceptibility genes. There are five that are known to cause ovarian cancer and breast cancer. As Your Honor is aware, BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 are two of those breast cancer susceptibility genes.

FANCC has the same pathway. It functions the same way as BRCA 1 and BRCA 2. The only difference is the way that it's inherited. So BRCA 1 BRCA 2 are inherited -- I'm taking you back to eighth grade biology class -- BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 are dominant genes, so if both your parents have it --

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excuse me, if one parent has it, then you can get it.

FANCC, which is Dr. Seskin has, is very rare. It's recessive. So both of your parents have to have the recessive gene in order for you to get that mutation. So what the science is starting to establish -- because now BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 have been studied for 30 some-odd years we are just now at the point we have that conclusive connection. FANCC is starting to be studied more.

It's not studied as much because FANCC happens -- because it's recessive, it doesn't happen as often as BRCA 1 BRCA 2, but people are starting to study it. Dr. Permuth has studied those studies that are looking at that connection and people are starting to see that yes, there is a connection between FANCC and ovarian cancer.

THE COURT: Who?

MS. SCOTT: Dr. Kobayashi. There are several other --

THE COURT: And I want to know their language.

Are they saying things like "there appears to be,"

"there is a good chance," like what is the

language? Because counsel is representing -- and I

didn't look at the studies, I'm being very candid

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with you, but counsel is saying that at the end of the studies, they are making it clear that more studies need to occur. The science has not basically come to a conclusion in this regard, so that's why I keep asking.

I will never be able to counter your experts' expertise in the medical profession. And your expert, like you, can sound so artful when you say it, okay, that's why in my little brain, okay, what I say is I default to what I know: Have they satisfied the standard? Is this something a proven tested methodology?

And if it's not, if it's still experimental, if it's still something that is unresolved, then it doesn't satisfy Daubert. I don't care how talented and the qualifications of the person offering it. Daubert requires it to be tested and proven, and that's why I objected to this whole idea of possibilities and plausibility.

Because if this was Frye, we would have a whole 'nother conversation, I was saying this the other day with the expert from Publix. What? And because I didn't get it. And that's why I said bring the witness here, let me ask some questions because maybe that will help me understand it.

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I say the same thing here. But you all don't seem to be in disagreement of your witness' qualifications, you seem to be in disagreement as to where the science currently is. They are saying the science is unresolved and there has been absolutely no studies that you can point to that creates a correlation between the mutation and cancer, higher risk of cancer.

You seem to be saying, well, people have looked at this and they are saying that, well, there may be. It's possible. That's what I'm hearing you say. And if that's the best you can say, the motion to exclude your expert in this limited area will be granted.

MS. SCOTT: There is the West Valen paper which does say that there is a strong correlation between FANCC and ovarian cancer and breast cancer.

THE COURT: And has that been peer reviewed? It has been peer reviewed. MS. SCOTT: one of the papers that one of our other experts, Dr. Boyd, who also on this issue has reviewed.

THE COURT: Okay. What else? Go ahead.

And so when I started out with the MS. SCOTT: standard, I meant on the standard of their claims because that's the way that the Court is looking at

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our right to defend our position, is to be able to put in alternative cause evidence. And that's all that Dr. Permuth and Dr. Boyd -- who plaintiffs have also sought to exclude on this very issue -- are trying to do, is to provide an alternative cause.

If plaintiffs get to go up there and say that talc definitively caused Ms. Seskin's cancer, then we are afforded the opportunity to put our experts on and to say, actually, here is another cause, FANCC or her endometriosis or whatever else the case may be.

THE COURT: By the way, I don't disagree with that statement.

MS. SCOTT: Right. And so under Daubert, we are looking at reliable methodology. And Dr. Permuth has employed a reliable methodology. She has a wealth of experience, unchallenged. She has reviewed peer reviewed literature. She has reviewed Dr. Seskin's medical records, and that, under Florida case law, is reliable.

And so as Your Honor asked plaintiffs, the issue here is whatever -- the complaints really here go to the weight of her testimony, not the admissibility. So to the extent they have issues

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with the correctness of her science, they can cross-examine her on. That's what Daubert instructs, vigorous cross-examination, not exclusion.

And one final point, Your Honor. Dr. Permuth herself, I think I heard Mr. Oliver mention that Dr. Permuth admitted there was no connection between FANCC and ovarian cancer in the literature, and that's just not true. She actually testified in her deposition that FANCC mutation has been associated with ovarian cancer, and that based on the scientific literature we are seeing, that FANCC mutations, particularly the one that Dr. Seskin had, are associated with ovarian cancer.

THE COURT: All right. Can I ask the plaintiff: I'm looking at this case, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco versus Mack, and the case says, "By excluding appellant's alternate causation evidence on the basis that its expert could not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof as to causation to appellant."

And they went on to say that all the defense was trying to do was not prove -- was not to prove, but basically instead they were attempting to

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diminish your argument that it was caused by their product.

MR. OLIVER: Judge, it's a great question. I litigate a lot of tobacco cases I had this come up in one of my tobacco cases and I'll give you the paradigm that happened in our case because it was very important.

This same argument -- Mack, by the way, I think was right at the time that Florida had adopted Daubert. The standard that Mack is talking about does not, per Your Honor's comments earlier, modify the preponderance of the evidence standard the defendants bear to support their expert.

In the case I was working on, our expert, in a tobacco case, admitted alcohol consumption can decrease your ability to quit. He admitted that, right? And the judge excluded evidence that our client had an alcohol problem and was consuming alcohol because they didn't have an expert who said I think this contributed to his inability to quit. And the case was ultimately reversed.

The difference there is that when our expert admitted that there was this connection, it was an established fact that drinking alcohol reduces your ability to quit smoking within the medical

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community. What we have here -- so that holding, as Your Honor, I think, recognized earlier, it doesn't modify the Daubert standard. The Daubert standard, which they bear the preponderance of the evidence showing they have reliable methodology, requires them to come forward with something. They can't just make something up and say there is a risk or there is a connection when there's not.

We go to Kobayashi. I read the Kobayashi article. There's a lot of stuff in these articles that I don't understand, but Marilyn Seskin's gene mutation is not in that article. This is her gene mutation. This is what Jennifer Permuth says she has, and that is not in Kobayashi.

And Kobayashi doesn't connect this gene mutation to an increased risk of ovarian cancer.

And Kobayashi doesn't quantify that increased risk of ovarian cancer.

Alinozi is another one of the articles that she relied on another one where the authors were perfectly clear that we have identified two instances in a gene database, only two people who had this mutation and had ovarian cancer. And they said if you want to figure out if this is a risk factor, you've got to have a lot of people. I

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don't know this for a fact, but I understand based on reading the genetic studies establishing risk have to have a lot of people in them.

THE COURT: Well, counsel acknowledges it's not as studied as others.

MR. OLIVER: Right, but it's not -- there is no study establishing a risk factor. Imagine if the shoe was on the other foot. We have, I believe, 38 out of 40 epidemiological studies showing the connection between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer. That's plenty, right? Under Daubert.

But what if my client came in and said, well, people have theorized that this happened, and you said, Mr. Sugarman, how many studies have shown an increased risk? And he said, well, none. Well, that's where they are. None have shown that.

Now, where it gets confusing, Judge, is this thing about FANCC. FANCC is a family of genes. It causes another type of cancer that's not ovarian, it's not breast. It's called Fanconi anemia, I believe.

The thing is, Dr. Marilyn Seskin didn't have Fanconi anemia. She has that gene family because she is of Ashkenazi Jewish heritage, but that alone

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Page 30 1 is like the first step. THE COURT: I get it. 3 Anything else, ma'am? MS. SCOTT: I think it's worth mentioning, 4 5 Your Honor, only because Mr. Oliver mentioned it as well about his own expert, his own expert actually 6 7 testified that he is not absolutely certain that FANCC genes could not contribute to ovarian cancer, 8 9 and also, coauthored a peer reviewed paper that 10 said that it's plausible that damaging mutations 11 and other genes in that same BRCA family, or same 12 FA family, could confer a risk of ovarian cancer. 13 THE COURT: Do you anticipate he is going to say that on the witness stand? 14 15 MS. SCOTT: Well, it would be nice. 16 The Court, having heard from all THE COURT: 17 parties, fully considered the arguments of all 18 counsel, the motion to limit the testimony of 19 Dr. Jennifer Permuth is granted. The Court is finding that there is insufficient evidence 2.0 presented there is a causal connection between the 21 2.2 mutation and increased likelihood of getting 2.3 cancer. 24 What else? Defense motion next. 25 MS. SCOTT: We'll go with Dr. Freidenfelds.

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Page 31 1 So, Your Honor, the J&J defendants have brought a motion to exclude Dr. Lara Freidenfelds. 3 MR. OLIVER: It's Freidenfelds. MS. SCOTT: Freidenfelds. 4 5 MR. OLIVER: I pronounce everything wrong. MS. SCOTT: Freidenfelds. 6 7 Plaintiff intends Dr. Freidenfelds, who is a historian who has devoted her career to studying 8 9 menstruation and reproduction, including pregnancy, 10 to come in and opine on the J&J defendants' 11 corporate practices and their state of mind. 12 to do this, plaintiffs want to put Dr. Freidenfelds 13 on the stand potentially for days to methodically 14 slog through --15 THE COURT: Potentially for days? 16 I mean, to slog through a bunch of MS. SCOTT: 17 internal documents to add this historical context 18 to reams of documents. But Dr. Freidenfelds is 19 unqualified to do any of this, Your Honor. She is not a mind reader, so she can't tell 2.0 21 the jury what the J&J defendants think or knew or 2.2 understood about anything. She doesn't have any 2.3 expertise in anything related to this case. 24 THE COURT: Give me examples of how she is 25 going to read the minds of J&J.

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MS. SCOTT: She is going to come in, Your Honor, and say that J&J acted -- to read documents and talk about J&J's marketing, and they marketed to women and they marketed saying it was safe and effective. She is going to offer all those sorts of opinions that aim to get in the corporate practices and corporate mind of the J&J defendants, but she doesn't have any expertise in J&J, none in talc, none in cancer, none in any topic that is relevant to this case. Again, she is an expert in menstruation and reproduction.

THE COURT: You list here that she is a historian of health, reproduction, and parenting in America.

MS. SCOTT: That's from her website. That's how she markets herself. Her expertise, she's written books on menstruation and reproduction.

THE COURT: Has she done any work on the history of health and history of reproduction and the history of parenting in America?

MR. OLIVER: Yes.

MS. SCOTT: Broadly, Your Honor, but broadly being a historian does not qualify you to come in here and tell the jury about J&J's corporate mind, their corporate practices, their advertisements,

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how those advertisements might have affected women who may or may not have seen them, especially when she didn't speak to any women who may or may not have seen those ads.

THE COURT: I know, but if I was to grant this, wouldn't this be the same -- I think about the tobacco cases because that's the only thing I have to draw my experience on when I look at this. But in the tobacco cases, you know, they hire these experts that do stay on the witness stand for about two, two and-a-half days, and they go through the history of advertising with cigarettes, you know.

They talk about how they started. They even go as far as to talk about when they started transitioning to this idea of light, when they started advertising to children, where they placed their advertisements.

And the experts normally testify that how that increased the number of individuals who started smoking. And that person is just a historian. That person is not necessarily somebody who is in the mind of R.J. Reynolds, okay?

Now even though in that case, they do have senate testimony and things like that, and they have the words of the executives -- I don't know if

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that's in this case -- but you would basically be saying that somebody who is a historian is not qualified to come in and basically outline how your client advertised and what the effect of that advertisement was on people using your product.

MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, we are not wholesale saying that historians can't testify. As you have observed, there have been historians in tobacco cases, but those historians were actually qualified to talk about that history.

We don't have that here. And don't take my word for I it, take Dr. Freidenfelds' word about it. We asked her about all of this in her deposition. We asked: Do you have expertise in marketing or advertisement, FDA cosmetic regulations, talc or talc mining, Johnson & Johnson, epidemiology, any of these things.

I mean, basically what Dr. Freidenfelds is going to -- she is completely unqualified, and just because she is a historian does not mean that she is an expert in the particular history that is relevant here.

THE COURT: Well, let's make sure we're clear:
Not just a historian, she is a historian of health,
reproduction, and parenting in America. I don't

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know what "parenting in America" means.

MS. SCOTT: But she is not an expert in marketing. She is not an expert in Johnson & Johnson. She is not an expert in ovarian cancer. She knows menstruation and pregnancy and generally health, and that's too broad. That's too general. Just being a historian does not qualify you -- a historian of science -- does not qualify you to come in here and tell the jury everything from astrophysics to zoology no more than us having juris doctorates qualifies us to come and tell a jury everything from antitrust to zoning law.

She is unqualified. And so what she is going to do, as I mentioned -- if you flip the page to slide four -- she is going to come in here and put a historical gloss on unambiguous documents, even though history is irrelevant.

For instance, she wants to tell the jury about how World War I era Johnson & Johnson ads show that J&J persistently marketed their products as pure and safe. She wants to come and talk about Johnson & Johnson's corporate practices and she wants to tell the jury what's in the minds of --

THE COURT: Didn't you just agree that you market the product as pure and safe? Are you going

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to say you didn't market your product as pure and safe?

MS. SCOTT: We marketed our product as pure and safe, Your Honor, but we don't need a historian to come in and say -- to talk about ads that say pure and safe to say that we marketed our ads as pure and safe. It's unnecessary.

THE COURT: Well, what is she saying about your product that you disagree with?

MS. SCOTT: It's not just about our product, Your Honor. She is going to come in here and try to tell the jury -- she is going to read documents and she is going to tell the injury what we thought in the documents.

It's in her deposition transcript, which we put here on slide four. She was asked, "Do you intend to testify about what any Johnson & Johnson person was thinking over the course of the '60s, '70s and '80s beyond about talcum powder use and ovarian cancer risk?" The relevant things in this case.

She said, "I would testify as to what they are thinking if they wrote it in a document."

So by her own words, she is going to come in here, she is going to read documents, and she is

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Page 37 1 going to tell the jury what to think about them, what inferences to draw, and that is impermissible 3 and improper expert testimony. 4 Let me say this: Are you THE COURT: 5 objecting to these documents coming into evidence? Are any documents that they seek to admit through 6 7 this witness in terms of documents of statements by Johnson & Johnson, do you object to them on 8 9 authenticity or any other basis? 10 MS. SCOTT: I'm not sure what documents --11 particularly what documents she is going to speak 12 about until she gets up, if permitted, to get up on 13 the stand. 14 THE COURT: But you have their exhibit list, 15 right? 16 We do have their exhibit list. MS. SCOTT: 17 Let me ask it another way: THE COURT: 18 don't have to limit it to this doctor. Are there 19 any documents that they attribute to Johnson & Johnson that you have objected to coming into 2.0 21 evidence?

> THE COURT: Well, the reason I'm asking you that question is because I intend to -- and I

MS. SCOTT: I'm sure there are. I can't give

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you any specifics at this time.

haven't heard from counsel yet, but I tend to agree with you. I'm trying to understand that if the document comes into evidence and the document says what the document says, I don't understand why any witness should then be able to say, oh, when Johnson & Johnson says this, this is what Johnson & Johnson means. That, to me, is problematic.

However, I don't see a problem with someone saying Johnson & Johnson is advertising this, and then saying based upon that advertisement, that appeals to women who have just given birth, okay? I don't have a problem with that because, again, I think that's a fair correlation.

That's not saying what Johnson & Johnson thinks or thought. It's just simply saying, well, Johnson & Johnson did this advertisement, and women basically started -- more women started using their products or trusted their products. I don't have a problem with that.

But I do have a problem if they are going to come in and start, as you've indicated, basically trying to get into the mind of Johnson & Johnson about what they were thinking and what they were doing.

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor, and to the

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hypothetical that you posed, reproduction is not even an issue here. Dr. Seskin never had children. This case is about talc and primary peritoneal cancer.

And so she is going to go beyond just looking at advertisements. She is also going to say things like Johnson & Johnson was aware of research demonstrating health hazards. She is going to say -- try to tell the jury that J&J suppressed research.

THE COURT: But is that based upon things that are contained -- like is there a basis for her saying that, not her just concluding that, is there something in the record, for example -- and I'm making this up -- is there a memo that you all turned in discovery that says, "We are aware, okay, of the cancer risk of our talc, but we are making lots of money, so let's just keep selling it"?

MS. SCOTT: Absolutely not.

THE COURT: Now, if that was in there, her testifying that Johnson & Johnson was aware of the risk, well, I don't know what the problem is, and evidence that Johnson & Johnson was aware of the risk is because I have this memo, and this is what the memo says. It's not saying what Johnson &

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Johnson thought, it's just basically saying Johnson & Johnson says this.

And that's what experts do. Experts rely upon opinion, they rely upon hearsay, in order to ultimately come to a conclusion.

MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, she is not qualified to do that. It's wrong because that's the invading the jury's function to look at the documents themselves and draw their own inferences and their own conclusions, and to have a purported expert get up on the stand with the imprimatur of an expert, with the imprimatur of a historian come in who is unqualified, give irrelevant opinions that are unhelpful to the trier of fact is improper under the Daubert standard.

And so she did not -- she also didn't have a reliable method. She basically cherry-picked documents, and that's on five where we talk about the poisonous fruit from a poisonous tree. She cherry-picked documents from the plaintiffs, she follows the trail of those documents and only finds documents that confirm her unreliable opinions.

THE COURT: But is she taking the documents out of context?

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: So you mean, like, for example, is she referring to let's say there is a document that has 20 pages and the document speaks to an issue, she is only taking the bad things out of the document and not making any reference to anything within that same document that contextually basically explains why that, quote, unquote, bad thing was said or done?

MS. SCOTT: That's what we anticipate, Your Honor, and we anticipate they are going to get out -- the plaintiffs are going to dump Johnson & Johnson documents in through an expert, she is going to give an expert spin with, again, the imprimatur or the endorsement of being an expert, and that's highly prejudicial and it's improper under Daubert.

If she is allowed to testify, which we don't think that she should be because she's unqualified, unreliable, it's unhelpful, then we are going to have to spend days going back and putting those same documents in context or showing her other documents that do put those in context. And while we haven't seen that with Dr. Freidenfelds because to my understanding and knowledge, there has never been a historian in any of these talc cases.

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We have seen that with other experts, like

Dr. Plunkett, who we'll talk about later today, who

get up on the stand for days, plaintiffs' attorneys

use her to dump those documents in, she provides

her expert gloss, and then we have to spend days

afterwards putting everything into context. All of

this can be avoided and it should be avoided

because she's unqualified, doesn't have a reliable

method, and it's unhelpful to the trier of fact.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear, what do you want to do?

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, let me tell you, it sounds to me like what the defendants want to do is avoid having to cross-examine the witness, which I understand the trial would be quicker if they didn't have to cross-examine Dr. Freidenfelds.

First of all, let me be clear, I don't plan on putting her up for days. She actually has multiple sclerosis. It puts her stamina down a little bit, so I'm cognizant of that, and we are not going to have her up for days.

Let me just go back to the beginning. We started with Ms. Scott talking about marketing, all right? And what she didn't tell you is that this book, The Modern Period, had a significant portion

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of it that related to the marketing and use of tampons by women, and what women and consumers of tampons expected out of that product.

She teaches marketing courses at Marymount University. She lectures on -- and I had written this down. She lectures on how advertising relates to the ways that people seek health care -- in particular women -- to how they think about their bodies and how they care for their bodies. She looks critically at how businesses work.

That's what she's done in her books, that's what she's done in her research. When she was a graduate student, she worked on the research for The Cigarette Century, the guy who wrote that book. She was his understudy for that book.

So when defendants say she doesn't have expertise, the first point is you have to take that with a grain of salt because they are just ignoring it and acting like it doesn't happen. She has it, we've put it in, they are not talking about it. That's really point one.

Point two is: What is Dr. Freidenfelds going to do? When she said I'm only -- in terms of reading minds or intent, I'm only going to say what the defendants' document says, if you read all the

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testimony, what she says is, look, I'm not going to stand up and say that Dr. Gavin Hildick-Smith, who wrote a memo that said our minds have asbestos in them, and you know what, if you look hard enough, you can find it in our baby powder too. That's in a memo -- roughly, I'm paraphrasing -- from 1971 or 1972.

She is not going to say to the jury, and I'm not going to ask her to say: Did Dr. Hildick-Smith and Mr. Lead, did they intend to defraud people?

She is not going to answer that question. She is going to say: I can't get into their minds. What I can tell you is I reviewed a historical record of documents and it was sufficient for me to reach opinions about what knowledge the company had, what statements they made consistently throughout a certain period of time, and whether those statements were contradicted by internal knowledge they had, right?

She is not going to say what they intended to do; she is going to talk about what they did and put that in historical context. So, for example, how is she going to put it in historical context? One question we would ask is: Well, what was happening in 1971? I just showed you a memo,

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Dr. Freidenfelds. Can you tell the jury what is happening in 1971?

And she is going to say: Well, in 1971, asbestos had become a big subject, right? Only in the last ten years had people began to understand that asbestos might cause cancer. So there are these scientists out there -- they didn't necessarily work for J&J, they were all over the place -- who were looking for asbestos.

So why is that important about this memo?
Well, J&J was following this science, right? Their
memos showed that they knew this -- and some of the
memos say this is a cancer, you know, this is a
carcinogen, we know it causes cancer, it might
cause cancer, it's needlelike particles.

That's the kind of context she is going to offer. She is not going to just repeat what documents say. She is not going to say that any particular person acted with fraudulent intent. She is going to say that the defendants' statements, based on her review of the historical record, were false, right, and they were misleading because they had knowledge that said that wasn't true.

She is going to talk about actions they took

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based on the documents she reviewed. So, for example, to suppress the science and those kinds of things. There are a lot of memos that talk about that too. We are going to get together with our buddies in trade associations and tamp down this tamp down that, and yadda, yadda, yadda.

So that's what she is generally going to do.

It is not going to take multiple days for our direct. And the basis of everything she is doing, when you set aside her expertise and study that she's done, it's their documents.

And they ask her these silly questions at the deposition. Did you review all the documents? And she said, you know what, I have a set of documents, some of those were gathered by the lawyers. When they retained me, they had to give me something to see if I could do this. I looked at that.

And we gave her access to Johnson & Johnson's production database in a multi-district litigation for these cases that has millions and millions of documents. And we didn't limit her. We didn't talk to her.

They asked her about her search terms that she used to look at that record. And I didn't know what they were, right, and she said I went through

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all these documents, I reviewed thousands of documents. I would follow the trails. I started here and I did research.

I looked at primary sources, secondary sources. This is just the kind of research I would do to write a book or an article.

So the last thing -- and I think Your Honor has seen these types of witnesses in tobacco cases, but a Ph.D. in the history of science, I cited a motion because I thought it was important. Ten years ago, I had never heard of that, so I started looking up -- I was like, well, where is a good explanation of what these degrees are?

So you go to Harvard's website, where she went. You go to Princeton's website, she didn't go there, but obviously, similar school. History of science is a multidisciplinary approach, and the courses actually say you are going to study geology, biology, chemistry, anthropology, which is what her undergraduate was in, right?

You are going to study all of these and you are going to learn to read, synthesize, deal with epidemiology and talk about scientific subjects from a historical perspective, which is exactly what she's doing here. And interestingly, she may

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be the most qualified witness to talk about this because she personally has focused on women's health issues, and this is a women's health issue. She was aware that women used talcum powder --

THE COURT: But what about the question that counsel said, that her testimony is invading the province of the jury? That it's ultimately the jury's decision to conclude -- it's one thing to just put in facts, it's another thing to then tell the jurors what you gleaned from those facts, and I think that's part of what counsel is objecting to.

They are saying, well, isn't is that the jury's conclusion? You are using your marker or designation as an expert to tell the jurors this is what you need to think about this statement that they made, as compared to allowing the jurors to come to that conclusion on their own.

MR. OLIVER: I mean, there are really two answers to that. First of all, as a legal matter, I think it's 90.703, but it might be 90.702, the Florida case law has been clear for years that testimony should not be excluded because it goes to the ultimate issue, so long as the expert is qualified they can do that.

THE COURT: But why is it helpful? In other

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words, the testimony has to be helpful, and just basically spoonfeeding the jurors -- meaning that the jurors won't be able to synthesize it, the jurors won't be able to understand it, and an expert has to come in and basically synthesize it in such a way that the jurors can basically go back into that jury room and make practical use of the information that came in.

MR. OLIVER: And that's exactly what she's doing. In order to understand these documents, in order to understand the context of these documents -- I could go get 20,000 advertisements from Johnson & Johnson and walk through them over a three-week period with the jury and go through them one by one, and they would get the idea, but we would be here for three weeks for just the advertising part.

Somebody like Dr. Freidenfelds, with the advertising documents, with the scientific documents can take examples, synthesize that information for the jury, and give them the ability that they need to understand sort of the whole pastiche of what was going on without us simply reading documents to them. And, quite frankly, even if we read documents to them, they

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don't have the understanding of scientific terms that she has.

A great example of one of the things she'll comment on -- we questioned her about this at her deposition -- is disclosures on medical articles.

Johnson & Johnson would get people behind the scenes, go write this article, and they would fund the article. And then when the article would come out in a peer reviewed article, it didn't say anything about Johnson & Johnson, it said Dr. Joe Smith, no conflicts.

And Dr. Freidenfelds is going to testify I do peer reviewed articles. I understand ethical conflicts. It's one of the things I've done as a historian all the time.

Should you be making disclosures if you're getting \$20,000? Absolutely. Why? Well, it shows bias in your study, and that has to be part of the situation.

So that's the kind of thing I could show the jurors the document, and without a witness to explain why that matters, they are going to be like -- you know, somebody who doesn't do peer reviewed literature would say, well, what is the big deal? Dr. Freidenfelds is going to explain

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what the big deal is, right? She is going to explain what the big deal is with regard to these memos that have all this information in it.

Like why is that a big deal? Well, it's a big deal because there was this research going on, it was well known at this point that cancer was being caused by this, and you know, average everyday citizens, this wasn't something they were on to, right? And all these ads that we've looked at that continued for 40 years, they all said it was pure and safe, right? And then she applies her marketing expertise --

THE COURT: Counsel said something I thought was interesting. Counsel said that there have never been -- I don't know how many of these cases have been tried, but previously, there had never been a historical expert presented in any of those cases, so why do we need a historical expert in this case?

And by the way, that includes the case where there was a \$1.6 billion verdict against Johnson & Johnson.

MR. OLIVER: I don't think that's accurate.

There has been similar testimony to what

Dr. Freidenfelds has said, and Ms. Scott actually

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alluded to it. Dr. Plunkett, who is going to be here, is a toxicologist and she has offered similar testimony to this.

There is a Dr. Steinberg -- he is not a doctor. I always want to call him a doctor.

Mr. Steinberg, who used to be in this case, but he's gotten elderly and I don't think he does this anymore. But he was in the big verdict, and he had some regulatory background and expertise and he went through some of these documents and explained what they meant and how they were in context.

So a lot of different witnesses have done exactly this. When they say there's never been a historian, they just mean that a person with this degree hasn't done it, and what we know from, I think, Kumho Tire from the supreme court, and every court that's followed it because they have to, is that Daubert doesn't rely on that type of schematism, right?

We don't require -- tobacco doesn't even make the same argument. We don't require somebody to work for the cigarette company to talk about cigarette design.

THE COURT: I want to tell you, the first tobacco case I tried, I had such a problem with the

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Page 53 1 historical expert. I remember -- and the plaintiffs were freaking out because I said --3 MR. OLIVER: Do you remember who it was? THE COURT: I don't. 4 5 MR. OLIVER: Was it Dr. Proctor? THE COURT: It's Proctor. 6 7 MR. OLIVER: Okay. THE COURT: He was on the stand for two 8 9 and-a-half days, direct and cross-examination, but 10 before he even got up there, I remember saying to 11 the plaintiff, I'm not sitting here listening to 12 somebody tell me what a document says. And I asked 13 them, and I said -- because obviously I did not try 14 the first tobacco case, many tobacco cases have 15 been tried. And so I asked: Appellate courts let him do 16 17 And the reason why I asked that is because 18 it didn't make sense to me that you can just put 19 somebody up there under the auspices of being a historian and we have to sit here and listen to 2.0 21 them tell us the history of advertising in tobacco 2.2 cases and then show documents about, okay, you 23 know, this advertisement, that advertisement. And I just I had such a problem with it. 24 25 I acquiesced because the appellate courts of all

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the tobacco cases that have gone up, they have never stricken the expert. They have never said that that is improper testimony. And I'm inclined to do the same thing in this case.

Ma'am?

MS. SCOTT: I think, Your Honor, the salient difference between the tobacco cases and the case that we have here is that Ms. Freidenfelds is fundamentally unqualified to offer any of the opinions on any topic in this case. She did not teach a marketing class. She teaches an abortion class where I think she testified that they looked at a marketing website.

THE COURT: Counsel said that she actually did marketing and she did research, so are you saying that that representation is not accurate?

MS. SCOTT: I'm saying that in her deposition, she said that she was not an expert in marketing or advertisement. She has very little experience in that. She has no experience in talc or primary peritoneal cancer or ovarian cancer or any of the issues --

THE COURT: Well, let's just be clear. In the tobacco context, what I remember of Dr. Proctor, he just got turned onto this, and all of a sudden,

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started researching and collecting all these documents. Somebody delivered all of these documents to him, and he just started going through the documents and then he started putting it all together and then he became the conduit to a lot of these plaintiff cases.

But I remember his testimony, how it started was there were all these documents, they were actually going to get rid of them, okay? They were held for a period of time, and he says, I'll take them. And he just started going through all the documents with his research people. That's how he got to the point where he was in his ability to come and present.

It wasn't that he had -- he was an executive for the tobacco companies. It wasn't that he had done marketing research on cigarette smoking or he had worked in marketing. It was -- I think -- he's a doctor. I don't know what he is a doctor of.

MR. OLIVER: He is a doctor of Ph.D., history of science.

THE COURT: And that is what allowed him to come in and do what he did. I'm not sure that this is any different.

MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, if I may, I mean,

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that's not what Dr. Freidenfelds has done. She has not gone and exhausted all the documents and come to any opinions. She has gotten a stack of documents from the plaintiffs' lawyer, she used search terms based on that limited stack, and then she went and confirmed whatever opinions that she had --

THE COURT: Ma'am, here is the problem with that argument: One is if she's foolish enough to get on the witness stand and not consider a document that is totally contrary to a position that she's taken, and you then get up there and you say, okay, you read this document? I did. Okay, and you brought out this statement? I did. Go to page 3. Okay.

And on page 3, it says, "Although we make that statement, we wholly disavow it because we believe that the safety of our customers are the main focus, and profit over someone's health will never be the benchmark of our success," and you bring that to her attention. The jury gets to weigh that. And they get to weigh whether or not that shows that you were aware of the harmful effects of your product, or whether or not you even, being aware, you decided to do what you do.

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I really do think this is one of those cases where it has to go to weight rather than admissibility. Your motion to exclude is denied.

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Plaintiff, what would you like to discuss?

MR. PENDELL: Your Honor, I think we are going to discuss Juan Felix.

All right. Good morning, Your Honor. Thank you for letting me be here. I'm excited.

I want to talk about defense's pathologist, his name is Dr. Felix. Again, this is a pretty narrow motion.

A couple things. First opinion, Dr. Felix cannot testify there is a safe level of asbestos exposure. He is not an expert in asbestos exposure. He admits that, he's not qualified to do that.

Second, Dr. Felix, in order to bolster his opinion, he says unknown, unnamed thought leaders, so folks he was unable to name, that agree with him that there was no association between talc and ovarian cancer, and also, that asbestos does not cause ovarian cancer. So obviously, Your Honor, it's Hornbook law in Florida that an expert witness cannot take the stand and act as a mouthpiece for other unknown people that he says the experts agree

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with me without citing the literature, peer reviewed, disclosing the names of these people who supposedly --

THE COURT: So he is just going to say there are other people out there that agree with me without identifying who they are?

MR. PENDELL: That's correct. And he is going to call them thought leaders. The biggest piece of our motion is his testimony that talc does not migrate from the perineum to the ovaries, and that in-plane particles are contaminants.

First, I want to premise this, Your Honor, by saying I absolutely agree that an expert witness can be qualified through experience alone.

100 percent true. The problem here is when you delve into Dr. Felix's experience, he does not have the experience to back up that opinion, and here is the reason why.

Dr. Felix admitted that in 99 percent of his patients' cases, he never uses this PLM process that he was talking about to look for talc particles. So if he sees 100 patients in a year, 99 of them, he does not use this technique to look for talc particles. He does not do it. And this is how you would be able to make a determination

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about migration and whether it's in-plane contamination.

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He also admits that with regards to the 1 percent of the cases -- so if we went back to my hypothetical, the one out of the 100 times he does look at it using PLM, he acknowledges at the time, before he even goes to look in there, that there is not going to be any talc. That's not what he's looking for and he already knows it's not going to be there. He is looking for something else.

He uses this as his entire opinion to say, well, I've never seen it, so therefore, it can't possibly happen.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, he is familiar with the test?

MR. PENDELL: Correct.

THE COURT: And he's testified that he's utilized the test?

MR. PENDELL: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. And you are saying that but because when he utilized the test, he wasn't specifically looking for the talc that we are talking about, that somehow disqualifies him from being able to give the opinion about the issue on the issue of migration?

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MR. PENDELL: Almost. There is one more step in that process. Not only that he wasn't looking for talc, but in the 1 percent of cases where he actually went through this process to look for anything, he knew before he did that process that talc wasn't going to be there.

So his opinion is the equivalent of saying gravity doesn't exist because I've never fallen out of a tree. That is what he is saying here; this can't be possible because I've never seen it. I've never looked for it, and I knew when I used this device to look at pathology slides, I knew it wasn't going to be there even before I looked, and based on that, this medical concept is not possible.

That is the entire basis of his opinion. It cannot be that he's never tried to look for it. He knew ahead of time when he was looking at these types of slides that it wasn't going to be there and that's not why he was looking for it, he was looking at something else that he knew was going to be there, and he was confirming it through this process.

THE COURT: What if he was looking at it and you're right, he excluded it, then he was using

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this test and he looked at it and he was wrong?
You're suggesting that because he's already
excluded it, he used the test, but you're saying
that if he had seen the talc or he had seen it, he
would, what? I mean, what if it was there? And he
said he had excluded it, but what if he looked at
it in performing a test and it was there?

MR. PENDELL: I understand where you're going with that point, Your Honor, but here is the problem with that: 99 out of 100 times, he didn't look at all. So the basis of his opinion is out of 100 patients, he looked at one slide and he didn't see it, therefore, it's not possible.

He would never be able to -- that would never pass muster if he wrote an article that he tried to submit to a peer reviewed publication for an opinion. That would never pass muster there.

THE COURT: But my question though is: You're not saying he wasn't qualified to do the test in the 1 percent that he did, are you?

MR. PENDELL: He is a pathologist and he is qualified to use the PLM machine to look for stuff.

THE COURT: Then it sounds like fun cross-examination. Get up there and cross-examine on that. That's not me excluding him.

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Page 62 1 Motion is denied. Good argument. MR. BALZANO: I was going to have fun saying 3 some things. Thank you, Your Honor. MR. PENDELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Defense, next motion? I quess we'll do Dr. Sitelman 6 MR. BALZANO: 7 too because Sitelman is our motion on their pathologist. 8 9 THE COURT: Okav. 10 MR. PENDELL: You might as well just deny this 11 motion too. 12 There is a little bit of a MR. BALZANO: 13 speculation piece. So J&J is moving to exclude 14 Dr. Sitelman, which is plaintiff's pathologist in 15 this case. And so Dr. Sitelman did use the same PLM, 16 17 which stands for polarized light microscope, and my 18 understanding is it just shoots a light, and if 19 there are certain particles -- like talc, starch, aluminum, silicon, there's a bunch of particles --2.0 21 that when you shoot this light at it, it lights up 2.2 and they call it a birefringent particle. 2.3 So fundamentally, we are moving to exclude two 24 opinions that Dr. Sitelman had. Dr. Sitelman 25 looked at a series of -- I think with PLM, he

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Page 63 1 reviewed about 40 pathology slides of Dr. Seskin's tissue and he found a number of birefringent 3 particles. 4 THE COURT: Can I just pause you? You all 5 keep saying something. Are we going to continue to refer to the plaintiff as doctor? 6 7 MS. STEMKOWSKI: She was a doctor. THE COURT: I know, but she is not a doctor 8 9 here. She is a plaintiff. So why are we calling 10 her doctor? 11 MR. BALZANO: I'm happy to call her 12 Ms. Seskin. 13 THE COURT: You all keep doing it -- and by 14 the way, both sides are doing it. Just a thought 15 go ahead. I'm so sorry. 16 MR. BALZANO: So Dr. Sitelman, the issue with 17 this is a birefringent particle is not necessarily 18 talc. So he used PLM, he saw birefringent 19 particles, and he is going to now get up here and say that is likely talc. And the kicker here is 2.0 21 that you can use --2.2 THE COURT: I'm sorry, go back. I'm so sorry 23 because I interrupted you and kind of lost my train 24 of thought. You told me about the light. 25 sorry.

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MR. BALZANO: No worries.

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So Dr. Sitelman used the polarized light microscope to look at 40 pathology slides and he saw birefringent particles, and based on that, he is going to say that those particles are likely talc. But the problem here is that is complete speculation there is further tests that you can do with different microscopes, something called the TEM.

THE COURT: But does he say why it's likely talc?

MR. BALZANO: So he relies on the fact he assumes that it's because of her exposure, and that's about it.

THE COURT: He's saying it's likely talc because of the case?

MR. BALZANO: Because Mr. Sugarman testified that she used talc. So the kicker is that you can definitively say if it's talc or not. You can use something called TEM, which stands for transmission electron microscopy, and that actually shoots electrons at the particle and tells you the composition.

I'm a little rusty, but I believe talc is magnesium. It will literally give you a reading

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telling you the chemical composition and you can definitively say if it was talc.

In this case, plaintiffs could have taken the pathology and given it to another expert,

Dr. Rigler, who has done this before. It's called a tissue digestion where you put it in some type of solvent and it destroys all the organic material, and then you take the TEM machine and you look at the particles and you can see if it is actually talc.

He didn't do that here, so it is complete speculation to say these birefringent particles, which could be a lot of different things, are talc.

And --

THE COURT: Are you saying that that's the only way to identify that it's talc, is by performing that confirmatory test?

MR. BALZANO: I believe the only way to definitively determine if birefringent particle is talc, or asbestos, any -- to identify what the chemical composition of that particle is, you need to do TEM, or you can use SEM, but it's both based on they shoot an electron and then it gives you a chemical composition of what the particle is. So it's complete speculation for him to --

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THE COURT: Why wouldn't you just do that? I don't understand.

MR. BALZANO: It's a good question for plaintiffs. I'm not sure why they didn't do a tissue digestion or why they didn't use TEM or SEM to say whether or not definitively Marilyn Seskin had talc in her pathology.

That leads me to my second point. My second point is not only is Dr. Sitelman going to say that the birefringent particles he saw were likely talc, he is going to say that the talc was from her use of Johnson's baby powder, but there is a much more likely explanation, which it could just be contamination from when they put the slides together at the hospital in Cleveland Clinic. When you take the pathology slides, you need to stain them and put extra cover sheets on it. I'm not really -- I don't really understand the complete process --

THE COURT: Why does he conclude that it was from a Johnson & Johnson product?

MR. BALZANO: So he basically just rules out contamination because he says that the particles within the same plane as the tissue, but what's funny is -- and Dr. Sitelman agrees to this at his

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deposition -- there were particles that he found outside the plane of the tissue, and that means that it was from some type of contaminant from the laboratory because as they were putting the slides together, if it's outside the plane of the tissue, obviously it wasn't in the tissue.

THE COURT: We don't exclude witnesses because you believe that there may be aspects of their testimony that they didn't properly take into account or properly exclude. That's called cross-examination.

I'm going to ask counsel to refer to your first argument. The second one, I will deny that, but as to the first one, I need to hear from the plaintiff.

MS. STEMKOWSKI: On why we didn't use TEM or SEM?

THE COURT: No, I don't really care why you didn't do it, but counsel's argument is it's basically you're speculating, you don't know what the composition of the product is --

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Sure.

THE COURT: -- and you didn't do anything to basically discern what is the composition of the product, and you are concluding it's talc, and they

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are arguing you're concluding that it's talc because you have a case that is based upon talc.

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Sure, so I can answer that for you.

So basically, Dr. Sitelman did a rule in/rule out diagnosis, like most doctors do. So he said, all right, so there are things that can be birefringent, right? We know it's a pretty small universe, talc is one of them. Starch, sand, calcifications, those types of things.

So he looks at her medical records, he looks at the testimony, and he looks at her exposure history, which is something that he can consider as an expert. And so for her entire life, she only used Johnson's baby powder talc.

And so he's looking at these slides and he says I identify birefringent particles, so let me see what she could have been exposed to. Okay, so she has a huge exposure to talc, but there's no evidence in the record that she was exposed to other likely birefringent particles. So we have that there.

The next thing he has to say is well, it could be contamination, so I need too look at that. And so he did, as Mr. Balzano said, in the plaintiff

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tissue, right? So with this microscope, super technical, you can basically toggle between magnifications, and he can say based off of his experience -- he's done this thousand of times over 40 years.

He can say that this particle is appearing in the plaintiff tissue, meaning that it was in her body when it was removed versus out of plane, which he did acknowledge that some of the particles he saw were out of plane. In fact, we are going to show examples of that to the jury so they can clearly see in plane, out of plane. Those things are both true.

So he has that. So he says, okay, some of these particles cannot be contamination because I have experience as a pathologist saying this is --

THE COURT: I don't want to go into the contamination, I want to stick with the -- so your answer to the question appears to be that he ruled it out by simply looking at what her exposure was, he looked at her medical records, he looked at her history, and he says that, well, this is the only thing that it could be based upon a review of what I know about her?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Well, there is more to this,

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Your Honor. There is also literature that supports his argument. We cite articles in our motions, one of them is the Johnson article from 2020, which I have here, in which they do a test -- and PLM is one of them -- and the scientists are looking for talc in women's genital tissue. So they are able to characterize how talc looks under PLM microscopes.

THE COURT: Did he testify that he looked?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Yes, so he did that. So he says that these particles are consistent with what the literature has found talc looks like in her tissue. So the literature supports him, he ruled in, ruled out --

THE COURT: Why didn't he just do --

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Well, let me tell you, Your Honor, it is incredibly expensive. Very expensive. Actually, in our other case we have in Sarasota County, we did that testing and they still say it's contamination.

So we would have spent all this money to have an expert conclude, in fact, the other case found talc, and they still say it's a contaminant. So it would not move the ball forward one way or the other for our case in our opinion.

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But here, we have an expert who is qualified to say more likely than not, I believe this is talc.

THE COURT: Anything else?

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MR. BALZANO: For just the point on the differential diagnosis, the point I think Your Honor gets it differential diagnosis, you don't have some type of machine that you can go that can spit out the exact diagnosis. Dr. Sitelman had that here, or Dr. Rigler could have done that for him. He says he's an expert, that's another point.

And then also, for the cited article, Johnson 2020, Dr. Sitelman is not qualified. He doesn't have experience. He hasn't made a career of identifying talc. He's a pathologist. He hasn't made a year of identifying talc using PLM.

And also --

THE COURT: All he's saying is it's consistent -- meaning that if there's medical literature out there and you go to a doctor and the doctor refers to the medical literature and then the doctor looks at the slides and he says, well, this is consistent with what the medical literature says, why is that not a fair reason for concluding that it was talc?

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MR. BALZANO: I think I'll just go back to the TEM. He had -- again, it's not like it's a differential diagnosis.

THE COURT: No, I agree. First of all, I agree with. I think that they may say it was expensive, they may say I don't know what he's going to say when asked about that, but again, I don't think based upon what you all have presented that this is a basis for me to exclude the opinion testimony.

MR. BALZANO: And I'll say one more thing about contamination. I know you don't want to hear about contamination, but I think there is an important point that I really want to talk about with Dr. Felix. I think we should talk quickly about it.

When talc or any particle, when any foreign particle is lodged in a live person's tissue, there is a foreign body response that triggers inflammation. And the point here is although Dr. Sitelman says, well, it's not contamination because it's in the same field, it's in the same surface as the pathology, as the tissue, there was no foreign body response. And that's why there was no inflammation encasing the particle. And that's

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why it was most likely contamination, because if you look at the particles and the contaminants on the ones that clearly no one disputes --

Dr. Sitelman does not dispute --

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THE COURT: Who says that?

MR. BALZANO: That there's foreign body --

THE COURT: No, that it's most likely contamination? Because you said there was no inflammation, okay, so you're saying the conclusion is that it's most likely contamination. Says who?

MR. BALZANO: Dr. Felix, and there's a couple of studies. There's at least one textbook -- well, it's basis of pathology that -- I don't want to get too much into Dr. Felix's opinion, but it's the basis of pathology that when there is a foreign particle, your body does everything it can to get that particle out. It has a response.

That's why the FDA, in 2016, there's no more powders. It's not just talc, it's corn starch, it's all types of powders that's not supposed to be in your body. The FDA, in 2016, said that there shouldn't be powder on surgical gloves anymore because it causes — when a surgeon is operating in live tissue, it causes inflammation. It causes a foreign body response.

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And here, when you look at the pathology slides, there was no foreign body response. When you pair that with the fact that when you look at the slides, the particles outside the plane, so it looks like there was some type of contamination at least on the slides that are not on the plaintiff tissue --

THE COURT: But the point that I want to add is that -- and I'm not suggesting that you're wrong. You may be absolutely correct.

The question though is that you're asking me not to allow him to present his conclusion because you have evidence that suggests that his conclusion is wrong.

MR. BALZANO: Right. Well, because it goes to the fact that it's an unreliable methodology. It is unreliable to look at a pathology slide when all of the physical evidence you see shows you that it is contamination. There is no foreign body response, you see contaminants on different, you know, parts of the slide not in the plaintiff tissue. The fact that he could have --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I don't know anything about this, so how do I exclude it by saying that it was obvious, this doesn't support it. I just

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Page 75 1 think it has to go to the jury and you do your best at your cross-examination and hope you land some 3 punches. 4 It's denied. What else from the plaintiff? 5 I'm still trying to get my computer logged on. MR. OLIVER: We'll do Boyd. 6 7 MS. STEMKOWSKI: Your Honor, we have plaintiff's motion to exclude Dr. Boyd. Do you 8 9 want to take a minute? 10 THE COURT: No, go ahead. I can listen. 11 MS. STEMKOWSKI: This is actually going to be 12 very straightforward for you, Your Honor. 13 Dr. Jeffrey Boyd we are seeking to exclude only a 14 specific cause opinion, and this is in the same 15 vein as Dr. Permuth. You've already excluded 16 Dr. Permuth's opinion --17 THE COURT: Who is arguing this for the 18 defense? 19 I am, Your Honor. MS. SCOTT: 2.0 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, ma'am. MS. STEMKOWSKI: So Dr. Permuth has been 21 2.2 excluded correctly in a CC opinion. Dr. Boyd 2.3 intends to offer the same opinion, but with less. 24 So during his deposition, he said that --25 THE COURT: I'm sorry, he is going to offer

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the same opinion with less, is that what you said?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: That's what I said.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MS. STEMKOWSKI: So during his deposition, he said that the FANCC gene could be considered suggestive of the cause of primary peritoneal carcinoma, but then he went on to say that he would not be comfortable saying it is more likely than not that this particular mutation was the cause of Dr. Seskin's primary peritoneal cancer.

So he has said I can't said more likely than not, I can said it's suggestive. And I would say, Your Honor, that if Dr. Permuth can't come in here and said that it's suggestive, neither can Dr. Boyd.

So -- but I want to go a little bit further with him because I think that defendants are going to say, well, Dr. Boyd is also a molecular epidemiologist and he can talk about FANCC and the Ashkenazi heritage and he provides more context. But if you again look at the literature that he is citing to support his opinion, it does not support his opinion.

And, in fact, he says, "I would say that there is insufficient literature at this point to put

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FANCC gene in the same category as, for example, the BRCA 1 and 2 genes in terms of a very high degree of certainty in terms of the causal relationship."

THE COURT: So what literature is he relying upon to support his opinion if it's insufficient literature?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Right, so he cites five. So he has five articles he identifies during his deposition, and I want to read to you from those articles so there is no confusion what they say.

One of them is the Frey article, and that says, "Although some studies have demonstrated FANCC heterozygous mutations to marginally increase the risk of breast cancer and early pancreatic cancer, other studies have failed to demonstrate an increased cancer risk, and to our knowledge, there are currently no risk reduction guidelines associated with that finding." That's one.

The second is the Pan article, and that's actually aimed at identifying the germ line mutations at FANCC and high-risk breast cancer patients in China. It is not about ovarian cancer, it is about breast cancer. It is not studying ovarian cancer in the slightest.

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The third is the Westphalen case, and that is looking at potential therapeutic responses to cancer based on genetic defects. Nowhere in any of these studies is there a sentence that says FANCC causes ovarian cancer or has been suggested as an increased risk. It does not exist in those five articles and, Your Honor, for that reason, his opinion has to be excluded.

THE COURT: You did the deposition?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Yes.

THE COURT: How does he come to the conclusion that at least it's suggestive?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Sure. So I have no scientific background, so it's in the family, as Mr. Oliver was saying. FANCC is in the same family as BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 and the Fanconi anemia family, and he says that it is a deleterious pathogenic mutation that affects how someone's genes can replicate if damaged.

So he says that, okay, if she is -- this gene is in the same ovarian cancer susceptibility family, although it is not one of them, and it has a similar background in what it does, right? So it affects how genes replicate.

And so the theory being, I think, is that if

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there is injury to a gene, it cannot fix itself. I think. And so he takes that and he says FANCC is suggestive of ovarian cancer.

And again, he is attempting to offer medical causation opinion and he cannot say more likely than not that it can do so.

THE COURT: Response?

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MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor.

So Dr. Boyd has been studying the BRCA 1, BRCA 2, FANCC family of genes for 30 years. He's been setting up laboratories. He's really a pioneer. He's been on the forefront of this.

And what Dr. Boyd did was he, using that extensive experience studying these genes, he looked at the 22 Fanconi anemia genes, saw that five of those genes -- as we talked about earlier, BRCA 1, BRCA 2, three others -- breast cancer and ovarian cancer susceptibility genes, increased risk. Again, FANCC, they are parallel. Same family, same function. FANCC causes other sorts of cancers, and now, peer reviewed studies are starting to establish that FANCC also causes ovarian cancer.

And I just want to correct my friend on the other sides here, that Westphalen case that

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Dr. Boyd relied on actually says, under results,

"We identified a strong correlation between

elevated alterations in a core set of

HRR-associated genes beyond BRCA 1, BRCA 2, such

as," and then references FANCC, "particularly in

breast, ovarian, pancreatic, and prostate cancer."

So this article is one that Dr. Boyd explicitly relies on strong correlation. He also uses his over 30 years of experience researching these specific genes to come to his opinion that the FANCC mutation that Dr. Seskin indisputably had was a suggestive cause of her cancer.

Now, he doesn't have to come in here and say it's more likely than not. I mean, we looked at the case law, Your Honor, and we looked at Mack, and it said that excluding alternative causation evidence on the basis that the expert could not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability improperly shifted the burden to the defendants -- it's not our burden -- and that's reversible error. And the Third DCA agreed with that.

And so we don't have to prove more likely than not, we just have to prove a reliable method. And he employed a reliable method. And a reliable

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method means it's more than speculative, it's more than conjecture, and that is what we have here.

And plenty of cases that we've cited in our papers say experience, just experience and reviewing medical records is enough. Here, we have even more than that. We have these peer reviewed articles, one of which establishes a strong correlation.

So even though the science, as we talked about earlier, is evolving, there is a sufficient basis --

THE COURT: But what did he do -- other than the peer reviewed article, what did he do to come to that conclusion separate and apart from the peer reviewed article?

MS. SCOTT: He has studied this family of genes, so he has his background knowledge.

THE COURT: I guess tell me, when he's asked the question and he's going to opine that there is a suggestive correlation, without looking at the peer reviewed article, how does he come to that conclusion?

MS. SCOTT: He comes to the conclusion based on the science, Your Honor. Based on the fact that BRCA 1 and BRCA 2, which are, again, known -- they

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cause ovarian cancer, okay? He is going to look and see that FANCC, which functions the same way, does the same thing, repairs those double breaks in the DNA, and if they're not repaired, they cause cancer, FANCC does cause cancers, and the strong correlation is now emerging that it's also connected to ovarian cancer. By looking at those parallels, those two genes that function the exact same way, he expects it is a -- he expects, as the literature is confirming, that FANCC --

THE COURT: But I don't understand.

MS. SCOTT: -- is a suggestive cause.

THE COURT: See, that's my point though.

Where is it at in terms of the research? Meaning,
has somebody -- has anybody ever done anything to
basically be able to come in and say that this is a
cause?

Because -- the only reason I'm saying that is because you can get an expert -- and I'm not saying this is your expert -- but you can get an expert to say anything you want them to say and then you can go out there and find somebody that wrote an article. So the question is that -- and I love the language that you all are using, suggestive. I don't even know what that means. What does that

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Page 83 1 mean, it's suggestive? MS. SCOTT: Likely. He says what it means in his deposition, possible, likely, suggestive. 3 suggests a cause. It suggests that it is a cause 4 5 of her ovarian cancer. And the article that I have read to you, Your 6 7 Honor, establishes that strong correlation. And so there is a basis, and that's all that we need. We 8 9 do not need to prove the science. No science is 10 provable, right? Like, I mean, it's tested, but I 11 mean, science is evolving art. 12 THE COURT: You are absolutely right, but when 13 was the first Johnson & Johnson case? 14 MS. SCOTT: I believe in 2017. 15 THE COURT: 2017? 16 MS. STEMKOWSKI: 2014. 17 THE COURT: 2014. And in that time -- but 18 people started studying this whole issue of --19 MS. STEMKOWSKI: 1980s. THE COURT: -- of whether or not the powder 2.0 21 basically caused ovarian cancer not in 2014, right? 2.2 And so my question is: Are you really telling 23 me since 1986, and we are now in 2024, that no 24 scientific literature, no scientist has been able 25 to correlate with any reasonable degree of

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certainty that the talc actually causes the ovarian cancer? I'm sorry.

MS. SCOTT: I can answer yes to that question.

THE COURT: To that one, right.

But my point in saying that is it's uncomfortable -- maybe that doesn't matter -- but it's uncomfortable to be here 38 years after the literature began, and the most you can say is that there is an article that is suggestive.

MS. SCOTT: The article is strong correlation.

I can show you the article. I can pull it up and show it to you. It says there is a strong correlation.

But the issue is that because FANCC is not -it's not in a large population of people, it's just
not studied as much, but it's now being studied
because of the parallel between these known ovarian
cancer and breast cancer genes. And let's be real,
Your Honor. People weren't really studying BRCA 1
and BRCA 2 the way they are now because it was a
women's health issue, and now people are focusing
more on women's health, and the natural progression
is now we're looking at these other genes in the
same family.

THE COURT: I know, but the point though is

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that isn't there supposed to be more, when we're talking about Daubert, aren't we supposed to be able to say there is this understanding within the scientific community? It's not a situation where we're saying, well, we have four doctors who say this, and four doctors who say that, and then you say, oh, well, there's an understanding, there is an acceptance within the scientific community.

Well, no, there is no acceptance within the scientific community. It's still being studied. Nobody knows the answer.

And so I don't think in a court of law, if it's still being studied and no one knows the answer, I don't think, under Daubert, you get to come in and say, well, some people say that there is a correlation.

MS. SCOTT: And Your Honor, that's not what we're saying. The community, under Daubert, is not the entire scientific community. It's the scientific community that's dedicated to this particular issue.

And the scientific community that is looking at these issues -- because these are the papers that we've cited. These are the papers that our experts have relied on. This scientific community

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is establishing this link.

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THE COURT: So your doctor, if asked, is it the universal understanding within the scientific community that there is -- is there a universal opinion within the scientific community that what you are opining today is accepted?

MS. SCOTT: I think that his specific -- in his community of people, there would be people in the community that would say yes.

THE COURT: That's not the answer to my question, because you can always find people in your community that --

MS. SCOTT: That's the relevant community, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're right, and I'm not saying that, but are there people in the community that say it's not?

MS. SCOTT: No, Your Honor. They might say that it's inconclusive, but there is no one -- and plaintiffs have cited no studies -- where someone has said absolutely not, can't happen, zilch, no way.

All the articles that we have cited have said it's possible. Everything from it's possible, we're looking more into it, to a strong

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correlation. And Dr. Boyd is part of that community. He is a leader in that community.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're telling me that in the community that we are talking about, if he is asked the question, he would say that there is still more studies that need to be done because it's not conclusive within our community?

Because there are medical professionals that will tell you, okay, you know, what is the standard for when you are replacing a knee, okay? And they would tell you -- and by the way, you ask any of the orthopedist professionals that testify, they will all say this is the standard procedure that you use. It's not experimental, it's not hypothetical, this is what you do.

What I'm hearing from you is that, yeah, there are people that think it's inconclusive. There are people who think it's possible. Some may even think there's a strong likelihood. But within the scientific community, there is no common understanding in terms of the way it occurs.

And so my question is: If there is no understanding within the community -- and I'm accepting it to be the community that your doctor is a part of -- how does that satisfy Daubert?

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MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, I'm not saying that there is no understanding within the community. The community are the people who have researched it, and the people who have researched it have said there is a potential link. From potential link to strong correlation. No one inside this community is saying it's not possible.

THE COURT: No, they're not saying it's not possible, but they're saying it's inconclusive.

MS. SCOTT: When you asked me about the community, I was thinking more -- I'm sorry, that's my fault, I was thinking more generally.

When I'm talking about the community of people who are actually studying these issues, there are -- the community of people studying these issues are observing and starting to establish a link. And yes, there is a gradation from a potential link -- and we've cited the papers -- to strong correlation.

THE COURT: So when do we get to a point where it would be -- so you're saying that as long as someone in the community says it's possible, it satisfies Daubert? Just by saying it's possible, that's enough for an expert to come in and testify that that satisfies Daubert?

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MS. SCOTT: Daubert requires a reliable methodology, and that's what Dr. Boyd said. When I speak about possibility --

THE COURT: Wait a minute, let's do all of

Daubert. Daubert requires a reliable methodology

and it has to be based upon something that is

generally accepted within the scientific community.

That's why I keep asking you: Is it generally accepted in the scientific community or is it just something that maybe the small group of people that you were able to find says it's possible?

Because that's the part that I'm struggling with. Because if we start just basically going on a scientific community -- by the way, if this was Frye, we wouldn't be having this conversation, right? It would be one of those things where almost anyone can come in and say anything, and your doctor would have been able to come in and say that.

But everybody said no, we don't want to use Frye, we want to use Daubert, at least here in Florida, okay? So the court said we are going to use Daubert and they said this is what is required. And one of the things that is required is, yes, reliability of methodology, but also, it has to be

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Page 90 1 something that is based upon -- that is generally accepted within the scientific community to which 3 the expert belongs. 4 I suggest to you that that hasn't been 5 satisfied because it's still being studied. really knows. And what happens if tomorrow there 6 7 is a study, someone writes a paper and says that we researched this, and originally it was 8 9 inconclusive, now we're saying there is a less 10 likelihood that it causes ovarian cancer. Because 11 that's the problem with possible. 12 (Telephone interruption.) 13 THE COURT: This is Judge Simon about your 14 courtroom. I'm going to take it only because it's 15 about your courtroom. 16 (Discussion off the record.) 17 THE COURT: All right. We got 6-1. We don't 18 have a problem. 19 Go ahead, ma'am. MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, I do believe that it's 2.0 21 generally accepted within this community that

THE COURT: Can I ask another question?

studies these issues that FANCC is a suggestive

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor.

cause of ovarian cancer. Now --

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THE COURT: Do you have a case where the trial court either excluded it or allowed it, and then an appellate court opined on the decision of the trial court? Because this is not the first Johnson & Johnson case, right? These cases have been tried all around the country, right?

MS. SCOTT: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And this is not a new issue, right? So has this been -- I always like to get guidance from what other people have done -- not trial judges, they make errors like I do. But appellate courts, we all got to listen to them, right?

And so if appellate courts have spoken to what a trial judge did and said, well, judge, you should have allowed this, or judge, you should not have allowed this, is there any guidance that you have in that regard?

MS. SCOTT: Not from an appellate court, Your Honor, but Dr. Boyd has been able to testify in talc trials on other genetic mutations based on his, you know, unchallenged qualifications and his reliable method.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MS. SCOTT: I mean, I think, Your Honor, just

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thinking about, again, the standard, Dr. Boyd used a reliable method. We don't have to come in here and prove -- excuse me, we don't have to come in here and disprove cause.

We have the right to present evidence of an alternative cause, and that's exactly what Dr. Boyd is going to do, and it's not so out of step with -- it's not out of step with the literature.

THE COURT: I'm going to ask them the same question.

Can I ask the plaintiff: Are you aware of any case law that -- because counsel is arguing -- and I want to be consistent. If you're going to make an error, make the same error consistently through.

But counsel is making the argument that it satisfies Daubert because no one is questioning the qualifications of their expert, and the literature supports the conclusion that this is suggestive, that there is a link towards ovarian cancer. So?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Sure. So I'm not aware of any decision in the United States where Dr. Boyd has been overturned, but he's also never brought this opinion about FANCC in another court.

THE COURT: He's never done that?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Not on FANCC. He has opined

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in other talcum powder cases on genetics, but not on FANCC. Not to my knowledge.

THE COURT: Is there a difference between other genetic testimony that he would provide and FANCC?

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Well, sure. If he came in, Your Honor, and he said that BRCA 1 causes ovarian cancer, that's genetic testimony. He would be absolutely able to say that because that's what the literature says. BRCA 1 is linked to ovarian cancer.

But the difference here is that the literature on FANCC, it's the potential link, it's possible, it's suggestive. And they do have a burden by a preponderance of the evidence to establish the alternative cause. They just can't come in here, like you said earlier, and say, well, I think it might be this.

And we have one article where it's the strong correlation, but what you notice is it's breast cancer, ovarian cancer, pancreatic cancer. There is no -- let me back up.

BRCA 1 and 2 is a 20 to 30 percent increased risk in women. If they have that, that is the increased risk. There is no piece of literature --

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THE COURT: That even assigns a percentage to the risk.

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Exactly. And I want to point out a couple more things, Your Honor. Their own experts disagree with him.

So Dr. Saenz is another expert that we did not Daubert, but she is probably going to come. And she said during her deposition, at present, there is no conclusive evidence that FANCC mutation increases your risk of developing ovarian cancer. That's her deposition at 150, lines 11 through 15. Dr. Felix, the pathologist that you just heard about at page 59, lines 12 through 17, he agrees.

And, you know, I want to just repeat that when I asked him at his deposition, well, what does the literature say, Dr. Boyd? "I would say that there's insufficient literature at this point, insufficient data to put the FANCC gene in the same category as, for example, the BRCA 1 and 2 genes in terms of a very high degree of certainty in terms of the causal relationship."

He is saying himself that the literature is not there. He is taking pieces of literature and he is saying if we look at it like this, we can say there is a risk. And that is insufficient for

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Page 95 Daubert. 1 THE COURT: Anything else, ma'am? 3 The motion to limit the I tend to agree. opinion of Dr. Boyd is granted. Thank you. 4 5 MS. STEMKOWSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Defense, I think we 6 7 are up to you. MR. CARUSO: Motion to exclude Dr. Ness, Your 8 9 Honor. Joe Caruso for the defense. 10 THE COURT: I'm just laughing because you all 11 are challenging everyone's expert. 12 MR. CARUSO: All right, Your Honor. I would 13 like to focus just on a few pieces in our motion. 14 More specifically, I'd like to talk about Dr. Ness' 15 failure to look at the specific disease that 16 Dr. Seskin had in this case, which is primary 17 peritoneal cancer. 18 Dr. Ness' analysis, as is true for all experts 19 in plaintiff's case, look at ovarian cancer, which is a clinically similar -- treated in the same 2.0 21 way -- cancer to ovarian cancer, but are different 2.2 from an etiological standpoint, and that's borne 2.3 out in the literature, and Dr. Ness didn't even 24 attempt to address this literature. 25 THE COURT: I'm sorry, she didn't have ovarian

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She had primary peritoneal MR. CARUSO: cancer, which has a different ICD code. It's a different cancer. They are similar, but they are similar in the sense that they are treated the same way, and from a clinical perspective, doctors tend to voice them in similar breaths because they are treated the same way.

But we are not here to talk about her treatment, we are here to talk about what caused her cancer, and from that perspective, they are different. What plaintiffs point to to say, no, no, no, they are the same, let's forget about that there's no literature that's tying talc to primary peritoneal cancer, which is a cancer of the stomach lining as opposed to the ovary. They say let's forget about that, Dr. Ness says it's the same thing.

Well, Dr. Ness, how do you say that? Let's go to their own motion. This is the testimony that the plaintiffs point to to say that it's the same thing.

This is what the plaintiffs point to for Dr. Ness to disregard the primary peritoneal literature and focus on ovarian.

Page 97 1 "Question: You were asked some questions about different types of genital cancers earlier? 3 "Answer: Yes. "Question: And when you refer to epithelial 4 5 ovarian cancer, did you include in your analysis thinking of fallopian type cancer? 6 7 "Answer: Yes, I did. "Question: Do you also include in your 8 9 definition of epithelial ovarian cancer peritoneal 10 cancer? "Answer: Yes, I do." 11 12 Cited just her deposition testimony. She has 13 no methodology, no reliable methodology to go to 14 and point to literature saying that talc use is 15 associated to primary peritoneal cancer. It's only 16 associated under their theory of the case with 17 ovarian cancer and it's not acceptable under 18 Daubert. 19 Did you ask that question? Did THE COURT: you take the deposition? 2.0 21 MR. CARUSO: I did not. 2.2 THE COURT: Okay. 2.3 MR. CARUSO: So as Your Honor just said, when 24 you have an expert and you're talking about FANCC,

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when nobody knows the answer, it's still being

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studied, cannot come in here and say that there's a correlation.

This is being studied. We have three peer reviewed literatures in 2007, 2015, 2020, that show -- and I can grab them for you here if you want -- that say there is a difference in the etiology, in the causes of these cancers. We looked at them, they have different risk factors.

And if Dr. Ness came in here said, yeah, I looked at those, I disagree with them for XYZ reason, that's a different discussion. She didn't even address them. That's unacceptable under Daubert.

MS. O'DELL: Good morning, Your Honor, Leigh O'Dell for the plaintiff. I feel like I've been dressed up for a long time and this is the first time I've gotten to say something.

Let me take this on and begin by talking about Dr. Ness' qualifications because I think it's helpful here. Dr. Ness has been studying the issue of talc and ovarian cancer since before 2000. She has been a primary researcher on some of the studies, the epidemiological studies that consider the question of is there a connection, a causal link between the genital use of talc and ovarian

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And in those studies, when you look at the defined number of women who have cases -- in other words, they have cancer -- what the researchers do, they include not only ovarian cancer, but fallopian tube cancer and primary peritoneal cancer. part of the disease pelvic carcinoma. the Levanon article is one of the articles we cited in our papers.

It defines it as those diseases are all the same because they are right there in the same area from a physiological perspective. Researchers now believe that epithelial ovarian cancer to include fallopian tube, and primary peritoneal starts in the fallopian tube and the cancer seeds it from the fallopian tubes there to the ovaries and into the peritoneal cavity, which is right there.

And so what Dr. Ness said is I considered those together, and that's supported by the literature. And that was what her -- when you say she's not considered primary peritoneal, it's really -- I don't think it would be accurate because she studied it for 24 years and she's been part of the ovarian cancer research coalition that has studied --

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THE COURT: What counsel said is that it's different. Cancer of the stomach is different -- I'm saying stomach.

MR. CARUSO: Stomach lining.

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THE COURT: Stomach lining is different from cancer of the ovary. And so the question you seem to be saying is that, no, no, no, because they are all in generally the same area, they just lump them all together, and all of the research that applies to ovarian cancer equally applies to this cancer that your client died from, or suffered from.

MS. O'DELL: She did die, sadly.

And if I could be say this, Your Honor, this is not cancer of the stomach. Primary peritoneal is just not cancer of the stomach, so we --

MR. CARUSO: Abdominal lining.

MS. O'DELL: With respect to my colleague, I mean, let's just be clear, that's not what we're talking about.

We are talking about a pelvic carcinoma disease of those three entities because they are essentially contiguous. So Dr. Morrissey, Dr. Seskin's treater, Ms. Seskin's treater, he says they have similar etiologies, similar treatments, similar outcomes.

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When you look at the literature itself, which is cited in Dr. Ness' opposition to this motion, one of the studies that the defendants will spend a lot of time talking about is the O'Brien study.

And it looks at certain cohort studies, and when they look at the cancers they are studying, and it's an epithelial ovarian cancer study, but when they look at those cancers, they are looking at fallopian tube, primary peritoneal, and ovarian cancer. They are all taken together. And that's the data that's considered in order to evaluate --

THE COURT: So are you telling me there is no particular study or research as it relates to the specific type of cancer that your client suffered? It's all linked to ovarian?

MS. O'DELL: No, sir. I'm saying that all of the 40 studies that considered the causal connection between talc and ovarian cancers, refer to it, include primary peritoneal cancers because they are considered a part of the same disease. That's what I'm saying.

When you look at -- and I can list study after study. The O'Brien study. The Kramer study, which was published in 2016. As a part of that disease set, they include ovary, fallopian tube, and

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THE COURT: But is there any research that speaks separately as to the type of cancer that your client suffered from?

MS. O'DELL: The body of literature that we are relying on is the 40 years of 40 studies that includes primary peritoneal --

THE COURT: I know, but I don't want to just talk about the literature that you're relying upon, I want to talk about literature that exists.

MS. O'DELL: In terms of the studies that focus on this -- and I just want to point out a couple other things for the record. Dr. Morrissey, from a cellular perspective, they are the same; from a treatment perspective, they are the same; and histologically, their serous subtype is what Dr. Seskin says, and they are all a part of that serous carcinoma. So the literature --

THE COURT: How are they different?

MS. O'DELL: They are essentially only different to the degree you have those millimeters from the fallopian tube and the ovary to this -- we're talking about if the fallopian tube is here and the ovary is here, we are talking about the lining that's right here. And so when you think of

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epithelial ovarian cancer as a disease group -they call it pelvic carcinoma as well -- they are
all a part of the same disease set.

So to somehow for the defendants to argue that the 40 years of literature that studied this disease as a pelvic carcinoma, they don't apply to primary peritoneal is absolutely inconsistent with the science, it's inconsistent --

THE COURT: But counsel said he had articles that actually speak to the differences.

MR. CARUSO: Yes, and I can distribute that if you want. This is the Jordan study. In the bottom section of the abstract on the left-hand side --

THE COURT: I'm half blind and you give me this print that's like 10 font.

Okay, go ahead.

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MR. CARUSO: I can read it. At the bottom there on the left-hand side, "The strikingly similar patterns of risk for serous ovarian and fallopian tube cancers, and the somewhat different results for primary peritoneal cancer suggest that peritoneal cancers may develop along a different pathway." That is Jordan 2007.

I'm going to pass out now Sorenson 2015, another peer reviewed piece of literature. Reading

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again from the conclusion here, "In contrast, observed differences in risk profile, clinicopathologic and prognostic factors as well as in the molecular patterns indicate that peritoneal cancer and ovarian cancer may be linked to different carcinogenic pathways."

I'm going to hand out Fortner 2020, another peer reviewed piece of literature. Conclusion of this paper, which by the way, Dr. Osann, in her report, notes as evidence of the differences between these different types of cancers.

"Ovarian, fallopian tube, and primary peritoneal cancers appear to have shared and distinct etiological pathways, although most risk factors appear to have similar associations by anatomic site."

So that's when you were asking earlier, what's the difference, right? They are close to each other, that's essentially how they relate them to each other. They tend to metastasize in the same area.

I should have noted this while we were discussing Jordan a few moments ago. Jordan looks at talc specifically, right? So they say, okay, let's take all of -- as counsel previously pointed

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out, a lot of the literature, despite the representation, they don't go in their method section and say we counted ICD code 10.9, 10.1, whatever. Because they do have different ICD codes, primary peritoneal, ovarian, fallopian; they are distinct cancers.

But interestingly, Jordan looks at the distinct cancers and they looked at when they could use perineal or genital use of talc. And they broke it down and they said, okay, we see no increased risk for primary peritoneal cancer. We see a slightly increased risk for ovarian cancer, again, suggestive of different etiologies between these two cancers.

You see in that particular study a slight increase for ovarian cancer. You do not see that for primary peritoneal cancer.

And another thing to note, Your Honor, is when you go to accredited websites, the American Cancer Society, they note on their website the differences between these cancers. One of which, obviously, in my opinion, points to the fact that they are different cancers. Men can get primary peritoneal cancer. Men can't get ovarian cancer. They are different cancers.

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And their own expert, Dr. Sitelman, in his deposition says, yes, if you look at them under a microscope, they are both serous type cancers, so they come from the same cell, but right now, we think of them as much different. He says that.

They are different cancers. And I think the --

THE COURT: So what are we missing here? When I say "we," what are they missing here? Meaning that they are going to have their expert come in and testify as to ovarian cancer as if it is peritoneal cancer?

MR. CARUSO: Correct, and whether or not they can do that in part depends on what methodology did they use to come in here and say that. They didn't even engage with this literature. It's not on their reliances. She never looked at it.

And for her to just come in here -- and the best evidence they have, they cite in their motion, her testimony is: Did you think they're the same? Yes, I do.

Based on what? How is she able to come in here and say that?

THE COURT: Did anybody ask her that question?

MR. CARUSO: I didn't come in at that

deposition, sir, but it's a great question

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THE COURT: But why wasn't that deposition taken? This seems like an important witness and you seem to have a serious concern with --

MR. CARUSO: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So my question is: Why wouldn't you take that deposition so the Court would have a record and I would know, for example, what was the answer to your last question?

MR. CARUSO: Well, part of the record you could look at is what studies did she look at, right? That's on her reliance list.

THE COURT: I'm not willing to do that. I want to hear the answer to: What will she say to you in response to that question? Maybe we need to get her on the phone.

MR. CARUSO: I think the only thing she can say, Your Honor, is that I didn't look at that literature. It's not on her reliance list.

THE COURT: But I'm not sure she needs to look at the literature. I need to know what is the basis for her saying that I can treat these two cancers the same, because that is the answer that I would to hear.

Well, were you aware of this literature, no,

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okay? I don't think that in and of itself disqualifies her from testifying, but the answer to that question may.

MR. CARUSO: Right, and I think what they might point to, which they have previously done, is when she listed out what makes these concerns the same, one thing they note is treatment, right? These cancers are treated the same, and oftentimes in the clinical setting, that is why they are conflated so often.

But we are not here to talk about treatment and how to best treat these concerns, we are here to talk about the cause of them. And the literature is clear that there are differences between these two cancers.

And despite the representation that the literature is equally clear, that they go through and, you know, say that this is study applies to both ovarian, peritoneal, and fallopian cancers, that is just not borne out. In the method sections of these papers, they have been going on -- they have 40 different papers.

I would like to see in those papers where they point out each time, yes, we are including primary peritoneal. Yes, we are including primary

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Page 109 1 fallopian. They are not doing that, Your Honor. 2 I know, but the one article that THE COURT: 3 you have, it says that --4 MR. CARUSO: Which one, I'm sorry? 5 THE COURT: I don't know, this one. 6 MR. CARUSO: Jordan, yes. 7 It says that it is strikingly THE COURT: similar, and it suggests that peritoneal cancers 8 9 may develop along a different pathway. Tell me the 10 significance. I don't understand the significance 11 of that. 12 MR. CARUSO: So that sentence is speaking to 13 the similar patterns of risk for serous ovarian and 14 fallopian tube cancers, right? And the somewhat 15 different results, which is what I was talking 16 about with respect to talc --17 THE COURT: But what is the different pathway? 18 What is the significance of the different pathway? 19 MR. CARUSO: It's a different etiology. And it's more clear --2.0 21 THE COURT: So what significance does it have 2.2 to this conversation? 2.3 MR. CARUSO: It's significant because what 24 they're taking about here, they are talking about 25 talc, right? They are talking about we looked at

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perineal usage of talc, we saw a slight increased risk for ovarian, none for peritoneal.

It's suggestive of a different pathway, right? A different etiology. And that's what Dr. Ness is trying to come in here and say, I've looked at the literature and it's the same thing, right? Ovarian and primary peritoneal, we can just lump them all together because they are treated the same. But that's not a proper basis.

MS. O'DELL: Your Honor, whenever you're ready.

THE COURT: I'm ready. Go ahead.

MS. O'DELL: I would say a couple things.

Number one, even in Jordan, if you look at Jordan on the right side of introduction, it says all three of these may be variants of the same malignancy. If you'll look, paragraph 2 on the right-hand side, it talks about, traditionally, the similarities. "Their close histological and clinical similarities, all three may be variants of the same malignancy."

THE COURT: It says they've been classified as separate, but given the close histological and clinical similarities, all three may be variants of the same malignancy.

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MS. O'DELL: Yes, sir. And I would just point out, this is a 2008 article, and since then, the literature has developed and they consider them as part of the same disease. Let me just point out --

THE COURT: But I'm going to ask you the same question I asked counsel. When your expert is asked the question: Are they different or are they the same? And if they are the same, how do you characterize them as the same? Why do you characterize them as the same?

MS. O'DELL: Because they are -- and let me just say the ICD-9 codes that my respected counsel cited don't make a bit of difference for this. I mean, we are not talking ICD-9 codes. We are not talking about what the disease is itself, and from a clinician's perspective, what Dr. Ness would say, as an epidemiologist, has looked at this for decades, she would say are they slightly different in terms of where they're located? You know, they are contiguous. But the histological type is the same; the way it is caused is the same from a talc perspective, and because you're dealing with the same cell type.

And so one of the other experts said,
Dr. Osann, which is one of defendants' experts, she

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says -- when asked on cross-examination at deposition, she said she'd usually consider it the same. They are usually dealt with together.

And so when you look at her treater, he says they are usually dealt with together. They are usually combined.

THE COURT: But what does the language mean when it says there is a separate pathway? What does that mean?

MS. O'DELL: Well, one, that's part of the, I would say dicta, from a legal perspective. In the article, there's a separate pathway. There is no evidence in the literature that's cited by Dr. Ness or any of the other experts that would suggest that there's a completely different causal mechanism for the way that genital talc causes ovarian cancer, whether it be the fallopian tube, ovary, or --

THE COURT: It says, "There is a suggestion that peritoneal cancer may develop along a different pathway." I'm trying to understand what the significance of that is, and did your expert consider that there may be a different pathway for the development of peritoneal cancer.

MS. O'DELL: Dr. Ness has considered that, not only for purposes of this case, but for purposes of

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her scientific literature where she's been a principal investigator on epidemiological studies which gathered the design of those, would gather women who have the cancer that's being studied, and within that group, within those cases, they are not only ovarian cancer, they are fallopian tube and primary peritoneal.

So yes, has in her own research she considered the differences, to the degree there are?

THE COURT: But here is what I don't think you are allowed to do, and I think this is what the defense is concerned about: You cannot take all of the literature and all of the adverse things that happen for somebody diagnosed with ovarian cancer and try your case as if you're trying it with somebody having ovarian cancer when your client has peritoneal cancer.

And you seem to be saying, well, it's the same thing. And they're saying that, well, who says Where is that coming from, that it's the that? same thing?

And that's why I'm asking, okay, what scientific literature is out there that says that it's the same thing?

MS. O'DELL: Well, Your Honor, I think we have

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to be careful with the terms, and I do think this is really a matter for cross-examination for any of these witnesses because you have studies that we are going to put in front of the jury, and they include not just ovarian cancer, they include primary peritoneal cancer, and they are evaluating the effect of talc to cause primary peritoneal cancer.

Now, within the researchers, they group those three things together because they feel that that is an appropriate grouping. Dr. Osann --

THE COURT: So are you telling me that the testimony is going to be that all of the research -- or the scientific community accepts that all the research associated with ovarian cancer equally applies to peritoneal cancer?

MS. O'DELL: It does in relation to this body of literature because primary peritoneal cancers are included in those studies.

THE COURT: Okay. I think you need to get your expert on the phone. I think I need to talk to your expert.

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, can I add something for the record? Absolutely, but there is a piece that's been missing from this that I don't think

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anybody talked about, and it may be because I took this deposition. It was a long time ago.

Her treating physician, who is a gynecological oncologist, Dr. Morrissey, actually says -- and I've been reading this. They asked him a question about what kind of cancer and he says, "Gynecologic primary, which would encompass ovary, fallopian tube, and uterus. It's not primary peritoneal carcinoma. It's gynecologic primary."

THE COURT: So she doesn't even have peritoneal cancer?

MR. OLIVER: She has cancer on her ovaries, in her peritoneal, and her own treating physician says -- her own treating physician --

THE COURT: Well, that's a difference. That's an important fact.

MR. OLIVER: Her own treating physician says these cancers, it's the same cell. They start in the fallopian tube, based on the literature, they go to the ovaries, they go to the peritoneum. He says, when they ask him: Why did you talk about where it was?

He said, well, that's how we do it. We look at where the most massive tumor was.

Was it on her ovaries? Yes, it was.

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THE COURT: You all should have started with that. That's a big difference. That's a big difference than you just saying --

MR. CARUSO: Your Honor --

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THE COURT: You've got --

MS. BROWN: I'm Alli Brown, and I just came forward only because I wanted to respond to that point.

That testimony actually comes from what was happening during the surgery, so it was before the pathology was finalized. They do sort of like a frozen check to see what it is. And the surgeon was testifying sort of at that time we didn't know. And as Mr. Caruso points out, for purposes of treatment, it doesn't really matter.

So just in fairness, I think it's a little bit being taken out of context, and I did want to assure the Court the final pathology report is primary peritoneal cancer, no one disputes that.

And while purposes for treatment, the surgeon isn't really interested either way if it's peritoneal or ovarian. From a causative standpoint, it's actually quite an important question that's obviously central to this case.

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, Dr. Morrissey gave

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that testimony when the final pathology report was presented to his face by their lawyer. And they were trying to get him to say it's all different, and he said it doesn't matter. I said that. I'm the one who wrote it to give it to the pathologist. The pathologist does their thing and I wrote, you know, peritoneal because that's where the biggest massive tumor was. It was on her ovaries, it was on her peritoneum, it could have been all three.

The reason they deposed this man was to try to get him to say what they want him to say in this courtroom, and he wouldn't do it.

THE COURT: What did you want to say, ma'am?

MS. O'DELL: Thank you. I'll pick up where

Mr. Oliver left off, and I thank him for pointing
that out more clearly than I had before.

But my point being, what he was saying, she was diagnosed at very late stage -- I should have started here, I'm sorry, Your Honor -- very late stage of ovarian cancer, which means it had spread throughout the pelvis.

You look at her medical records. You heard
Mr. Oliver talk about the pathology report saying
there was cancer on the ovarian surface. There are
other places it refers to primary peritoneal. Her

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death certificate says fallopian tube cancer. So it's in evidence that it was throughout the pelvis.

THE COURT: Okay, I need to understand. I need to understand. When you all stand up in your opening statement, okay, you are going to tell these jurors that your experts are going to come in and your client died of, what?

MR. OLIVER: High grade serous cell cancer.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't know what that means.

MR. OLIVER: That is the type of cancer that Dr. Seskin was diagnosed with. That is the type of cancer that every single --

THE COURT: What is it? It's cancer of the, what?

MR. OLIVER: It's cancer of the either ovaries, fallopian tubes, or peritoneum. It is the cell type that was on her ovaries, and it was on her peritoneum, and I believe it was on her fallopian tubes as well.

THE COURT: I'm trying to understand the significance of this conversation because somehow the defense has the impression that you all are going to be presenting testimony that your client died or contracted peritoneal cancer.

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You now seem to be telling me -- and you may have said it before and I didn't hear it, but you seem to be taking the position that, no, she died of this type of cancer that encompasses, okay, the ovaries, the fallopian tubes, the peritoneal, all of that, but nobody ever isolated and said that it was peritoneal cancer.

MS. O'DELL: There are different references in the records at different times. As Mr. Oliver mentioned, her pathology report talks about cancer on the surface of the ovary. There is a reference in the medical records to primary peritoneal. There are references in the death certificate to fallopian tube cancer. She was a late stage woman with disease throughout her pelvis.

THE COURT: I know, but ma'am, my point is that their argument -- I think their argument diminishes significantly if you are telling me that there are -- the medical experts that are going to come in and testify that your client died of ovarian, peritoneal, and other types of cancer.

I'm sorry, I look at his argument and I say, oh, well, ovarian cancer was also a cause of her death, so then I would deny the motion.

But I was approaching this as if she died from

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Page 120 1 peritoneal cancer as the primary cause of her death. MS. O'DELL: Her cancer, her pelvic carcinoma 3 is the cause, or was the cause, of her death. And 4 5 that's what Dr. Ness will say. Excuse me, just to be clear, she is a general 6 7 causation witness. She will say the genital use of talcum powder can cause the type cancer that 8 9 Dr. Seskin had. And then there will be another 10 witness --11 THE COURT: And the type of cancer that she 12 had was: Fill in the blank. 13 MS. O'DELL: Well, she had pelvic carcinoma, 14 which includes, and we have reference in the 15 medical records, to cancer on the ovary to primary 16 peritoneal. 17 THE COURT: So she didn't just have one type 18 of cancer? 19 MS. O'DELL: It's just throughout the pelvic 2.0 area, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Do we know where it started? 2.2 MR. OLIVER: We don't. 2.3 MR. CARUSO: Your Honor, the pathology report 24 is clear. So as they pointed out in the 25 deposition, Dr. Morrissey is a surgeon. And during

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the surgery, as Ms. Brown pointed out, he could not make a determination as to where it was. That wasn't his role.

So he took it, gave it to the pathologist, and the pathologist, undisputed in this case, makes a finding of primary peritoneal carcinoma. There was involvement of the surface of the ovary, and there was a mature teratoma, which is a benign finding on the ovary. The primary tumor site, the primary cancer site, her diagnosis is a primary peritoneal cancer.

And it is important not just for us, it was important for Dr. Seskin. In the medical records, she has correspondence with her treating physician. She went got a consultation at MD Anderson, the leading cancer center in America, and they made it a note in the chart from a prior doctor's visit that she had ovarian carcinoma.

She responded to that doctor and said there is a mistake in my medical chart. I do not have ovarian carcinoma. The pathology was specific for primary peritoneal cancer. They are just treated the same.

That is the language of the record. It was important to her, it's important in the literature.

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It is true that they are distinct cancers. It is not the same sort of let's just lump them all together.

Some studies have, but not every one, most of them don't even identify what they're calling it, they just say epithelial ovarian cancer. And they are making the assumption that, oh, well, they are clinically similar, so they must be talking about all the same of the pelvic carcinomas. No, that's not true.

THE COURT: What they're saying, at least what I heard, is that at the time that her cancer was discovered, it had basically infiltrated all of these different parts, and nobody was able to say that it started here or it started there, and all of the areas were affected. So she had cancer of her ovarian, she had cancer of -- I mean --

MR. CARUSO: So, Your Honor, cancer obviously metastasizes, right? And you can start with pancreatic cancer and end up having lung cancer.

It's still pancreatic cancer.

THE COURT: But normally the doctors can say where it started.

MR. CARUSO: Correct, they did that here.

THE COURT: It originated here and it spread

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MR. CARUSO: And that's exactly what the purpose of the pathology report was. What is the source of this cancer?

And after analyzing it, the pathologist in this case, Dr. Seskin's treating pathologist, said this is suggestive -- not suggestive. He says this favors primary peritoneal cancer. That's what it is.

There was minor involvement on the surface of the ovary, and the main mass on the ovary was a mature teratoma. That's a benign finding. It's not related to the cancer.

These are distinct etiologies, distinct cancers, and I worry that we are getting a little far afield from the main point here, which is Dr. Ness' methodology as to addressing them.

THE COURT: Well, we are not getting far afield because, as I said, I think your argument diminishes if, in fact, she had ovarian cancer as well. And so the point -- your whole point is that, well, they're different.

And so my point is but they're testifying that she had all of it, that the entire area was impacted by the cancer. And now you're saying,

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Page 124 1 well, the pathology seemed to suggest something different. 3 MR. CARUSO: Yes, the pathology report doesn't suggest something different; it says something 4 5 different. It says --THE COURT: I think you need to reach out to 6 7 your doctor. See if your doctor is able to have a 15-minute conversation with the Court. 8 9 MS. O'DELL: I would be glad to do that, Your 10 Honor. 11 THE COURT: What's next? 12 Do you need a break? Let's take a break. 13 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, would you like a copy 14 of a surgical report where he confirmed -- well, he 15 confirmed in his deposition, but --This is Dr. Ness? Dr. Ness is the 16 THE COURT: 17 doctor we're talking about, right? 18 MR. OLIVER: Sure, but Dr. Ness is an expert. 19 Dr. Morrissey is -- and I think one of the things 2.0 that's happened here, Your Honor, is we've gotten 21 general causation expert and we're talking about a 2.2 specific cause issue. But the thing that wasn't 2.3 said is every one of our experts -- our experts, 24 not theirs. I understand their experts can say

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what they want them to say.

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Our experts are all going to say -- you know, Dr. Chan, specific causation. Does it affect your conclusion at all from a geographic standpoint, the largest mass of the tumor was in the peritoneum, or was diagnosed as primary peritoneal, and he is going to say it doesn't affect it because the literature is the same because the cell type is the same.

I can have melanoma on my private parts. She can have melanoma on her private parts. It's a different type of cancer. I've got primary cancer on something different than what she has, but it's the same cancer.

MS. O'DELL: And Your Honor, I would just -THE COURT: We are taking a break. We'll come

(A recess was taken at 11:54 a.m. and the proceedings resumed at 12:05 p.m.:)

THE COURT: Let's go back on the record.

MS. O'DELL: How do you want to do this in terms of speaking with Dr. Ness?

THE COURT: Where is Dr. Ness located?

MS. O'DELL: She's in Houston.

THE COURT: I can't call from here.

MS. O'DELL: Can I put her on my cell phone?

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Page 126 1 Is that appropriate? I don't know how loud that is THE COURT: 3 going to be. Go ahead, you can try. (A speakerphone telephone call was placed.) 4 5 DR. NESS: Hello? MS. O'DELL: Hi, Dr. Ness. This is Leigh. 6 7 I'm in the courtroom with Judge Thomas. you on speaker and you are on the bench in front of 8 9 Judge Thomas. He has a question for you. 10 THE COURT: Can you hear me? DR. NESS: 11 I can. Good morning, Your Honor. 12 Good morning. THE COURT: All right. 13 One of the conversations we've been having is 14 a basis of your opinion, and the conversation about 15 whether or not this was ovarian cancer, or if it was primary peritoneal cancer, and whether or not 16 17 it makes a difference. So my question to you is: 18 Your understanding and your testimony is going to 19 be what type of cancer was this? 2.0 DR. NESS: Yes, okay, so let me just be real 21 clear about this: They are the same. There really 2.2 isn't a distinction between the two, Your Honor. 2.3 And the reason that I say that is based upon just 24 the literature at this point is exceptionally clear that the genesis, the origin of these tumors, you 25

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know, whether they are found on histology lining the ovary, whether they are found in the fallopian tube, whether they are found in the peritoneum, all of those tumors derive from the exact same thing, and that is fallopian tube tissue.

They are called FIT tumors. So they spread to all these different places because they are all contiguous; however, they all derive from the exact same tumor type. So they are the same. There is really not a distinction between tumors that are found lining the ovarian tissue or tumors that are found lining in the peritoneal tissue.

THE COURT: Well, when you say they are the same, because there is — this is a Jordan study, I don't know how else to characterize it, and the defense gave me this, and it says the following: It says that the strikingly similar patterns of risk of serous ovarian and fallopian tube cancers and the somewhat different results from primary peritoneal cancer suggests that the peritoneal cancers may develop along a different pathway.

What does that mean?

DR. NESS: Well, that's the opinion of a single author, and what you'll hear from me in the courtroom is that we never rely on a single

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opinion. So peritoneal tumors and ovarian tumors, there is a slew of literature that suggests that they have very similar risk factors.

You know, you may find one study outlier there where they find different risk factors for the two, but the fact of the matter is, you know, I can show you numerous papers that will say that serous tumors derive from these FIT precursor cells and that they spread to all these different places.

And I can find you numerous papers that show that the risk factors are very, very similar.

THE COURT: There was an argument that at the end of all of this, her diagnosis was primary peritoneal cancer. You're saying that that has no significance to this conversation?

DR. NESS: That is correct. That is exactly 100 percent, 1,000 percent what I am saying. That is my opinion.

THE COURT: I'm going to let the defense ask any questions that they may have of you.

MR. CARUSO: Cross her on these points?

THE COURT: Well, you can ask her whatever

questions you have.

MR. CARUSO: Fair enough.

So, Dr. Ness, I just want to ask a few

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Page 129 1 questions about how you went about confirming that these risk factors are sufficiently similar that 3 you do not need to address studies like Jordan 4 2007, Fortner 2020, and Sorenson 2015, which 5 suggest the opposite. DR. NESS: Okay, well, let me be clear about 6 7 something: You know, you're catching me unprepared. You know, I'm not testifying until the 8 9 week of the 20th, and I have not reviewed this 10 particular aspect of the literature, so I can't 11 throw back at you references. 12 MS. O'DELL: Dr. Ness, this is Leigh. 13 point out, the Court needs to know that those 14 references that were just listed are not something 15 that Dr. Ness was asked about at her deposition. 16 They are certainly not something --17 THE COURT: But they didn't take her 18 deposition. 19 They did take her deposition. MS. O'DELL: 2.0 Oh, you took her deposition? THE COURT: 21 MS. O'DELL: She's been deposed. 2.2 MR. CARUSO: I did not, but her deposition was 2.3 taken. 24 THE COURT: Okay, when I asked did you take

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her deposition, I'm not talking about did you

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personally take it; I'm talking about did your team take the deposition. That's why I thought -- okay.

MS. O'DELL: Dr. Ness' testimony was very clear that she considered them to be part of the same disease, just like she stated, and no further questions were asked.

DR. NESS: That's correct. I mean, this is a complete curve ball out of nowhere, so I know now that when I come to trial, I will be prepared to answer these questions with lots of references.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any other questions? She says she's not prepared because the literature that you're making reference to, she doesn't have it in front of her, so she hasn't had a chance to be able to properly respond so it.

Did you all provide this literature to her?

MS. O'DELL: She was not examined on this

literature at her deposition.

MR. CARUSO: It was in the briefing on this point, and I think this is part of our point, Your Honor, that she has not engaged with this literature.

THE COURT: You've got give her an opportunity to respond to it. What she is saying is that I may have a perfectly good reason to be able to respond

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to it, but you haven't -- I don't know it, so I can't respond to it.

And by the way, if she can't respond to it, it's hard for the Court to make a conclusion as a matter of law that her opinion should be excluded.

MR. CARUSO: But her obligation in conducting her general causation analysis was to take the literature and apply it to the specific cancer. That was her obligation.

DR. NESS: Wait, wait, I --

THE COURT: No, Doctor, you have to wait.

Doctor, we'll let you know when we need you to speak, okay?

DR. NESS: Sorry. Apologies.

MR. CARUSO: She looked at ovarian cancer literature, which, in some cases, in the methodologies of the studies, include -- they state explicitly in this study, we will look at ovarian, fallopian, and peritoneal cancers. In other studies, there is no mention of peritoneal cancer.

THE COURT: But what you're doing -- and I will accept that's your argument. The problem is that you can't ask me to exclude a witness based upon studies that you've never presented to the witness to allow the witness to explain to you why

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those studies are not either reliable or why those studies were not considered. That just is fundamentally unfair.

And I don't know enough about the science for me to just say, oh, you found these articles and she didn't consider them. She didn't find them, she didn't know anything about them, oh, I'm going to eliminate her testimony. I won't do that.

You've got to give the expert -- especially since you deposed the expert. And when you deposed her, you didn't even ask anything about this. And so now you want me to exclude her based upon the fact that you found articles that you never asked her about. I find that to be fundamentally unfair.

MR. CARUSO: Well, Your Honor, we do have in our --

THE COURT: Doctor, we don't need you any further. Thank you.

DR. NESS: Okay. Thank you very much, sir.

MS. O'DELL: Thank you, Doctor.

THE COURT: Go ahead, sir.

MR. CARUSO: Our experts, such as Dr. Osann, do engage with this literature in her report, such as Fortner, and she goes through why there is a meaningful difference here, and that difference is

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not addressed in plaintiff's reports. And it's their obligation under Daubert to match up the specific condition that is alleged in the case with the literature, and they have not done that here. And it's not our obligation to show them the literature that conflicts with their position. Their methodology has to be sound.

THE COURT: It may not be -- if you take the position it is not your obligation, I personally do not think that this is good practice. I'm just being candid with you.

If you are going to challenge their expert on this level, you have to ask the expert about the studies. How can we as lawyers -- we are not the science people. How many times have you all sat up here and said, Judge, I'm not a science person; Judge, I'm going to do the best I can. Why? Because that's not our field. That's not part of our brain that works. They are.

We have to give them an opportunity to educate us so that we are making informed decisions, not basically saying -- and you saw it. You got my attention. I said, okay, we spent, how long, about 35 minutes on this. All because I was like, well, I don't understand that, what does this mean?

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And then I find out that you did take her deposition and you never asked her about it. So I'm not excluding her based upon that. It's denied.

MR. CARUSO: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Next motion?

MR. CARUSO: Can I address other points in Dr. Ness' --

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. CARUSO: Okay. So I would also like to address her methodology as to her asbestos opinions and her heavy metals opinions.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CARUSO: With respect to her asbestos opinion, she is going to try and come in here and tell the jury that Johnson's baby powder is contaminated with asbestos, all talcum powders are contaminated with asbestos, and that is considered, in my opinion, to be one of the causes of Dr. Seskin primary peritoneal cancer. And her basis for saying talcum powder is contaminated with asbestos is her review of about 50 plaintiff-selected documents out of the tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of documents.

And when we said, okay, well, how do you know

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what they mean? Because these are sophisticated testing documents, obviously very complex, as we've heard in previous motions. And she said, well, I can read the English language.

That is not a sufficient basis. If that's all it takes, to read these, then the jury can do that. She does not need to come in here then.

THE COURT: Let's just be honest. I'm not sure it's fair to put jurors -- I wouldn't even put myself -- on the same level of somebody who is a doctor who has studied this and they are reading the literature as compared to us.

Do you know how many times, your motions, I had to read them? And I don't consider myself dumb or thick, but as I was reading it, I was like, okay, what did he just say? Because you all start throwing around that jargon and it's foreign to me.

So my brain is immediately saying, okay, invader, invader, ignore it, ignore it, and then I've got to refocus myself and I've got to read it again. And it's not, well, they said it, Judge, they wrote it in a motion, so it should be that easy. No.

Sometimes it requires a level of knowledge, a level of sophistication that I don't think most

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jurors, all the jurors are required to do, there is no educational requirement for jurors. Hopefully they can read and they can write.

MR. CARUSO: Right, so I'll go to this point then, Your Honor. If that is true, correct, that you need some sort of sophistication, and Dr. Osann is a highly educated individual, perhaps more than some of our jurors will be, they have an expert coming in here who is going to testify that, okay, I've looked at all of this information and I determine that there is a chance of asbestos contamination in Johnson's baby powder. They can have that expert -- I'm sure we are going to argue about that, we already did, but it's not Dr. Ness.

THE COURT: You're right. I don't allow cumulative testimony. And, in fact, I don't know why Dr. Ness needs to testify that baby powder contains asbestos; I think Dr. Ness needs to testify asbestos was a cause of the injury. I don't think she needs to say it was from baby powder. I think she can say asbestos is a cause of the cancer that the plaintiff succumbed to.

MR. CARUSO: And even just to supplement that point, Your Honor, even if she wants to do that, her basis for saying so is the IARC Monograph,

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which looks at a completely different type of asbestos exposure. It's completely inapposite as to what type of exposure they are alleging here with Dr. Seskin.

What they are going to come in here and say is that Johnson's baby powder was contaminated with -we'll take one example -- .00002 percent asbestos. The types of studies that the IARC Monograph is looking at are studies where, during World War II, women were working in factories and getting huge amounts, occupational amounts of asbestos exposure. That's a completely different scenario.

It's not applicable to the type of allegations that are made in this case where it's, you know, trace amounts of asbestos exposure that they are alleging. So even on that ground, she can't come in here without doing a comprehensive review of this literature and say this.

THE COURT: Do you want to respond?

MS. O'DELL: Yes, please. I mean, what Dr. Ness will say is I've seen evidence that there is asbestos in Johnson's baby powder, and she is going to base that on the opinions of Dr. Rigler, going to testify to his testing.

THE COURT: Why does she need to testify to

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that? Why would we care what she thinks is in the baby powder?

MS. O'DELL: She needs some basis to include it in her systematic review to say this literature that shows asbestos can cause ovarian cancer is relevant. And I think clearly --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, what is her purpose for testifying? Testify to say what?

MS. O'DELL: Let me back up. Dr. Ness is an epidemiologist who can testify to the health effects of Johnson's baby powder, whatever its constituents are, which include asbestos, platy talc --

THE COURT: Why is she testifying as to

Johnson's baby powder? Why isn't she just

testifying as to the chemicals -- like, for

example, why is she says Johnson & Johnson as

compared to testifying if there's magnesium in it

and talc, whatever is in it, that should be her

opinion. How is she qualified to basically then

testify as to Johnson & Johnson's product?

MS. O'DELL: Well, I would use the analogy of a pathologist and an oncologist. The pathologist looks at a slide and identifies the type of cancer, what's there, but an oncologist takes that

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information and he or she evaluates it from a health perspective.

Well, that's what Dr. Ness is doing. As an epidemiologist, she will testify to the health effects of asbestos and that asbestos can cause ovarian cancer.

THE COURT: I don't have a problem with that.

I have a problem with you saying she's going to say that the product had asbestos. She can say this is what asbestos -- this is what a product containing asbestos will do if it is -- if the body comes in contact with it, okay? That's consistent with what I saw in the pathology of this particular plaintiff.

MS. O'DELL: Right.

THE COURT: But she can't say -- because you have other people saying --

MS. O'DELL: She will not go into that in detail.

THE COURT: She doesn't go into it at all as it relates to Johnson & Johnson. All she should simply say is asbestos, this is what it does, this is how it affects the body, this is what it causes.

MS. O'DELL: She can certainly --

THE COURT: She cannot say: So Johnson &

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Johnson product contained asbestos, so this is what Johnson & Johnson's product did to the plaintiff.

MS. O'DELL: She is not going to say that because she is not case-specific. She is a general causation expert. And she is going to testify that asbestos and other constituents that witnesses will talk about are in Johnson's baby powder can cause ovarian cancer.

THE COURT: No, she can testify -- without making reference to what other people testify to -- asbestos and other constituents cause cancer.

MS. O'DELL: Right.

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THE COURT: Not the way you phrased it. And by the way, it's your job to link it and put it all together.

MS. O'DELL: I think we will do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What's your next issue?

MR. CARUSO: My next issue with Dr. Ness -- and I can anticipate where you're going to go with it based on what we just discussed -- is she has a similar opinion as to heavy metals, except even less attached to any sort of --

THE COURT: That baby powder has heavy metals in it too?

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MR. CARUSO: No, she is going to testify based on one paper from 1997 from a supplier of our talc that there were increased levels of chromium, cobalt, and nickel. And she has not done a single review on this.

THE COURT: I don't understand that. I don't understand how she can testify to that. I'm assuming there is somebody else who can testify to what was in your product. I don't think this doctor is that person.

MR. CARUSO: And the related point, Your

Honor -- I agree with that. The related point is

she can't come in here and say that those

constituent metals are linked to cancer because we

asked her: Have you done a comprehensive search on

the topic of whether heavy metals in the presence

of talc powders contribute to their

carcinogenicity? I have not.

Then we asked her: Have you done it for chromium, cobalt, nickel? No, I haven't.

So even though she can't come in and say what's in the baby powder, she can't --

THE COURT: What is the basis of her saying that heavy metals contribute to cancer?

MS. O'DELL: Well, there is evidence in

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Johnson & Johnson's own documents that other witnesses can talk about that there is nickel at high levels of 1,800 parts per million, chromium, and cobalt. And then what Dr. Ness can testify to is the health effects of those constituents, and particularly the International Agency for the Research on Cancer has determined that nickel and chromium are group 1 known carcinogens.

THE COURT: But is she doing that just because she read an article or is she doing that because she studied it?

MS. O'DELL: She's read a comprehensive review and the literature in the comprehensive review that was done by --

THE COURT: I don't understand that. Is that what we're coming down to in terms of experts, we give them some literature, some peer reviewed article, and we say, okay, you've read it, now come in and tell us what it says?

MS. O'DELL: No, sir, that's not it at all.
What we're saying is the product as a whole, just
like a cigarette, has numerous constituents, and
they, combined together, can cause ovarian cancer.
And that's what Dr. Ness is going to say, but
within the product itself, the presence of these

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substances that explain the biologic mechanisms by which it causes cancer.

THE COURT: My question though is: How is she qualified to speak about metals causing cancer other than the fact that she's read an article that says it?

MS. O'DELL: It's more than that. She's read comprehensive reviews of that literature and she is a cancer researcher for 25 years who has --

THE COURT: So she's seen it? Has she seen and been part of studies of which metals have caused cancer? Because I don't think experts are conduits to basically come in here and basically put out what the literature is. Experts don't just come in and say, oh, by the way, this is what the literature says and I agree with it.

MS. O'DELL: No, sir, but she as a cancer researcher can take the literature from her perspective as someone who has done these studies on women with ovarian cancer, and other types of cancer for that matter, and she can assimilate that literature and help explain why --

THE COURT: But she's never done it as it relates to metals?

MS. O'DELL: Well, there is a difference, Your

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Honor, in saying she's not written a study that has to do with nickel per se in women in saying that the scientific literature, the consensus is that nickel is an inflammatory agent that causes such a reaction that it's not a possible carcinogen or a probable carcinogen, but the World Health Organization has determined it is a known carcinogen to cause cancer.

And so it is just a small part, but a part of Dr. Ness' opinion that says the presence of these constituents help explain the mechanism by which talcum powder causes ovarian cancer.

THE COURT: So you're doing exactly what I said. It's not based upon any firsthand knowledge, you're just basically repeating what the literature says?

MS. O'DELL: Your Honor, if that was the rule, that an expert could never testify to somebody else's article, they could never read the literature, assimilate it, formulate an opinion and testify to it, you had to be an author of the study, then frankly --

THE COURT: I didn't say she had to be an author of the study. What she has to have been is she has to have at least experienced -- if she's

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never come in contact with metals causing cancer, if she's never done any studies of metals causing cancer and the only basis is that she read an article, scientific article, well respected article, and that article says it, my whole point is that she's just a conduit to whoever did that study.

You're coming in and wrapping her up in this cloud of, I guess, credibility based upon something that somebody else did. So I'm not saying that she can never -- or no one can ever testify about a study that they weren't part of. We have talked about multiple studies that I would allow people to come in and testify to. But I have to be that it has to be related to something that they have done. I mean, something they have seen.

MS. O'DELL: Well, it is related to something she has done.

THE COURT: Has she ever seen a cancer that was caused by a carcinoma caused by metal?

MS. O'DELL: I can say with 90 percent certainty that she has.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. O'DELL: But let me just say this, Judge: When we get to this part of her opinion, I will lay

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the foundation. So she lays that foundation that, yes, she has seen this in her --

THE COURT: The problem that you're going to have -- and I don't know why you would ever want to put yourself in this position, but I'm either going to stop her, or I'm going to give a curative instruction. I'm going to strike it from the record and give a curative instruction telling the jurors to disregard the testimony.

Why anybody would ever want to put their expert in that position -- your expert is going to get frustrated because your expert is going to think that they are certainly capable of doing that, they are going to think that the Court is somehow suggesting that they are not as qualified as they think they are, and it just affects the entire presentation. It doesn't make sense that you would proceed that way.

Now, I've seen lawyers proceed that way, but I need you all to know that I'm not shy in saying that. If I think that your expert is basically giving an opinion that your expert should not be giving, it's better to do it now rather than wait until your expert is on the witness stand and me do it in front of the jury.

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MS. O'DELL: Yes, Your Honor. Just to be clear, what Dr. Ness has considered as part of her opinion in this area is not one article. It is compilation of all the literature that deals with nickel, chromium, and cobalt as gathered and synthesized by the International Agency for the Research on Cancer. So it's not just one peer reviewed paper, it is comprehensive --

THE COURT: So?

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MS. O'DELL: -- that says, that concludes, and it's generally accepted, that nickel can cause cancer.

THE COURT: I'm not suggesting that the articles are not accurate. What I'm suggesting is that the only reason she knows any of this is because she just simply read an article. She's never treated a patient, she's never done a study, all she's doing -- what's the difference of going and finding an orthopedic doctor who has never done a surgery, never done a surgery on the knee, but you call him as a witness and they come in and say, oh, I read these articles and this is all the problems with the knee.

Well, how do you know that? Have you ever done a surgery? No. Well, then why would you be

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able to come in and testify about --

Yeah, anybody can open up a book and see the anatomy and shows what the knee -- how the knee is structured, but that doesn't make you qualified to come into court and give an opinion based upon a surgery of a knee if you've never done surgery on a You have to have --

And by the way, I'm not saying she had to have the leading study, I'm not saying she had to have treated 50 people, but she had to have had some exposure to metal causing a carcinoma in order for her to come in and give an opinion that it does.

MS. O'DELL: In her work as professor of public health at the University of Texas, Your Honor, I am confident that she has dealt with heavy metals extensively.

THE COURT: Then you're good.

MS. O'DELL: Okay.

MR. CARUSO: Your Honor, we --

MS. O'DELL: I just can't point to an article that she's written.

I'm telling you I'm not excluding THE COURT: her based upon that at this time because you're telling me that you're able to relate it. are not able to relate it, I'm telling you I will

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ask the jurors to strike her testimony and disregard it.

MS. O'DELL: Understood.

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MR. CARUSO: We asked her, and she said, "I have not reviewed that literature in detail," period.

THE COURT: No, I'm not talking about literature. I'm talking about whether or not she herself has ever treated someone where she has -- it has been suggested that it was metals that basically, or some metal product that caused the carcinoma. And if the answer to that question is I have, I think she's allowed to testify.

MS. O'DELL: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. CARUSO: But also, Your Honor, it needs to be related to the product that we're talking about and she has no basis to say that these metals are in talcum powder.

THE COURT: She doesn't have to say. You asked me to have her not to say it. All she's going to testify to is if these metals are present, these metals can cause cancer. She's not going to testify that it was present in talc or in Johnson & Johnson's product. They have other experts who are going to testify to that.

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Page 150 1 What she is saying is that metals, this is how the metals, when introduced into the body, can 3 cause cancer. And I think if she's had that experience -- and you're representing to me that 4 5 you believe it's there -- I will overrule the objection and I will allow her to testify to that. 6 7 And if she doesn't, then she won't testify to it. MS. O'DELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 MR. CARUSO: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 Plaintiff, I believe you're up. Next? 12 MR. OLIVER: We don't have any more Dauberts, 13 Your Honor. Do you want to move on to MILs? 14 MR. CARUSO: We have Dr. Chan. 15

MR. OLIVER: I don't think we have any more Dauberts.

THE COURT: We've got to do everything, so what's next?

MR. OLIVER: Okay. We'll do attorney advertising, motion in limine.

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THE COURT: Attorney advertising?

MR. OLIVER: Yes. We filed a motion in limine to keep out mention of attorney advertising. One of the things that the defendants have done in other cases -- and I cited some of this in the

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motion, and I reread it after three years that I wrote it, and I couldn't believe it. I was like, I can't believe they're saying this stuff in trials.

They are going to go in, if allowed, and at some point in the trial, they will make the argument that the reason they took baby powder off the market is because they have been inundated with lawsuits, and what one of the attorneys said was it's 1-800 Sue Me, 1-800 Sue Johnson & Johnson, and they need another defendant. It's stuff that's totally irrelevant.

Now, let me tell you why --

THE COURT: Wait a minute, they are saying that during the trial?

MR. OLIVER: They are saying that during the trial. I don't think it was Ms. Brown, just to be clear. It was one of her colleagues who tried another case, and that colleague actually gave an interview about it to Law 360.

And I want to be clear about something, Your Honor. The reason they do that that is their theory of why they took it off the market. They say our product is completely safe, we took it off the market dastardly attorneys doing all this.

Now, there is a piece of evidence in our case,

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and I want to be clear. I don't want you to hear this from them first. They asked my client when he and his wife decided to file a lawsuit and they did see an advertisement. It wasn't my advertisement. He didn't call the person on the advertisement, he called me because we've been friends -- he testified to all this. He called me because we've been friends for 12 years before any of this happened and asked some questions and then retained me.

It doesn't -- and in their motion, they talk about this. And I reread their opposition. It's very circular. They were like, well, we have to know why they filed a lawsuit. And I'm like, that is not relevant. The relevant thing is did my client get exposed to the product --

THE COURT: I have never allowed a party, plaintiff or defendant, to testify that, oh, I was in the accident and then I called my lawyer before I called the doctor. Or I called my lawyer and -- I think it's dangerous, a slippery, slippery slope to get into.

If you want to ask questions in jury selection about lawyers advertising, I guess that's really local lawyers more than anything else because I

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think we have some lawyers who are local, Morgan & Morgan, Rubenstein Law, they are all over the air waves. I just did a trial with Rubenstein Law and I allowed them to ask the question because they are local and they advertise extensively here, and they need to know whether or not jurors think that that's a problem.

But I don't know -- and I guess I'm about to hear -- why lawyer advertising is relevant in this case.

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, can I leave you with one fact just to make it clear? My client didn't see this until she was a month from her death, and she suffered with cancer for three years. I just want to make it clear this is not a situation where she saw some advertisement, filed a lawsuit at diagnosed. This happened right before she died.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from the defense.

MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, a big part of the basis of this motion in limine is they want to prevent us from coming in here and disparaging plaintiffs, plaintiffs' attorneys, or their claims or things of that nature, and that is absolutely not what we are going to do, but it is a part of

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this case. I mean, the testimony of the plaintiff here is that they saw a lawyer ad, and afterwards, they said that's the basis of my belief now that I have this ovarian cancer.

So we are allowed to ask questions about the basis of the claim, the validity of the claim, the credibility of the witness for bringing the claim.

THE COURT: What is the relevance of that? Is it any different if she saw an ad that wasn't a lawyer ad? She just saw an ad. If you want to ask because you think it's relevant, I was driving one day and I saw a billboard and it made me -- and after I saw that billboard, then I called my lawyer. I mean, I don't know why you need to say that. I don't understand why it is -- what does it go to show?

MS. SCOTT: The relevance, Your Honor, is that the basis of this lawsuit is not the science, as they are going to try to say. They are going to try to say the science supports their theory of the case, but the motivation for bringing this lawsuit was not the science. It was seeing this ad and saying, oh, it's an ad, let's investigate and see if we have a claim.

THE COURT: I disagree. And by the way, you

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cannot stand here and tell me that the motivation of somebody who has carcinoma and is dying from carcinoma is because they saw an ad.

The motivation is that I'm dying from carcinoma. Somebody may have told me that I have a right, but the motivation isn't because I saw a sign. No. Somebody telling you that you have a right to file a lawsuit doesn't mean that that's the reason you filed the lawsuit. You filed the lawsuit because you were dying of carcinoma and you believed that the defendant is responsible for your injury.

So I'm excluding it. I don't think it's even close.

What else?

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MR. CARUSO: Should we do Dr. Chan now, motion to exclude?

THE COURT: Let's do that after lunch. I don't want to do another Daubert motion.

MR. OLIVER: Do you want us to do more MILs until 1:00?

THE COURT: Yes, and then we'll come back and do Dr. Chan.

MR. PENDELL: I was going to say, Your Honor, I think Dr. Chan is easy.

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MR. CARUSO: I would disagree.

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THE COURT: Of course. Let's do it after lunch. Let's go ahead and do another motion in limine, if the defense has another motion in limine.

MS. SCOTT: We've got guite a few.

MR. OLIVER: Which one are we doing, Sydney?

MS. SCOTT: I think we'll go to our motion in limine 35, which is related to the bankruptcy, and it might be a quick one to go over, Your Honor. Motion in limine 35, we talked a little bit about the bankruptcy issue on Monday. The motion in limine 35 goes to excluding evidence that's a reference to LTL, which is the successor in interest of JJCI's --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, aren't they a defendant?

MS. SCOTT: LTL? Or LLT? They are a defendant, but the issue in this motion in limine is that evidence related to their restructuring should be excluded as irrelevant because it doesn't have any bearing in this case to the extent we need to talk about it. For example, telling the jury who LTL is, we have a stipulation in the jury instructions that discuss who LTL is.

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THE COURT: Well, if punitive damages are in the case, certainly that would be relevant and probative.

MS. SCOTT: For punitive damages, Your Honor, but the financials of LTL wouldn't be relevant and we can stipulate to those numbers.

THE COURT: No, no, what I'm saying -- what I don't allow is I don't allow people to stipulate away bad facts, okay? I think they have a right prove their case, and if they want to prove it without accepting your stipulation, I think they have a right to do that.

But I agree with you that, for purposes of the liability, I don't know why we need to get into the restructuring. That, to me, is not relevant and probative to anything. It's just liable; how are you liable, okay?

But when it comes to punitive damages -- and now this is if what counsel represented to me on the Zoom is accurate, and I'm not saying it is, that's just what counsel said, I think it's relevant and probative to the issue of punitive damages.

MS. SCOTT: It is to the extent of the financials or the amount, Your Honor, the net worth

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of the defendant.

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THE COURT: And why you did what you did.

They allege that what you did was basically you restructured and you took all the money out of the company and you basically then put some money into this other entity for the sole purpose of just resolving lawsuits, but it was a small fraction of the value of -- I'm not saying it's true, ma'am.

MS. SCOTT: I understand.

THE COURT: I'm just saying that's what they are saying. And if that is, in fact, what happened, then I just don't see how it's relevant and probative.

MS. SCOTT: It's not an allegation in this case, Your Honor, and it's fundamentally not true. We funded our liabilities to the full amount of all litigation, which is why the Third Circuit said you are not insolvent and so you cannot file for bankruptcy. It also specifically said that you did not file this bankruptcy in bad faith and was not going to penalize for trying to find an efficient and effective way to resolve the tens of thousands of talc claims that have been brought against Johnson & Johnson.

Furthermore, Your Honor, this sort of evidence

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has been excluded in all of these cases, almost all these cases because it's not relevant and it's highly prejudicial and it allows the plaintiff to come in here and say the facts that they said on Monday, which are patently false, as pointed out --

THE COURT: Well, they have to have evidence. They can't just come in and make it up. They have to have -- first of all, they have to have a witness who is able to say it, okay, and they have to have evidence to support it. They can't just make it up.

MS. SCOTT: Well, I mean, I won't say they made it up, but they did misquote or misrepresent what happened with the bankruptcy. And if they are allowed to do that in front of the jury, then J&J has already been poisoned in the mind of jury, and it's going to be very hard if not impossible to undo.

THE COURT: Here is what I will do: I will say that they cannot make any statements in that regard during opening statement, and if they plan on introducing any evidence to that effect, then I will, as soon as they are going to call the witness for that, they need to request a sidebar. We'll have an in-camera conversation outside the presence

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of the jury, and at that time, I will be able to ask the witness questions -- what is the witness going to testify to -- and then I'll then decide I'm letting it in or I'm not.

MR. MAZINGO: Your Honor, good afternoon. Ridge Mazingo for the plaintiff.

But, Your Honor, you hit the nail on the head overall. Just to elucidate a couple things, you know, number one, we don't intend -- we are not going to make this a mini-trial on the bankruptcy. We are not going to contend the defendants don't have a legal right to file bankruptcy.

You know, at the time we wrote this motion, we assumed this was going to be a bifurcated trial, as Your Honor probably did. It was defendants who suggested doing it all in one; that wasn't our decision.

We had not planned to bring it up in phase one. This was going to be a phase two issue for punitive damages, as Your Honor talked ability. But it is plainly relevant to punitive damages, as you stated, and one of those reasons is because we are going to call a financial expert, Matt Diaz, to testify about defendants' financials and he can't fully and accurately do that without mentioning the

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bankruptcy.

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One of the defendants solely exists because of the bankruptcy, and their financials are rather peculiar because it was a rather peculiar bankruptcy procedure. And you can't fully and accurately testify about the financials of this company without mentioning the bankruptcy.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I don't know what he is doing to say, I don't know what the basis of all of that is, but I'm assuming he has the financials and I'm assuming he has a basis, so your motion in limine is --

Well, first of all, I'm going to say it's granted in the sense that it will not come in for purposes of liability, okay? And if it does come in, the only possible relevance it would have would be as to punitive damages, and the Court will conduct an in-camera review outside the presence of the jury before that testimony is presented to the jury to make sure that it is based on facts and based upon sound reasoning.

Anything else on this motion?

MR. MAZINGO: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

What other motion in limine?

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Page 162 1 MR. PENDELL: Can I pick one of their motions? Can we do the IARC one? I think that's probably 3 easy. 4 THE COURT: Motions in limine should be easy 5 Just give me the motion and let's go. MS. SCOTT: That's our motion. 6 7 I just asked if I could pick one MR. PENDELL: of their motions since it's a very easy one. 8 9 THE COURT: Well, let them arque it if it's 10 their motion. MS. SCOTT: All right, Your Honor. Motion in 11 12 limine number four goes to excluding documents from 13 a now bankrupt manufacturer of talc. Defendants 14 seek to move to exclude internal documents that are 15 authored by that nonparty, third-party, and alleged 16 coconspirator called Imerys as hearsay, as 17 irrelevant and hearsay testimony because, one, 18 there was no conspiracy. And so we filed --19 Is there a conspiracy count here? THE COURT: There is, and we have moved for 2.0 MS. SCOTT: 21 summary judgment on their conspiracy claim. 2.2 rested on our papers for that. 2.3 But there is no conspiracy. There is no 24 alleged agreement. The only thing that the

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plaintiffs have alleged is that we were a

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participant in a trade organization --

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THE COURT: Ma'am, I'm sorry to cut you off.

See, this is why motions in limine are somewhat
easier. There is a conspiracy count. Summary
judgment has not been granted as it relates to the
conspiracy count, and you want me to exclude
evidence of the conspiracy from the trial.

MS. SCOTT: Not only because they don't have a claim, but also because those are hearsay statements that do not fall under one of the assumptions. In addition, in order get in a coconspirator statement, the plaintiff needs to prove or at least put forward a prima facie showing of conspiracy that's independent of the document that they are seeking to admit.

THE COURT: But if I exclude it, then how are they able to establish what you call the predicate in order introduce it? In other words, if they, during the trial, establish the predicate that you say they are required to establish, and then you stand up and you say, objection, Judge, they didn't establish the predicate, and I say overruled, I find that the predicate has been established, then I wouldn't exclude it.

But if I say sustained; counsel, do you want

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to continue to try to lay the predicate? And counsel tries to lay the predicate, then -- do you see what I mean? How do I do this now when I don't know if they can lay the predicate or not?

MS. SCOTT: Understood, Your Honor, but --

THE COURT: I think what you should do is it should be a contemporaneous objection.

Do you have a conspiracy count?

MR. FAMILONI: We do, yes.

THE COURT: And they have a conspiracy, count. I'm trying to understand how the statements of the, quote, unquote, coconspirators -- or, by the way, any statements in furtherance of the conspiracy cannot be admitted assuming they are able to satisfy the predicate.

MS. SCOTT: Well, because Florida law states, Your Honor, that there must be independent evidence to prove a conspiracy and each member's participation in it before admitting a coconspirator hearsay statement.

THE COURT: Okay, but how do we get there?

If, in fact, I grant your motion, so what are they
to do at trial in order to establish -- you are
saying establish what the conspiracy is and then -independently establish what the conspiracy is,

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don't use the statements to establish the conspiracy. Independently establish the conspiracy. Once you've independently established the conspiracy, then -- and you are able to lay the predicate for the coconspirator statements, then you can elicit those statements. But how can they do that if I tell them they can't do it at all?

MS. SCOTT: Understood, Your Honor.

One further point that I'll make, a lot of these documents post-date Ms. Seskin's succession of use of talc powder. So she stopped using talc powder in 1994. That's the only sworn evidence that we have about her -- the end of her use of talc powder.

So we believe that documents that post-date her alleged use should be excluded also as irrelevant.

THE COURT: Documents that -- what do the documents say?

MS. SCOTT: The documents are internal documents of a nonparty coconspirator.

MR. FAMILONI: Your Honor, that's part of our argument is that they were vague. We don't know what documents they are specifically referring to. However, the documents and reasonings that form our

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elements are actually their own produced documents that we will bring out in trial, to your earlier point.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm just trying to understand: Any documents after 1994, after the period that you say that the plaintiff stopped using your product, you're saying those documents should be excluded because they are not --

MS. SCOTT: They are not relevant, Your Honor, because whatever the conspiracy could not be affecting her after she stopped using -- allegedly stopped using Johnson & Johnson baby powder.

THE COURT: But what if the documents -- see, because she stopped using it doesn't mean the conspiracy ends. If she stopped using the product, but the conspiracy is ongoing. You remain part of the conspiracy until you affirmatively withdraw from the conspiracy by some affirmative word or act. Meaning you call the police and say to the police, hey, or you tell the police I withdraw from this.

And by the way, there have been people who have been convicted because they agreed to do -- and when I say "convicted," I know this is not a criminal case, but people have been convicted

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because they agreed to part -- I agree to rob the bank, okay? And because they agreed to rob the bank and they did some act in furtherance of robbing the bank, then they changed their mind after they robbed the bank, then they said I'm done, I'm not robbing any more banks, but they kept -- the people kept robbing banks. And then he got swept up and charged with the conspiracy for all the banks that were robbed, and he says, but I only agreed to rob the one bank.

There was no affirmative action on your part showing that you withdrew from the conspiracy, so all of your acts were taken to be in furtherance of the overall conspiracy, and it doesn't stop because you say I stopped after the first bank.

So I think it depends upon the document, what the document says, and I can't grant that motion.

MS. SCOTT: Understood.

THE COURT: You need to make a contemporaneous objection.

MS. SCOTT: Understood, Your Honor.

MR. FAMILONI: I would just add, Your Honor, she actually stopped her use of the baby powder in 2019. She stopped her diaphragm use of the baby powder in 1994. She continued using the product

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Page 168 1 past the date 2016 date that they stated, but the specific use of her diaphragm she stopped much 3 earlier. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't make a 4 finding as to when because I don't know the facts 5 the way you all know them, I'll just simply stand 6 7 on the motion in limine is denied. I think you need to make a contemporaneous objection at the 8 9 time. 10 What is the other motion in limine? 11 MR. PENDELL: I had asked if we could do the 12 IARC one. Can we do that? It's going to take four 13 minutes. 14 THE COURT: You can pick one. You don't have 15 to keep letting him pick them. MR. PENDELL: She hasn't let me pick one yet 16 17 though, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: You picked the last one. 19 MR. PENDELL: No, no, they did a different 2.0 one. 21 THE COURT: Oh, that was a different one? 2.2 MR. PENDELL: Yes. 2.3 THE COURT: Okay. Well, it's your turn now. 24 MR. PENDELL: Okay. I would like to pick the 25 IARC motion, which is theirs, but it's very simple

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to settle this controversy, I think.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. PENDELL: I'm happy to start.

MS. SCOTT: Okay. On MIL 13, J&J defendants seek to exclude any misleading characterization that IARC, which is International Agency of Research of Cancer, has classified talc as 2B carcinogen, and the fact that in March 2019, the IARC advisory group identified domestic talc products as a high priority for re-review, look at talc in 2024.

We believe plaintiff intends to present evidence that IARC has designated domestic talc, along with 50 other substances, as high priority re-review, but this evidence is irrelevant and highly speculative. There is no guarantee that there will be any review by IARC. It's not slated to occur until June 2024. We are now in February, so four months from now.

THE COURT: So let me make sure I understand:
Has there been any paper issued or any affirmative
statement made that they are going to review it?
Or is this just -- I don't understand where it's
coming from. Where is this coming from?

MS. SCOTT: So there is a statement that says

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it's on the list to be re-reviewed sometime in 2024, but there's no guarantee it will be re-reviewed. If they do re-review it, they said they would do it in June of this year.

It's not relevant. It's highly speculative, and it would require us to speculate as to the meaning of why it's on the list with 50 other substances and why it's relevant and why it matters. It doesn't. It would be a complete side show, Your Honor.

MR. PENDELL: Your Honor, this is easy: None of this is relevant because our people are going to refer to the IARC stuff as, for talc particles, a Group 2B, which is known as a possible carcinogen to humans. And IARC classifies talc fibers as Group 1, which is a known human carcinogen, and that is how we are going to refer to it in front of the jury. That is how our experts are going to refer to it.

THE COURT: Are you going to be making any reference to the fact that they are going to be re-reviewed, along with 50 other substances, in June of 2024?

MR. PENDELL: Not in the first instance, but of course, if opposing counsel would like to ask

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| 1 | that of one of our experts, they will be prepared |
| 2 | to respond. But in the first instance, no, Your |
| 3 | Honor. |
| 4 | THE COURT: Motion granted unless you open up |
| 5 | the door. |
| 6 | MS. SCOTT: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. |
| 7 | THE COURT: What's next? We've still got four |
| 8 | minutes. I'm trying to give you a taste for the |
| 9 | way the trial is going to go. |
| 10 | MS. SCOTT: We can do MIL 22. |
| 11 | THE COURT: What is it, ma'am? |
| 12 | MS. SCOTT: The J&J defendants are moving to |
| 13 | exclude evidence related to the foreign labeling of |
| 14 | JJCI's products, or to foreign labeling |
| 15 | requirements generally. There is just no way that |
| 16 | any foreign labeling is relevant to this case that |
| 17 | is based on a U.S. citizen using talc that was |
| 18 | purchased in the United States. |
| 19 | THE COURT: Where was it manufactured? |
| 20 | MS. SCOTT: It depends on the time, Your |
| 21 | Honor. |
| 22 | THE COURT: Well, was it ever manufactured in |
| 23 | a foreign jurisdiction? |
| 24 | MS. SCOTT: Post 2003 well, manufacturing, |
| 25 | I'm not sure the exact place, but there was talc |

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Page 172 that was sourced from mines in China, but prior to 1 that, it was in Vermont, and even earlier than 2 3 that --THE COURT: Who put the labeling on the 4 packages when it was sent here? Did they follow 5 6 United States standards? 7 MS. SCOTT: Well, the actual product was manufactured in the United States. What we are 8 9 trying to exclude is evidence of warning labels 10 that are under different -- under foreign 11 regulatory regimes for Johnson & Johnson baby 12 powder --13 Meaning that the warning labels THE COURT: 14 were not warning labels used in the United States? 15 MS. SCOTT: Correct. 16 THE COURT: These were warning labels used in 17 another country? 18 MS. SCOTT: Right, they are foreign bottles. 19 Why were you using warning labels THE COURT: 20 used in another country? MR. FAMILONI: Well, Your Honor, for example, 21 2.2 we think it's relevant because I'm going to use Canada Workplace Hazardous Materials Information 23 24 They warn of the dangers of talc, and that's often referenced or cited by OSHA, which is 25

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our domestic regulation system in terms of what materials are safe or hazardous. And so we believe there is a connection there about defendants' notice, awareness of the dangers of their product.

THE COURT: No, I'm not -- because then nobody is obligated to follow -- what the foreign labels say, they don't have the same standards that we have. Their standards are probably a lot -- I shouldn't say this, but their standards probably a lot less than our standards.

And so it's unfair to look at what is on a label in a foreign country that doesn't have the requirements that we have and try to apply them to what is going on here. And I think the probative value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because they don't have the same standards.

MR. FAMILONI: But, Your Honor, to rebut that, respectfully of course, is that this same organization indicated that if you are using talc that contains more than .1 percent of crystalline silica or asbestos, it will meet their criteria for carcinogenicity. That is still, in this country, a standard that is equally dangerous. We forbid that level of crystallizing asbestos in our talc.

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THE COURT: I'm not talking about any foreign country. Talk about what happened in the good ol' -- make America great. No, I shouldn't say that.

We are only going to be talking about what happens here in the United States. We are not going to be talking about everything else going on with every foreign country.

MR. FAMILONI: I have one more thing, Your
Honor. It's relevant to our punitive damages claim
because Johnson & Johnson employees generally got
this warning, but the public, as consumers who
still bought this product, regardless of
jurisdiction or country where this was sold, they
had the benefit of the warning, yet the average
consumer in the United States did not get benefit
of that warning.

THE COURT: You know, that's interesting that you say that because I was always wondering: When we talk about punitive damages, do we talk about punitive damages and the continuing manufacture of this product worldwide or are we talking about what they do within a jurisdiction of which an American court has authority?

Because, by the way, you can make cigarettes

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that, here, we have all these codes and standards and you know what you know, so you stop making them here, but you mass produce them in China and you sell them in China because China doesn't have the same regulations and the same prohibitions.

So when we talk about punitive damages, I always thought that we have to talk about it in the context of the United States, not what they're doing worldwide, but I may be wrong. I don't know.

MR. FAMILONI: I have no indication that you're wrong, Your Honor. You know, if I was going to make a social argument, of course I think it should apply broadly because, of course, the safety of an individual is not just respective of an American citizen.

But in terms of this court and the jurisdiction, I can't say that it should apply -- that you should take into consideration a worldwide standard.

THE COURT: What about the law? What does the law say we do when we seek punitive damages? If Johnson & Johnson says we totally stopped all distribution of baby powder in the United States, but you have evidence, yeah, but you're still producing it in the world, you're still producing

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| 1 | it in all these other countries, is that relevant |
| 2 | to punitive damages here in the United States? |
| 3 | I don't know the answer. I'm asking. I would |
| 4 | think not. I would think that we have to look |
| 5 | about what's happening here in the United States |
| 6 | because our laws are so different than what happens |
| 7 | in another country, so. |
| 8 | MR. FAMILONI: Honestly, I can't make the |
| 9 | argument otherwise. |
| 10 | THE COURT: All right. The motion is granted. |
| 11 | Well, the motion in limine was to preclude you |
| 12 | making reference to foreign labeling? |
| 13 | MS. SCOTT: Labeling of Johnson & Johnson |
| 14 | products. |
| 15 | THE COURT: Granted. |
| 16 | Lunchtime. We'll be in recess. We are only |
| 17 | taking recess for 45 minutes. It will be until |
| 18 | 1:45 p.m. |
| 19 | (A recess was taken at 1:04 p.m. and the |
| 20 | proceedings resumed at 1:48 p.m.:) |
| 21 | THE COURT: You can be seated. |
| 22 | What's our next motion? |
| 23 | MR. BALZANO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. |
| 24 | I'll argue defendants' motion to exclude |
| 25 | Dr. Rigler. |

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THE COURT: Okay. Is this another Daubert?

MR. BALZANO: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BALZANO: So Dr. Rigler is plaintiff's asbestos expert, for lack of a better term, but he didn't test any of the alleged bottles that the plaintiff used for asbestos, and he didn't even do an exposure analysis to figure out how much asbestos the plaintiff was exposed to.

He does do -- and I want to focus on his exposure analysis because I think that's one of the most important parts. That's his only case-specific opinion.

This is the exposure analysis that Dr. Rigler conducted in this case. And again, it doesn't deal with asbestos, it only deals with the amount alleged that the plaintiff was exposed to, and this exposure analysis is complete speculation. He relied on -- and I think my colleague was talking a little bit about this before, about the usage and the history of usage in this case.

The only information we have from the decedent in this case a plaintiff fact sheet that she signed four or five days before she passed away.

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, that is false. They

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keep saying that and we need to correct the record. That is false information that they keep repeating.

THE COURT: You'll have your chance.

MR. BALZANO: So in that plaintiff fact sheet, she alleged -- they ask what was your exposure, what was your use of Johnson's baby powder, and they put down 1949 to 1994. So from that plaintiff fact sheet, the only information we have is until 1994.

And Dr. Rigler relied on that plaintiff fact sheet, he relied on the testimony of the plaintiff, Mr. Sugarman, the husband, and he relied on a college friend of the decedent for her usage in 1970 to 1974, 50 years ago. And I want to start with the first time.

So when you look at the exposure sheet, that's what he starts with. He starts with the 1970 to 1974 exposure, which is based on the friend -- Diana Ronell is the name of the friend. And when you look at Ms. Ronell's testimony, she says that they would go on trips together sometimes. They would go to the lake, they would go on some camping trips, and she would see her use allegedly Johnson's baby powder.

And when asked how many times, she would say a

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It was vague. Maybe three or four few times. She couldn't give a specific number.

And Dr. Rigler, from that testimony alone, extrapolates it out to two applications a day, seven days a week, 365 days. The 4 grams number, I mean, we don't really have any testimony about how much she would apply. We're not even sure how she would apply it necessarily.

So from that, his exposure assessment is completely speculative. And then when you look at the 1975 to 2018 period, if you isolate 1975 to 1993, we don't have any information about that because the decedent met Mr. Sugarman in 1993, I believe. So from 1975 to 1993, there is no information, but still in the exposure, still those two applications a day, seven days a week, 4 grams.

Then when we get to Mr. Sugarman, Mr. Sugarman testified in his deposition -- and this is what we were talking a little bit about before. testified in his deposition that the 1994 time period end date on the plaintiff fact sheet was supposed to only be in relation to the use of her diaphragm.

But first off, again, the only information we have from the plaintiff, again, is the plaintiff

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fact sheet. And second, why would Dr. Seskin put -- when you look at the plaintiff fact sheet,it asks: When did you use Johnson's baby powder? From 1949 to 1994. She wasn't using her diaphragm when she was born in 1949.

So it seems like a weird interpretation of that question to say the '94 end date was diaphragm, but the 1949 start date was any use, or use when you were a baby. So all this is to say, Your Honor, that this exposure analysis -- again, only talc, not asbestos -- he just had assumption upon assumption upon assumption, and it's completely speculative.

And I don't think it will help the jury -- one last point. I don't think it will help the jury because it's not like he's doing some type of complex math. He admits in his deposition that this is just simple math. He just takes two times 365 times four.

THE COURT: All right. Who is this witness again?

MR. BALZANO: He is plaintiff's asbestos testing expert. I think he has a degree in microbiology, but he has experience in -- he's a microscopist.

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THE COURT: All right.

MR. OLIVER: So, Your Honor, one thing I want to make clear, at least at this point, I'm going to focus on this exposure analysis. That, quite frankly, is not the main point of Dr. Rigler's testimony. And they don't seem to be challenging that, so if we need to talk about that with you, I do want them to raise that. I just want to make that clear so I can respond just to this part of it because this is by far not the part that's not most important.

So the first thing I want to do is make clear a couple things. Dr. Rigler's exposure analysis, he's done this type of analysis before. Your Honor has to remember that the exposure analysis here is exposure to the product, Johnson's baby powder, not a specific level of exposure to asbestos or fibrous talc or the ingredients, just like a cigarette.

Your Honor has done cigarette cases. No expert in a cigarette case comes in and says I know which carcinogen caused the cancer, and you had too high a level of plutonium. We know plutonium is in cigarettes, but so are 600 other carcinogens. So it's exposure to the product.

He used 4 grams as a conservative estimate.

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He actually got that from a peer reviewed article that he sent me. There is a J&J document that he also relies on where they surveyed women using talcum powder in the genital area.

They used 8 grams as a regular measure, and he can obviously show the jury what a gram sized application of this powder looks like, but that's where he got that. So he went with the lower number, which was something reported in a study, and the higher number is one that is actually reported in J&J's own documentation.

THE COURT: So we don't know how much she would use?

MR. OLIVER: Well, she didn't testify to that because she died before we scheduled a preservation deposition and she died before we could get that to happen. So what does the testimony show about her usage?

THE COURT: The husband didn't know?

MR. OLIVER: Well, I'm going there. I'm going there. And I'm going to start in the beginning with her college roommate. Well, I'll start with the sworn statement.

So her sworn statement in this case, the fact worksheet, she wrote from birth to 1994. At

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Mr. Sugarman's deposition, he explained that at the time that Marilyn Seskin filled this out, she was about four weeks from her death. She could not fill it out herself, he filled it out for her by asking the questions and she was able to sign it.

So when they ask about this thing about when did she start using it, he said, well, she told me it was used on her as a baby. So she didn't understand that we are not talking about usage as a baby; she just said, well, I used the product when I was a baby because I know my parents put it on me.

And that continued until '94. When they asked him about '94, they said something like, did she stop then? And he said, well, she stopped using it on her diaphragm. And they ask a series of questions, and it got kind of entertaining at one point. He finally said, ma'am, we didn't need birth control anymore, that's what she meant. She stopped putting it on her diagram in '94.

Why? She was 55. We didn't need birth control. Then they asked follow-up questions; did she keep using it on her underwear? Absolutely she kept using it on her underwear.

How do you know? I saw it -- we have some of

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the bottles, by the way.

I saw it in her underwear. I did the laundry in the house, I saw it in her underwear. And on several occasions, he testified that he bought the product for her very close to her death, before she had filed this lawsuit and realized that there was a connection between these products.

So the usage as defendants have characterized it is not exactly accurate, but these limitations that they're talking about in Dr. Rigler's exposure analysis, he is not going to quibble with those. If they ask him, well, you didn't have any information about what happened between the time her college roommate saw her use it when they were camping and when she met Mr. Sugarman later in life, Dr. Rigler is going to say, that's right, this is an assumption. I'm telling the jury it's an assumption that people use this in a habitual way, just like deodorant.

THE COURT: You called it an assumption. How is it not just pure speculation?

MR. OLIVER: Well, Your Honor, it's not speculation because it's a reasonable inference for the jury to draw that, look, she was using it. She said she used it her whole life.

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Her sheet says I used it my whole life in this manner, right? Her sworn sheet. And her roommate saw her use it when she was in her 20s, and then her husband has oodles of testimony about the manners in which he knew she used it and that kind of thing.

So there is no speculation, she said she used the product. You get the details of how she used the product and the frequency with which she used the product more from the testimony than you do the fact worksheet because the fact worksheet asked a set of specific questions that she, quite frankly, filled out while she was on her death bed.

THE COURT: So I'm just trying to understand your point, sir. Is it your point that this particular witness cannot testify that she used the product or how often she used the product?

MR. BALZANO: I think the point is that this really goes to it's not helpful to the trier of fact. As plaintiff's counsel points out, there's plenty of testimony, and the jury can hear that testimony and the jury can decide how much exposure.

THE COURT: Did the roommate testify, the college roommate?

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Page 186 1 MR. OLIVER: Yes. THE COURT: Oh. 3 MR. OLIVER: By deposition. 4 MR. BALZANO: So I don't know why we need 5 this. And as plaintiff's counsel said, this isn't the most important part of his testimony. 6 I don't 7 know why we need to get up and say 137,000 --THE COURT: Yeah, why can't you just do that 8 9 math? 10 MR. OLIVER: There's an answer to that, and 11 it's a really good one. The epidemiological 12 literature that establishes the talcum powder 13 connection between ovarian cancer, it measures 14 exposure in terms of -- and different articles use 15 different terms, but for the most part, it's 16 dosages a day, or usages a day, right? 17 And he is putting it in those terms based on 18 the literate so that if the defendants cross and 19 they want to say, they didn't even tell you how 2.0 many applications she had, right, we have this 21 information from an expert who said, look, I 2.2 counted out the applications based on the evidence, 2.3 I did the math, and I've done this before, I know 24 what I'm looking for in terms of application. 25 THE COURT: I don't understand. But why

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can't -- the husband is going to testify and the husband is going to testify about how often she would use it and he is going to testify approximately how much of it she would use.

MR. OLIVER: That's true.

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THE COURT: The college roommate is going to testify by deposition and she is going to testify that she used the product. I don't understand the need to have this witness just basically -- really, all this witness is doing is exactly what they've already said and just putting it in maybe a neater package.

MR. OLIVER: First of all, I don't agree that he's doing exactly what they've already said because those people are not in any measure going to quantify the number of doses. And if you remember from the defendants' summary judgment motion, Your Honor, one of the things they complaint about -- albeit incorrectly -- is dosage, right?

They want to talk about dosage of constituents, but the fact of the matter is what we care about under the law is dosages of product, right? And so they criticize us for not talking about the dosage of the product.

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Page 188 1 Well, we fix that criticism by giving them an absolute number and dosage of the product, which will allow --3 THE COURT: Where is the dosage number on 4 5 here? MR. OLIVER: Well, dose is applications. 6 It's 7 total applications. THE COURT: But all it was was math. All he 8 9 did was just basically take a number and multiply 10 it out. If you take 365 -- right? 11 MR. BALZANO: It's just multiplication, Your 12 Honor. 13 MR. OLIVER: That's right, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: So you have dosage. Even if they 15 cut someone from saying there's no dosage, it is in 16 the record, you just have to do the math. 17 What is he adding other than taking a 18 calculator and multiplying it out to get dosage? 19 I think, Your Honor, what he's MR. OLIVER: doing is very similar to a federal 1006 exhibit. 2.0 21 There is a counterpart in the Florida rules, I just 2.2 don't remember the number. 2.3 But essentially, I could give the jury all of 24 the medical bills in this case and just say go add 25 it up, but I don't. I give them a specific sheet

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of paper on top of the medical bills, which is provided for under the rules of evidence.

THE COURT: That is because it is voluminous calculations.

MR. OLIVER: That's true.

THE COURT: This is not voluminous calculations. I'm looking at this and the only numbers I see are applications per day, two; times per week, seven; number of days, 365; number of years, four; applications, 2,920.

That's very, very basic math. This is not -- and I agree with you, if this was medical bills where you've got to go to multiple sheets in order to get the number, I get it. That's not what we have here.

So I don't think this doctor should basically be able to present -- I think you can do this in argument. I think you can put it together.

Meaning you put together -- in other words, in your closing argument, you can pull this sheet up and you can present this as your closing argument as compared to him testifying to it.

MR. OLIVER: Sure.

THE COURT: Assuming that the evidence is going to come in as you just indicated from the

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MR. OLIVER: Right. I mean, I don't have a problem with that, and I agree that I can do that through argument, but I also agree that it's appropriate to summarize this type of evidence through an expert.

THE COURT: Motion in limine, at least as to this part, is granted.

MR. BALZANO: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. OLIVER: Now, do defendants want to talk about the other stuff with Dr. Rigler? Because if they do, I need to know.

MR. BALZANO: So I want to talk about next his opinion about asbestos being above ambient levels.

MR. OLIVER: Okay.

MR. BALZANO: So the next opinion Dr. Rigler gives is -- so, again, Dr. Rigler, like plaintiff's counsel said, they do have -- they allege some bottles that Mr. Sugarman found in his house that Marilyn Seskin allegedly used. He didn't test that bottle though to see if that contained asbestos.

They didn't test that bottle, and like we were talking about earlier with Dr. Sitelman, Dr. Rigler can do a tissue digestion to see if Dr. Seskin's tissue contained --

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Page 191 1 THE COURT: You mean the actual bottle of talc 2 powder that she used, he didn't test it? 3 MR. BALZANO: He didn't test it. MR. OLIVER: Neither did the defendants. 4 5 THE COURT: But my question is: But why does he need to test it if the ingredients -- do you put 6 7 different ingredients in the product? MR. BALZANO: No. And Your Honor, I think the 8 9 more important point is that he didn't test 10 Dr. Seskin's tissue either, so there is no 11 connection. He could have digested her tissue to 12 see if there was asbestos, what we were talking 13 about earlier with Dr. Sitelman, to see if there 14 was asbestos in Dr. Seskin's tissue. He didn't do 15 that either. So he has no connection to this case. 16 17 what the opinion that he wants to come in here and 18 say is that Dr. Seskin had exposure to asbestos 19 above ambient levels, meaning above levels that are just in the air. 2.0 21 THE COURT: But how does he know that? 2.2 Exactly. And one more point --MR. BALZANO: 2.3 THE COURT: How does he say he knows that, is 24 my question. 25 MR. BALZANO: Well, in another case that

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plaintiff's counsel has, the Matthey case, this was a deposition in 2020, we asked them. So this is September 11, 2020, and we asked them: "We just want to make sure when you come into trial and you get on the stand, you are not going to tell the jury that Ms. Matthey had an exposure to asbestos in the excess of ambient? You are not going to tell them that, are you?

"ANSWER: I would have to think about that.

"QUESTION: Okay.

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"ANSWER: I can't make an answer to that right now as I sit here.

"QUESTION: All right. Sitting here today, you have not formed the opinion that Ms. Matthey was exposed to asbestos in the excess of ambient, fair?

"ANSWER: That is fair."

And then at our deposition in the Sugarman case, he says, "All right. And my question, Dr. Rigler, is today you've offered an opinion that Dr. Seskin was exposed to asbestos in excess of ambient, but you weren't able to do that in 2020 in Ms. Matthey's case. Can you explain why you are now able to make that opinion?"

And he starts to read the deposition, and then

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he says -- so this was September 11th of 2020 -"I've had time to think about it. I've had time to
think about that since that time, and again, based
on what I talked about earlier and the questions I
answered earlier, it would be my opinion, you know,
more likely than not, she would have been exposed
to a level above ambient."

THE COURT: Does he say why he says that?

MR. BALZANO: He had more time to think about

it. In 2020 --

THE COURT: No, that's why he's now able to answer it, but why can he say now to a reasonable degree of certainty that -- more likely than not, I think is what he said -- that she was exposed to levels above ambient?

MR. BALZANO: Well, first off, I think he is probably going to be relying on -- and this is what another portion of our motion is, is he relies on litigation testing from -- he used to work at a laboratory, MAS Material. I'm not really sure what it stands for.

But he used to work there and that laboratory was retained. There is another expert, Dr. Longo, in this litigation, and they tested baby powder and they say that they found asbestos, but it's all

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Page 194 1 litigation reports. It's all litigation tests. It's all funded by plaintiff's attorneys and --3 THE COURT: Well, does that mean that it didn't be relied upon? 4 5 MR. BALZANO: No, no, no, and I think the important point is, in 2020, he had those tests. 6 7 Those tests happened in 2017 and 2018. THE COURT: What I'm trying to get to, and 8 9 maybe we'll just ask the plaintiffs, I'm trying to 10 There has to be -- he can't just say it. 11 He has to have a basis for saying it. 12 So what is the basis for saying it? 13 MR. BALZANO: I don't know what his basis is. So the basis for him saying it is 14 MR. OLIVER: 15 the body of his work that he performed, not 16 specifically this case, but for these cases. 17 Dr. Longo is not our expert, but Dr. Rigler at the 18 time was like his partner in the lab. Dr. Rigler went out and started his own lab called Aspects 19 2.0 Labs. They actually use the same space, they just had a different financial arrangement now or 21 2.2 something. 2.3 So what they did in the context of this 24 litigation, I believe through the MDL proceeding up

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in Philadelphia, was they gathered up samples of

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Johnson's baby powder. Some Imerys railcar samples, which were also Johnson's baby powder, Imerys is just the supplier of the raw talc.

So they gathered up these samples. Some of them came from places that they got them off the internet. They bought them. Others came from things that the defendants produced. And they did a three-step process to test for asbestos.

What Dr. Rigler will testify to is, yes, I tested these bottles of baby powder, I tested them from this decade, this decade, this decade, I used these methodologies, and he has exact numbers, but between 70 and 72 percent of the time with regard to Johnson's baby powder, I found asbestos structures -- and he has pictures of them and all that stuff -- in the bottle.

So that testimony goes to defect and they have arguments about that. I just want to make sure we are not confusing that.

But that also forms the basis of his opinion regarding above ambient exposure. Above ambient exposure -- ambient exposure is what you and I get walking down the streets of New York or Miami, right? There might be asbestos in the air.

What Dr. Rigler is going to say is, look, I've

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tested baby powder. 72 percent of the time, it has asbestos in it. When it has asbestos in it, I can tell you, using mathematical calculations, roughly how many fibers are in a gram of that powder. This is sort of accepted industry science on how you do that math.

He is not going to say -- he will certainly say I'm assuming her testimony is true, right, that she used the product. I mean, I believe it. And he is going to say if I believe the testimony of record, and this woman used this her whole life on her genitalia from age of sexual maturity to her death, then this would be above ambient exposure.

Because you or I don't have that. That's the definition of ambient is just background. But what she has has to be far greater than background because she was using it in a time period during decades which we know it had asbestos exposure in it.

THE COURT: If her testimony, or if the testimony about how often she used it, if that testimony is accepted, wouldn't that just automatically be above ambient?

MR. OLIVER: That I believe is true, yes. I mean, he is going to say that based on his

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testing --

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THE COURT: So I guess the reason I'm asking is why then -- I understand if he explained ambient the way you just explained what ambient is, why is it necessary for him to then come in and opine that her exposure was above ambient? Because it doesn't seem like that's a complicated fact that an expert would need to opine on because ambient is just basically saying this is just normal exposure based upon everyday living, walking around, existing.

MR. OLIVER: He will need to explain that.

THE COURT: Right, he would explain that.

MR. OLIVER: Sure, sure.

THE COURT: I don't know if this is really -if we should be fighting over this, because if he
explains what ambient is, and then he says, well,
her exposure was above ambient because, okay, she
used the baby powder -- accepting the testimony as
true, she used the baby powder for this period of
time, that by definition would be ambient exposure.

MR. OLIVER: And maybe to put some of it in context on why he needs to say this, the defendants are going to put on a case that -- first of all, they're going to tell everybody that talc is everywhere. It's everywhere, it's everywhere.

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Talc is everywhere. It's on your medicine, it's on your this, it's on your that.

And they are going to say the same thing about asbestos. There is asbestos out there just flouting around in the air, right?

So it matters -- which is not true, right? It matters to have an expert say, look, you know, people who are just walking around and not using this product, they are not getting exposed to the same level of asbestos as somebody who is walking down the street, right? You would have to be in a construction job or, you know, doing something like that where you are exposed to an extra level of asbestos. That's why we need the testimony.

THE COURT: I get it.

MR. BALZANO: I think the problem here -- and to go back to the exposure assessment, I started with this, he could have calculated based on his assumption how much -- because that's more complicated math -- to see how much asbestos Dr. Seskin was exposed to based on her alleged use. But he didn't do that.

There is no connection, I think that's the point here, is that Dr. Rigler, he is just going to get in here and say, yeah, the talcum powder that

she used exposed her to asbestos above ambient levels, but there's nothing to back that up. There is no connection to this case.

He didn't look at the tissue. He didn't look at her bottle. He didn't even conduct some type of exposure analysis for asbestos.

THE COURT: I don't understand that argument because what he is saying is he's accepting that her use is factually supported by the record.

Meaning if, in fact, her use is incorrect, meaning the jury rejects the testimony regarding her use, then his opinions all go away, right? Because his opinion is based upon the testimony that has been presented in the record.

And so I don't know anything requiring him to basically say that it's this many parts per milliter of exposure. All he needs to say is that it's above ambient. I don't think he needs to quantify it, like to say how much above ambient. I don't know why that is required.

MR. BALZANO: I think it would be important for him to look at studies and look at the ambient level of asbestos to try to add some type of value, some type of expert value.

THE COURT: Why?

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MR. BALZANO: I mean, to add expert value to the case. I mean, in 2020 --

THE COURT: I would think that if he didn't, you would be happy about that, because if he did, that would just make their case stronger and your case weaker. If he didn't, that makes your cross-examination more colorful and it makes your argument to the jury more powerful.

MR. BALZANO: Understood, Your Honor, but I would just leave you with the fact that he just sort of changed his mind from 2020 to 2023. He had more time to think about it. I don't think that is emblematic of a well thought out --

THE COURT: You all just stood up there about three and a half hours ago and you told me that science is forever evolving. Science doesn't just --

MR. BALZANO: Not this science though, to be fair. It's different science.

THE COURT: Motion in limine is granted as to the -- I'm sorry, I granted it as to the exposure and I'm denying it as to the ambient levels.

MR. BALZANO: And there is one more portion in the motion, but I would like to rest on the papers for it. It's really complicated.

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THE COURT: It's really convoluted?

MR. BALZANO: Complicated asbestos science.

MR. OLIVER: Both.

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THE COURT: Okay. Tell me what it is.

MR. BALZANO: So the bulk of Dr. Rigler, what we expect the bulk of Dr. Rigler's opinion will be when he used to work at this other MAS lab and their testing of Johnson's baby powder. They tested a number of bottles, and there is a couple portions of this.

I mean, we say that it's unreliable. We argue that it's unreliable testing because when you look at the asbestos -- so when plaintiff stands up here and talk about tremolite or anthophyllite, there is an asbestiform version of tremolite, which is asbestos, and then there is a non-asbestiform version of tremolite. Not all tremolite is asbestos.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BALZANO: And it depends on how it grows in the earth. The asbestiform is needlelike, and I think the tensile strength, it doesn't break easily. The vast majority of tremolite and anthophyllite is not non-asbestiform. It doesn't grow in that habit.

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But what happens is when you're dealing with these really, really tiny, really small particles, is if you take a non-asbestiform tremolite and you break it, some of it can sometimes look like a needle, but it didn't grow in an asbestiform habit. So to identify tremolite, to look at talc and see tremolite, that's not necessarily asbestos. And it's unreliable because, you know, you cannot distinguish between asbestiform and non-asbestiform using the methods that Dr. Longo --

THE COURT: Who says that?

MR. BALZANO: Who says that you cannot distinguish? So there are a bunch of definitions from various public health authorities and public agencies.

THE COURT: I know, but you have to tell me -you're saying his opinion is unreliable. I need to
know it's unreliable because it's not the proper
methodology. It's unreliable because it's not
proper application to the facts in this case. It's
unreliable --

That's what I need, and you can't just talk to me about -- you've got to give me something specific that I can hang my hat on.

MR. BALZANO: So when you look at a bunch of

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government agencies, they all define asbestos as tremolite asbestos, or something grown in an asbestiform habit. And the methodology that he relies on is something called AHERA.

It is escaping me what it stands for right now, but it is some type of government protocol, I think issued by OSHA. And that was primarily for when they were abating schools. Like schools would have asbestos or buildings would have asbestos and they were abating it.

Now, those counting methodologies, when they would look at the air to see if there were particles in the air, and if they saw tremolite, they would characterize it as asbestos tremolite, but that's because they knew beforehand that there was asbestos in the walls. So they don't have to worry about misidentifying non-asbestiform tremolite with asbestiform tremolite.

And these are the counting procedures that Dr. Rigler and Dr. Longo used when they were looking at talc. They would see tremolite and they would count it as a fiber. Under these procedures, you would need to count, I think it was either three or five fibers to say that something -- because sometimes it could be contamination if you

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just found one, so they had counting protocols.

So there are a lot of -- so non-asbestiform is what we call cleavage, a cleavage fragment, and we say that there are a lot of authorities that say there is no scientific proof to show that the non-asbestiform version of tremolite or anthophyllite are harmful.

THE COURT: So the gist of what you're saying to me is that you don't believe that he has properly tested or the proper amount of asbestos, at least the tremolite asbestos, and therefore, his opinion is unreliable?

MR. BALZANO: Right.

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, so first of all, let me just back up and say that Dr. Rigler applied the counting rules that have been endorsed by the EPA, which have a five-to-one aspect ratio, and OSHA has even done -- well, actually, he applied OSHA, which is a three-to-one. I think EPA has done a five-to-one.

These are the accepted counting rules within the industry. They are the majority counting rules --

THE COURT: He is going to testify to that?

MR. OLIVER: Oh, he is absolutely going to

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testify to it. And they are going to put up an expert who is going to talk about some different counting rules, and the interesting thing is nobody follows those counting rules except Johnson & Johnson and other industry participants who want to get away from asbestos lawsuits.

THE COURT: OSHA doesn't follow it?

MR. OLIVER: No, they follow the three-to-one. They follow what Dr. Rigler did, right? So he's following the accepted regulatory and scientific counting rules.

In terms of whether tremolite that is a cleavage fragment is dangerous, the authorities also agree -- and this is in the peer reviewed literature -- that we don't know whether it's the chemical composition of the asbestos or the needlelike shape, but there are many scientific authorities -- in fact, the majority position -- that say, look, it's the needlelike shape that matters.

So when you take a rock of tremolite and throw it on the ground, the rock isn't going to hurt you. But if you shatter it with a ball and it turns into little shards, there are tons of scientists out there that are going to say that's the problem,

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it's the needlelike shape.

And, in fact, the FDA convened an international working group on this issue. Now, the FDA hasn't finalized this yet, but the working group recommended to FDA to follow the process for, you know, finding the asbestos that Dr. Rigler recommended, they are using the same rules, and in that working group statement, they say everybody agrees it's the needlelike shape that is the problem, not necessarily the chemical composition. That's why we have six different types of asbestos and they all have a different chemical composition, but we know they all form cancer because they all tend to come in this needlelike shape, as does talc.

So there's absolutely no problem with the methodology used, but here is the best part, Your Honor. They are complaining about cleavage fragments. Dr. Rigler testified when I counted, I didn't count cleavage fragments, and 96 percent of what we counted in our test are what are called bundles.

Bundles are multiple strands of asbestos or fibrous material, you know, laying on one another.

96 percent were bundles. Bundles can't be cleavage

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fragments. They are mutually exclusive.

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Cleavage fragment is what it sounds like. He said he didn't count those, and anyway, 96 percent were bundles.

So this argument is simply something that a bunch of old asbestos scientists might sit around a bar and debate and say, well, that's interesting, I'll look at this paper, I'll look at that paper, but it is not anything that has to do with Daubert.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. BALZANO: I would like to sit with the asbestos scientists. I'm sure it would be fun.

But just on the bundles point, so, again,
Dr. Rigler worked at MAS, and MAS has done all of
this talcum powder testing in the auspices of
litigation. They all were being paid by
plaintiffs' attorneys to do these tests.

And this bundle point, there was -- it is so subjective, so if I could hand up -- I'm sorry, I don't have a copy for you, counsel.

MR. OLIVER: That's okay.

MR. BALZANO: This is just from page 11 of our motion. This just shows how subjective this type of microscope and this type of testing is.

When you -- they would have various TEM, they

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would use that type of microscope to look at these fibers and bundles. And at a certain point, they weren't finding as many bundles. I don't have the numbers in front of me, but they were finding something like 40 percent of the tremolite or anthophyllite particles that they were identifying, they were saying were bundles.

And then at some point, that shot up to like 93 percent. And what they would do is they were looking and they were just -- it is so subjective to just look at that picture and say, well, that looks like a bundle. Or, well, that looks like a fiber.

And there is just no methodology behind -it's just the eyes of the microscopist when they
are looking at that particular particle.

THE COURT: Isn't it just about counting and what you see?

MR. OLIVER: It's a five-to-one aspect ratio, or three-to-one. Those are measurements that every singer fiber satisfied. Those are the counting rules.

So it's not arbitrary. They didn't make this up. That's what they followed.

MR. BALZANO: So counsel is talking about --

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THE COURT: This one here is a single fiber?

MR. BALZANO: That's what the MAS scientists

say, and then the other one, they're saying is a

bundle.

So I don't want to get confused with the counting rules. There is a difference between counting what you see as a fiber, and then when we're talking about bundles, a bundle is something where, when you look at the fiber, it sort of is breaking up, and what that shows you is that it grew that way. And that's why it matters, because it's whether or not it's asbestiform.

THE COURT: Why would this be a bundle?

MR. BALZANO: I agree. I don't think it's a bundle.

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, that argument cannot stand. I cannot look at that and tell you anything about this, and neither can he. That is insanity, all right?

Our doctors have the absolute -- the rules, right? The rules for counting. And J&J is going to say we have our own rules that we wish somebody would adopt. We wish the FDA would do what we want them to do because then we would never get in trouble. But the FDA hasn't agreed to do that.

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THE COURT: I get it. The motion is denied.

What else?

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MR. BALZANO: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. SCOTT: We have one last motion to exclude on -- I'm sorry, two more motions to exclude. This one on Dr. Plunkett.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, the J&J defendants have moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. Laura Plunkett. We are going to focus our argument today on three buckets of her opinions, and I'm just going to start off by saying that Dr. Plunkett is a toxicologist and a pharmacologist, but that's by training.

Her profession is she's been a paid consultant and expert witness traveling the circuit offering exert opinions. And I'm not saying that to malign her character in any way, everyone has to make a living, I'm just saying that based on our experience with her, particularly in this talc litigation, we have a sense of what sort of opinions she's going to offer, and particularly, the inadmissible opinions that she is going to offer.

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As I started off, those opinions fall under three buckets. The first bucket is on opinions on FDA regulations. The second opinion is on what I referred to earlier with Dr. Freidenfelds corporate mind reading, and then again this reading unambiguous corporate documents into the record and putting her own expert spin on those documents.

Courts around the country have excluded Dr. Plunkett's testimony on these sorts of opinions and we would submit that this Court should join those courts as well. I'll go one by one and talk about those buckets.

So the first one is on FDA regulations.

Dr. Plunkett intends to come in and talk about --

THE COURT: What's her background?

MS. SCOTT: She's a pharmacologist and toxicologist.

THE COURT: Okay. I think you said that. Go ahead.

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor, and she's been a consultant for 25 to 30 or so years. She intends to tell the jury things like J&J defendants failed to comply with FDA regulations governing things like warning labels and cosmetic. She doesn't have a lot of experience in cosmetic. As a

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toxicologist, she focuses on drugs and drug labeling.

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But in any event, plaintiff admits in their response that Dr. Plunkett is going to come in and talk about the applicability of the FDA regulation to cosmetics -- that is, which regulations apply -and she is also going to say whether or not the defendants met those requirements -- that is, whether the defendants complied. And that's pure legal opinion, Your Honor.

Moreover, Dr. Plunkett has never worked for She has almost no experience with cosmetics. She is not qualified to offer these sorts of opinions.

She is clearly opining on the law, and in a similar case involving talc litigation, a trial court in California -- and we have the language here on the slide -- precluded Dr. Plunkett from opining that talc-based powders should have been labeled to warn of the risk for two reasons. First, she can't give a legal opinion, and second, she's not qualified on FDA regulations or the applicability of their labeling.

So I think plaintiffs responded in their response that she is a scientist and she is going

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Page 213 1 to give her views on the law as a scientist, but that makes her even less qualified to opine --3 THE COURT: I'm sure they didn't say that. Did they really say that, she is going to give her 4 5 views on the law? MS. SCOTT: The response at 35, Your Honor, 6 7 her opinions in this case do not come from interpreting statutes and regulations as a lawyer, 8 but as a scientist. 9 10 Another case that we have cited on this slide, 11 Your Honor --12 THE COURT: But when do I let anyone come in and interpret the law? I don't understand that. 13 14 She is going to come in and interpret the law as a 15 scientist? 16 MS. SCOTT: I agree with that, Your Honor. 17 You are not supposed to come in here and tell the 18 jury what the law is, opine on what the law is. 19 That is your job, obviously, of course is to instruct the jury on the law and they will follow 2.0 21 the law that is given by you, not by an expert. 2.2 Is there any dispute as to what THE COURT: 2.3 the FDA regulations require? 24 MS. SCOTT: There are instances where, for 25 example, she talks about whether or not we

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misbranded our products, whether they need to be labeled, and I think the legal dispute there is whether we needed to label or not under the FDA's regulations, and she is going to come in and say yes, defendants were supposed to label these to label baby powder under the FDA regulations.

THE COURT: So what she's saying is that she is going to point to a specific provision of the FDA regulations and say, under this particular regulation, it requires products to be labeled and this is what the labels should require?

That, to me, is not interpreting the law.

That's just simply saying what the rules and regulations are as it relates to that.

The only other way that could happen is if you all are under agreement as to this is what it requires, and I then instruct the jurors. Because if not, who is going to come in and tell the jurors that this is what the label -- you are required to have a label, you are not required to have a label. This is what the regulations say, this is what the regulations don't say. Somebody has to do that.

MS. SCOTT: They are not supposed to give an opinion as to the law.

THE COURT: It's not an opinion as to the law.

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What it is is that there was a statute that was passed, or the FDA has regulations. This is what the regulations are, okay?

And then they would say you either complied with those regulations or you didn't, here is the reason you didn't comply with those regulations. I don't know why that -- I don't think that is what would disqualify the testimony.

MS. SCOTT: To say whether or not the defendants complied with the law or comply with the regulations?

THE COURT: Whether or not you met the FDA regulations. That's what experts do all the time experts. Experts come in all the time and they say this is the law as it relates -- this is the law as it relates to standard of care.

Did the plaintiff meet that standard of care?

No. Why not? And this is why they didn't meet it.

MS. SCOTT: But Your Honor, we are not talking about standard of care that requires expert testimony. We are talking about here is a cited regulation, here are some words in the cited regulation, and let me interpret the legal meaning of these words. So whether or not something has been, for example, misbrand or adulterated --

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THE COURT: But ma'am, if you all don't agree -- in other words, I would understand that if you're telling me, Judge Thomas, we agree what the rules and the regulations are and we agree to how they are to be applied. But when you don't agree, then somebody has to come in.

They may give one interpretation, you may give another interpretation, but the only other way -- because how are the jurors going to know what to do unless you're telling me that I, as the judge, have to basically say here are the regulations that apply, this is what the regulations mean, and then you argue what actually happened. But otherwise, I don't know how it's done.

MS. SCOTT: It is the province of the Court to instruct the jury on the law.

THE COURT: But the problem is you don't agree. I'm going to have a mini trial and you all are going to basically come in and you are going to testify to me what the FDA regulations are, what -- so I have to decide these are the regulations. So I'll then say, okay, these are the regulations that apply to this case. That may be the easiest part of this.

Then the next question is going to be what

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Johnson & Johnson was doing. This is what Johnson & Johnson was doing. Then you look at the regulations, you look at what Johnson & Johnson was doing, and you say Johnson & Johnson failed to comply in this regard because the label required 14 point font; Johnson & Johnson didn't have 14 point font.

The label required that you list out all the ingredients of your product, Johnson & Johnson didn't put all the ingredients of their product there. What did they leave out? They left out asbestos. They left out, you know, metals. They left out all these other things.

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MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, the issue is we are not going to be -- if I'm understanding you correctly, we are not going to be fighting over -- we are not fighting over any ambiguity in the regulations. The regulations are what they are.

You can't have an expert come and make the legal opinion, have a legal conclusion that a party complied or did not comply with those regulations. That's pure legal opinion. She's tried it before and courts have said no, you're not allowed to give a legal opinion.

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But unless you have other questions, I can move on to the second bucket.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MS. SCOTT: The second bucket, Your Honor, contains Dr. Plunkett's opinions about the J&J defendants' business practices. And so she plans to tell the jury things like what J&J defendants knew and when, opine on whether their actions were reasonable --

THE COURT: There is another witness that is going to testify to this?

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor, with, we believe, the same sort of reading unambiguous documents in order to put an expert spin to come to a conclusion. And courts have likewise prevented Dr. Plunkett from coming in and giving any express opinions about defendants' motive or intent.

THE COURT: I don't understand what qualifies

Dr. Plunkett to come in -- I mean, I guess she's

not the, quote, unquote, historian of medicine or

whatever the last person's title they had, so what

allows her to look at documents and then come in

and say this is what Johnson & Johnson did and this

is when they did it? I'm trying to understand

that.

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MS. SCOTT: We agree, Your Honor. She can't come in here and do that, and that's what courts have said. She can't come in and read documents and speak to a party's motive or intent. Such opinions are speculative.

The Echevarria case that I mentioned earlier from the California trial court said Dr. Plunkett is not qualified to opine on corporate behavior. She's a pharmacologist. Plaintiff can put into evidence documents and testimony to show corporate activity and they can argue that. They don't need an expert to be on the stand --

THE COURT: I don't know if they can even put that in through her. I'm assuming somebody gave her some documents and she looked at the documents and she is going to come in and testify, okay, Johnson & Johnson did this and Johnson & Johnson did that. I don't know how that informs her ultimate opinion.

All right. We'll hear from them in a minute. What is the next one?

MS. SCOTT: Just to take a step back on the FDA regulations, in addition to it being improper legal opinion, she's just not qualified to opine on FDA regulations. She's never worked for the FDA,

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she's never been an employee, she's never consulted for, she's not speaking on their behalf.

THE COURT: So what you're telling me is all she really is doing is reading the regulations and saying whether or not you complied with them?

Yes. As a pharmacologist, she --MS. SCOTT:

She's never applied the THE COURT: regulations, she's never been in charge with enforcing the regulations, she didn't write the regulations? So she is just doing -- she has a nice degree and then she is reading the regulations and she is saying this is what they are because I read them, and this is what Johnson & Johnson did or did not do because I know the facts of the case?

MS. SCOTT: Precisely, Your Honor.

All right. What's the third THE COURT: bucket?

MS. SCOTT: The third bucket is one we've spoken about before, particularly with Dr. Freidenfelds, and that is Dr. Plunkett's narrative testimony based on unambiguous documents. Again, plaintiff's counsel wants to put her on the stand to interpret and put an expert spin on our company documents. She has a track record of doing that in other cases.

THE COURT: I don't understand. Let's turn it in for a minute because it's the same argument and I need you to help me understand because I don't understand how -- she is a pharmacologist?

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't understand how this person, being that, gets to basically look at the regulations, and then come in and say what they are, and then come in and say how they didn't comply with the regulations. Then I also don't know how they then get to look at their corporate documents and say what they knew or what they should have known. I don't understand how she's qualified to do that.

MS. O'DELL: Well, let me take a step back and really explain maybe a little bit more fully what my counterpart did what her qualifications are.

She is a toxicologist. She has a Ph.D. in pharmacology. She also is a -- she's an FDA regulatory specialist; she has a certification for that.

She's been in this industry for 25 years where she has consulted with cosmetic manufacturers, even back in 1990 when the condom manufacturers were addressing the question of talc, and whether talc

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is a hazard, she consulted then to condom manufacturers. So she is someone who has been in the industry and has been interacting with the FDA. She's never been employed by the FDA, but I'm not sure to be a regulatory expert you have an employment at the FDA.

What she has been is she is certified in that area. She has been consulting --

THE COURT: Certified in what area?

MS. O'DELL: As an FDA regulatory specialist.

THE COURT: What is that? I don't know what that means.

MS. O'DELL: I think it's just a certification through the Food and Drug Administration.

THE COURT: To do what? A certification that allows you to do what?

MS. O'DELL: To consult -- to understand the regulatory framework and to consult with companies and assist them as they are interacting with the FDA. Consultants are hired all the time by manufacturers, both in pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and others, in order to understand the regulatory framework and interact with the FDA and what's required under FDA regulations.

In this case, it is particularly important to

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have someone speak to the cosmetic regulatory framework because it's not like a pharmaceutical where drug companies are required to establish safety, demonstrate that to the FDA, go through certain testing protocols in order for a product to be on the market. That's not the way cosmetics work.

Cosmetics work where it's the company's duty to ensure the safety of their product, ensure -- and it's all on the company. They have no duty to have the product approved by the FDA before it goes on the market. They have no duty to test it. They have no duty to send adverse event reports to the FDA like you would have in a pharmaceutical or medical device. It's a very different regulatory environment.

And so what Dr. Plunkett can do is assist the jury in understanding, okay, whatever you heard about FDA in other context and think you know it, that's not how cosmetics work, and here are some of the principles. For example, 740.1 is one of the regulations, and it says that a cosmetic shall bear a warning to prevent a health hazard that may be associated with a product.

THE COURT: But in other words, I've heard

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counsel say that nobody disagreed with what the regulations say. The regulations say what the regulations say.

The question is about you then go one step further and you then have your doctor say that Johnson & Johnson failed to comply with that regulation, and they are saying how is she qualified to then basically tell the jurors that we failed to comply with the regulation when all she's really doing is reading the regulation and then accepting some facts that I guess the plaintiff put in front of her, and then saying, okay, they didn't comply because they didn't do this and they didn't do this?

MS. O'DELL: It's more than that. She has gone through as a toxicologist and pharmacologist, and she's done a risk assessment to determine if there is a hazard associated with Johnson's baby powder. And based on that finding, her opinion that there is a hazard, she has said a reasonable company in the same circumstance would have provided a warning that Johnson's baby powder can cause ovarian cancer.

Her opinion is going to be, to your point, a standard of care opinion. As a reasonable company,

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based on this information that they had internally, and based on the regulation, a reasonable company would have had added a warning. That's one of the things that she will say.

She will say her opinion is that the presence of asbestos and fibrous talc in the product not on the bottle is consistent with the FDA definition of misbranding. Because if you branded it appropriately, you would have those ingredients.

Lastly, a cosmetic product with no benefit -we are not talking about a drug where you are
weighing risk and benefit. You are talking about a
cosmetic benefit that has a risk of causing a
deadly cancer. Like in the case of Ms. Seskin.

And in that setting when you have the presence of asbestos, that's an adulterated product. That is consistent with the FDA standard of it being adulterated.

So what Dr. Plunkett has done, similar to Dr. Freidenfelds, but in totally different focus, her focus is on the regulatory interaction between Johnson & Johnson with not only the FDA, but also the national toxicology program.

THE COURT: But I don't understand. If the standard of care, if you're testifying that she's

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Page 226 1 really a standard of care expert --MS. O'DELL: In many respects. Regulatory 3 standard. THE COURT: I understand. 4 5 If she is coming in and testifying that they failed to meet the standard of care for the 6 7 labeling of products, or for -- I don't know exactly what the standard of care is, or any other 8 9 company with the information that Johnson & Johnson 10 would have put these items on their product, and 11 the failure to do that is falling below the 12 standard of care. And the standard of care are the 13 FDA regulations? 14 Well, yes, Your Honor. They fail MS. O'DELL: 15 today act reasonably because they didn't warn, and 16 the basis for that is what the FDA has said is 17 required for warning, which is a hazard that may 18 It's not that you have to prove beyond a cause. reasonable doubt. 19 THE COURT: But she doesn't get to say that. 2.0 21 That's your argument. 2.2 MS. O'DELL: She is not going to say that. 2.3 THE COURT: But see, I think that -- and the 24 fear that I have is that that's the way you all use

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these experts. And you use these experts kind of

to basically direct the jurors to the ultimate conclusion that you want. And I'm not talking about -- I'm talking about the legal conclusion that you want.

And I think that's part of what this motion is about. I'm getting a little uncomfortable because it's almost like the expert is telling the jurors: Accept these facts, and I'm the expert and I'm going to tell you what the law is, and this is the conclusion that you should draw. And that's really called summation by the lawyers at the end of the trial.

Now, I guess part of this is saying that, well, what is stopping her from being able to come in and say that they fell below the standard of care for labeling and here is why they fell below that standard of care. And I'm not sure what there would be to stop her from saying that.

The problem though is that, in doing that, she is actually going to provide opinion testimony as to what the regulations are and how those regulations are to be applied. That may be part of the problem of how is she qualified to do that.

MS. O'DELL: Well, she is qualified in the sense that she does this when she consults with

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cosmetic manufacturers and she does that all the time, but Your Honor, you can't do that in a vacuum.

THE COURT: But you didn't argue to me -- oh, no, they argued to me about Publix.

MS. O'DELL: But you cannot do that in a vacuum. If there is going to be a standard of care and they failed to act reasonably because they did not provide information on the bottle about the constituents or about a warning, it cannot be in a vacuum. She has to have a basis to offer the opinion.

THE COURT: I agree. I think what you're saying to me is that her testimony is they failed to act reasonably on the labeling of the bottle because they failed to put the ingredients on the product on the bottle.

Well, what requires them to put the label on the bottle? The FDA regulations require that.

Okay. And then the FDA regulations are there. Or she could say FDA regulations section 4332-1, okay? And then she says that's the basis of my opinion. But I don't know if she can say anything beyond that.

MS. O'DELL: We are not offering her to say

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beyond that. We are offering her to say they did not have a warning. I think she can say that, that's a fact. The bottle has never had a warning.

THE COURT: So the bottle never had a warning?

MS. O'DELL: Zero warning for the entire time

it was on the market. Never mentioned ovarian

cancer. No warning.

Your Honor, we would put her forward to say here is the bottle. It's never had a warning. This is my opinion about hazard and the hazard this product creates. The FDA regulation requires when there is a hazard that may be associated, you shall warn. That would be -- and the failure to do that is the failure to act responsibly or reasonably.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not sure I have a problem with that.

So what about their documents that you intend to --

MS. O'DELL: Well, this is a complicated, complex story. It happens over 50 years. And Dr. Plunkett has looked at thousands of documents. She's had, similarly to Dr. Freidenfelds, access to our database. She's been studying this issue for almost seven years, I think. And she has read these documents and to put in context what J&J

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knew, when they knew it, just the facts, and what that means from a regulatory standpoint.

THE COURT: But I don't understand.

MS. O'DELL: For example --

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THE COURT: No, ma'am. It's one thing for me to allow a historian to do that, but then if you're just basically telling me you can just go find an expert -- and by the way, they call your expert -- they say her job has been basically -- she's testified 150 times since 2003 in deposition and trial.

So you can't possibly stand there and tell me you can find a reputable expert, and then you then basically give them all the information you can give them about the company, and they basically get to introduce all of that evidence and say, well, they should have known.

MS. O'DELL: But Your Honor --

THE COURT: Do it through your historian. Do it through that medical historian that you talked about. It shouldn't be that I allow it to come in over their objection. I'm not turning every single witness that you intend to call here into some historian about what people knew or should have known. No. I think that's going too far.

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MS. O'DELL: Yes, sir. Let me just draw the distinction between Dr. Plunkett and Dr. Freidenfelds.

Dr. Freidenfelds is going to talk about marketing, the communication to women as consumers. You heard that argument.

Dr. Plunkett is very different. She is going to be talking about J&J and the talc supplier,

Imerys, their interaction with regulatory agencies and what they were saying to regulatory agents, what they were not saying to regulatory agencies, how that affected --

THE COURT: I'm sorry to say this: Who cares what she thinks about what they were doing and who they were talking to? The issue is whether or not their product fell below the standard of care.

You don't get, as an expert, to come in here and say, oh, and you know how I know their product fell below the standard of care? I found a memo from them. Oh, I found a communication where they said this or they said that, so they knew that this should have happened.

No. She is a standard of care expert. She is not somebody -- I'm not turning this trial, or any other trial that I'm turning into, is where you

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have somebody -- and I agreed with you on the historian because I think that's appropriate in light of what I heard. I just don't think that's the same thing here.

And you're right, there is a distinction between these two witnesses, and one is just a professional who has not studied the historical documents except for purposes of this litigation. The other one has basically looked back at all of these documents from a historical perspective and I think that's different.

MS. O'DELL: Well, I will say this, Dr. Plunkett --

THE COURT: Please don't talk me out of the other decision that I made with the other historian.

MS. O'DELL: I will not. I promise I won't.

But I will say that when you're talking about what Dr. Plunkett intends to testify to in terms of J&J's documents to put them into context, and that is -- and I'll give you an example.

THE COURT: I don't know what that means.

MS. O'DELL: I'm trying to explain, Your Honor. Maybe I'm not being quick enough.

But the National Toxicology Program considered

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talc and whether it was -- should be regulated as a carcinogen, and so there are documents associated with that process in the '90s and the 2000s, and that's a regulatory interaction. And what Dr. Plunkett's opinion is, based on her review of the documents, how they essentially circle the wagon and put the full court press on to prevent -- and I'm talking about Johnson & Johnson and Imerys, the talc supplier.

When they worked to ensure that in 2000, that talc would not be listed as a carcinogen, despite the evidence that was in place at that time, including their knowledge that there was asbestos in talcum powder, J&J knew that. And J&J was working day and night to ensure that the National Toxicology Program would not --

THE COURT: What gives her authority to come in and say that?

MS. O'DELL: She would say from a regulatory standpoint, because she's dealt with the National Toxicology Program as well, as part of her work as a regulatory specialist, she would say Johnson & Johnson's lack of candor to the National Toxicology Program, the way they worked to ensure that talc was not listed as a carcinogen was not consistent

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with a responsible company because in the face of that evidence, and in the face of the regulatory framework, what they would have done is said we are going to war because there was significant evidence, including asbestos evidence, that talc could cause ovarian cancer.

So that is a regulatory sort of event that she is specially equipped for to explain. That is because she has regulatory expertise. She has dealt with the National Toxicology Program, she's dealt with the FDA, she's dealt with other regulatory agencies.

And so for her to be able to evaluate how they started --

THE COURT: Too far. I think you're going too far with her. I am not permitting her to come in here and testify looking at their documents, and after looking at their documents, talking about what they knew or should have known, what they should have done.

She can testify about -- and I'll hear from you if you want to be heard on this.

She can testify about whether or not they violated the standard of care. She can testify about how she concluded that they violated the

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standard of care because the regulation says this, they failed to comply with the regulation.

And to be honest with you, I believe you said something, and I'm trying to remember what you said, I believe she may be even -- this is what I want to hear from you about -- she may be even able to testify about the things that Johnson & Johnson knew and the things that they did not as it relates to the standard of care, and that information was not -- I mean, that information did not lead them to put it on the label.

But this idea of Johnson & Johnson knew this, so they lobbied for this, or Johnson & Johnson knew that, and so they went and tried to circumvent this over here, she can't testify to any of that. None of that.

You want to respond?

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor. I'll start with your last point first.

We would disagree that anyone would be able to come in and talk about what J&J knew, we talked about that. But to Your Honor's earlier point, Dr. Freidenfelds, these are her opinions. I mean, she is going to come in here and talk about what we were aware of in the '60s, '70s.

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THE COURT: No. No, she's not. She's not.

She's not. I think she can talk about the standard of care. I think she can say --

Now, I think if you're talking about standard of care in the sense as to the labeling and your failure to put the warnings on the labeling in violation of -- arguably, in violation of FDA regulations, if there is a memo that is -- or some statement that says -- and I rarely think this is there, but it can be something akin to this: Hey, you know the FDA requires us to put the ingredients on our labels, but in order to do that, that's going to cost us this amount of money, so let's not do it. Well, if we don't do it, that's going to be a violation of our standard of care. Well, we don't care, we'll wait until we get caught.

If there is that memo that's there, I think she can make reference to it. But if she's just basically taking memos and she's associating it with your conduct or your behavior or a regulation, I don't think she can do that.

MS. SCOTT: That's what she intends to do,

Your Honor, and so -- but earlier, I was making the

point that all the things that they want to do with

Dr. Plunkett, to Your Honor's point, they can do

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with Dr. Freidenfelds. All of her opinions track.

But on the FDA point --

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THE COURT: Because she's a historian, I overruled the objection and I'm not preventing you from -- to the extent that this witness can actually testify about documents that were in Johnson & Johnson's possession and control that went to this issue, I'm not preventing that historian from talking about those documents.

I'm stopping this witness from talking about those documents because I think you are utilizing this witness in a manner that is inconsistent with her expertise.

Go ahead, you were saying.

MS. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honor.

Just to touch on the FDA point, this whole standard of care, I think it's a Trojan horse. I think it's a backdoor way to get in a pure legal opinion, but the point I'll make is, again, she's not qualified to do this. Again, she's a toxicologist. Drugs is her game, okay? Not cosmetics.

THE COURT: She said that she's consulted with companies on --

MS. SCOTT: She has consulted, perhaps, but on

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drugs.

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THE COURT: They told me it was on also on warning labels.

MS. SCOTT: And there is an instance in the '90s, I think I heard condoms, which is a medical device, not a cosmetic.

But in any event, not only is she unqualified, her methods are unreliable. So, for example, the FDA interpreted its own regulation related to talc baby powder in 2014. It said labels aren't required.

In addition, she does things like say the FDA doesn't regulate cosmetics. That's not true.

THE COURT: Well, didn't they say labels aren't required unless they -- did it say they may? And so they didn't actually say you don't have to put labels on, they actually said that you may be required to put labels on if your product does these things?

MS. SCOTT: The FDA, in response to a citizens' petition in 2014 that said, hey, FDA, talc baby powder should have labels on it. The FDA wrote back, said we looked at things, we checked it out, they don't need to put labels on. The science isn't there. They don't need to put labels on this

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Page 239 1 Johnson & Johnson baby powder. 2 THE COURT: Did they say they don't need to put labels on unless this? Or did they just say 3 4 no, you don't have to put labels on? They don't have to put labels on. 5 MS. SCOTT: 6 THE COURT: That's the FDA? 7 MS. SCOTT: That was the FDA's response to a citizen petition who said, FDA, take a look at 8 9 this. THE COURT: So I don't understand then. 10 11 is this person coming in testifying that the FDA 12 requires labels if the FDA says you are not 13 required to have labels? 14 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor --15 MS. O'DELL: Let me. 16 Your Honor, that is a mischaracterization of 17 what happens with a citizens' petition, with 18 respect. The citizen's petition asked for a specific label in 1998. It was not, "Please warn 19 20 about ovarian cancer generally." 21 This was a petition that was filed by the Cancer Prevention Coalition, and it was not acted 2.2 23 on until 2014, and that's part of what I would put ford forward with Dr. Plunkett. 24

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THE COURT: What would happen in 2014?

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MS. O'DELL: In 2014, there was a letter from the FDA that said we have looked at the evidence and we don't believe this label that was suggested to us is appropriate based on what they viewed at that time. But it was not a comprehensive view of the data and it's certainly not the data that we have now.

THE COURT: But my question, ma'am, is: Has the FDA ever required Johnson & Johnson to put a label on the talc -- is it talc baby powder, baby powder?

MS. O'DELL: Johnson's baby powder with talc, Your Honor, and FDA cannot require a label under the cosmetic regulation that was in place. They cannot require a label.

It is the manufacturer's duty to put the label on the product. The only way they can require -- and, you know, this may seem shocking to you, it sort of was to me when I got in the case, but the FDA could not require a label unless they went to court and sued a manufacturer in order to require --

THE COURT: But if they thought it was serious enough and causing the type of harm that you all are speaking of, then isn't it their obligation to

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go to court and make sure that a label is placed on the product? And the fact that they didn't put a label on the product --

See, here is what I'm concerned with. I'm concerned with -- you're using the FDA regulations through this particular witness, but nowhere are you going to say that the FDA required them to put a label on their product.

You're saying, I think, that Johnson & Johnson fell below the standard of care because knowing what they know, a reasonable manufacturer would have put the label on their product. But the law didn't require them to put the --

MS. O'DELL: We did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Tell me how.

MS. O'DELL: I'm sorry, forgive me for saying this again, but the regulation says it's not "may." It says -- and this is to the manufacturer.

It says in 740.1 that I mentioned before, it says it shall bear a warning. That's the duty of the manufacturer. "It shall bear a warning to prevent a health hazard that may be associated with a product."

THE COURT: So help me understand what that's saying. Are you telling me the FDA has a

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regulation that says that it places the responsibility on the manufacturer; if the manufacturer is aware that there is a hazard of their product, although the FDA doesn't say put a label on your product, they are saying that if you learn that there is a hazard associated with your product, you must put a label on the product?

MS. O'DELL: It says shall. "Shall bear a warning to prevent a health hazard that may be associated with your product."

That's what the standard is. And because it's a cosmetic -- and there are thousands and thousands and thousands of cosmetics on the market. They go on the market every day. They are unregulated. They are often untested.

The FDA can't say, hey, I'm going to look at everything on the shelf and I'm going to bring a lawsuit every time I think there's going to be a warning.

THE COURT: I know, but they can do it once the public becomes aware of the level of the hazard as you all -- you want to have a historian come in here and you're going to have a historian tell us about all they should have known, not ten years ago, not 15 years ago, not 20 years ago. So I'm

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sorry, this is not -- this whole idea people started becoming alarmed about this issue of talc, it wasn't just yesterday.

So it's one thing to sit up here and say that somebody just put a product on there and nobody is complaining about it, but this particular product was on their radar. And so they absolutely could have gone to court and sued based upon the information and all the testing that was being done. You all are telling me they started doing this testing a long time ago; it wasn't just within the last five, ten years.

So I don't accept that. But I'm not sure that I disagree with you in the context of the FDA doesn't require cosmetic products to immediately have a label, but the FDA standard says that if you learn, okay, that your product is hazardous, or may be hazardous, you shall place a label on, then I think the FDA, in essence, is assaying, okay, manufacturer, your failure to do that would fall below the standard of care that is required of you, even though we are not going around telling Johnson & Johnson and Procter & Gamble to put a label on, we are telling you basically the onus is on you.

MS. O'DELL: 100 percent. It is

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self-regulated and --

THE COURT: What do you want to say?

MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, I mean, just going back to the FDA has already said particularly and specifically about Johnson & Johnson's baby powder, they said the citizens who were saying, hey, look, there is this issue with ovarian cancer, they said we want a "may cause" label. And the FDA said we looked at the science, no, we are not saying that Johnson & Johnson has to do that.

And of course, I mean, the FDA has the authority to enforce its own regulations.

THE COURT: But that doesn't change what counsel is saying. Counsel is saying that whether the FDA chose not to put a specific label or adopt a specific recommendation as to a label, that's one thing, but the FDA regulation, even without the adoption of that specific request, the FDA regulations still say that if you become aware that your product is hazardous, you shall put the necessary warning labels on your product.

So I haven't heard you say that's not what the regulations say. Is that what the regulation says?

MS. SCOTT: I'm not sure, Your Honor, but I know the FDA was interpreting its own regulations

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But in any event --

THE COURT: Did what?

When the FDA responded that there MS. SCOTT: is no label necessary on Johnson & Johnson's baby powder.

But that doesn't mean -- they THE COURT: didn't release you from the standard of care that is already in the regulation. They, according to plaintiff's counsel, they passed that on to you. They said, you know, we are not going to take on that immediate responsibility, but we are willing to pass that on to you and make the manufacturer responsible.

MS. O'DELL: I'm happy to --

One minute. I'm still over here. THE COURT:

MS. SCOTT: I'm just reading from the FDA's response on this, but Your Honor, to the extent that this goes to some legal opinion wrapped into a standard of care and our awareness, I think Dr. Plunkett, not only is she not qualified because cosmetics is not what she is an expert in, even if she has some consulting experience, that does not make her an expert in it. But to the extent awareness and all that and knowledge is relevant,

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her testimony would be cumulative because

Dr. Freidenfelds is going to come in here and give

that testimony about what we knew, when we knew it,

at various points in time.

THE COURT: I agree, and that's why I'm not going to allow it. I'm not going to allow cumulative testimony and I'm not going to allow this particular witness -- I think if they are going to introduce about what you knew and when you knew it, that testimony should come in through the historian who is testifying.

But I'm not excluding this witness from testifying about the standard of care, and that includes being able to make reference to the FDA regulations. I will allow that to be part of that. And if there are -- that doesn't mean I'm saying that she can't refer to documents that go to the standard of care, because I don't know what that is. And I'm assuming they told you what documents they were.

MS. SCOTT: Quite frankly, Your Honor, I don't know what the standard of care is when you're talking about a legal regulation that we are not challenging that what the words say. I don't know what the standard of care is.

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And to the extent we are talking about some industry standard of care, she is not in the industry. This is not her industry. She is not an expert. She is completely unqualified to give these opinions.

THE COURT: What's the standard of care in what industry?

MS. O'DELL: Well, it would be in cosmetics, and how a reasonable cosmetic company would have conducted themselves under these circumstances with the information that they had available.

THE COURT: I'll accept that.

MS. O'DELL: So, Your Honor, just to be clear because I want to make sure that I understand, there are certain documents that provide facts for Dr. Plunkett in terms of her standard of care opinion. So, for example, if there is a document that J&J sent to the FDA that had certain representations about the safety of the product, and that's not consistent with what was known in the literature, the scientific literature, can Dr. Plunkett testify to that? She has testified --

MS. O'DELL: It would be, for example, there is -- that it is safe and there is no evidence,

THE COURT: What does the document say?

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credible evidence that it causes ovarian cancer. We would say that that's not true and that's not been true for decades.

THE COURT: But why don't you introduce that through your historian? Meaning, the only purpose of this witness is to say that there is a standard of care, and that standard of care to the extent that the -- or I don't even know if she can actually even say that it causes cancer.

MS. O'DELL: She is not going to testify as to cause. That will be Dr. Ness and Dr. Chan.

Dr. Ness will give a general causation opinion.

She is a toxicologist, and so based on that, she would testify to the mechanism, part of the mechanism for how it can cause cancer, the migration through the fallopian tubes, and that talc and its constituents can cause inflammation, that's sort of the mechanism by which we put forward that talc can cause cancer; that if it's applied to the genital area, it can ascend the genital tract, reach the ovaries and fallopian tubes, et cetera.

THE COURT: You want to have the pharmacologist testify to that?

MS. O'DELL: She's a toxicologist as well.

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She studied in that area. That's very much within her area of expertise to do that.

THE COURT: I always love when you use these witnesses and they can tell us when the sun is going to come up and where the moon is going to go down. Okay. So you were asking me for guidance?

MS. O'DELL: So, for example, the FDA letter that counsel for Johnson & Johnson mentioned, that's something typically that Dr. Plunkett would speak to. What does the letter say, what was known in the scientific literature at that time, and whether they acted as a reasonable company in response to that process.

Because there were two citizens' petitions, there's evidence that Johnson & Johnson collaborated with somebody at the FDA, that they actually ended up -- that person went to work with a lobbying group on behalf of cosmetics, and there's a whole back story of why the FDA did what they did.

THE COURT: Who is going to tell us that back story?

MS. O'DELL: Well, Dr. Plunkett has done that in the past because it's from a regulatory --

THE COURT: Let's keep it in the past. I

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don't think she should be coming in and telling us a back story about how the FDA did anything. Why is she qualified to testify about what the FDA did and why they did it?

MS. O'DELL: Your Honor, she has done what experts do; and that is, they looked at corporate documents. She puts them in context for the jury to help explain what was happening, what Johnson & Johnson -- the information they had, what they were doing, not their thoughts, what they were actually doing, and put that in context for the jury so they would understand it in terms of the regulatory framework. And I think it's clearly within the case law that --

And 3M is an example. You know, they explain the basis of their admissible opinion through commenting on documents and evidence that have been produced in litigation.

If they want to cross-examine her that she hasn't looked at enough documents, or she's omitted a document in giving her opinion, then so be it.

Let them examine her.

But she has looked at thousands of documents and synthesized her opinions based on that evidence, and so for that reason, Your Honor, as it

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relates specifically to the regulatory interactions, I believe that Dr. Plunkett is not only qualified, but she can comment on those documents in a way that speaks to was Johnson & Johnson acting as a reasonable company.

And that's what she's done in other cases, what I would do here. It would be narrow. It would not in any way overlap with Dr. Freidenfelds. It would be focused on the regulatory aspects.

MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, not qualified. I just want to take the example that my friend on the other side said about the letter, what Dr. Plunkett would say about the letter.

She would say what it says; the jury doesn't need that. She would say what was known. You can show another document. Dr. Freidenfelds, she will establish what was known at that time, right?

And then were they reasonable, and I'm struggling, Your Honor, to figure out what is the basis. And I'm going back to our conversation on Monday with the Publix expert and whether that expert was qualified to talk about a reasonable standard, when all she had -- at least she had some retail experience, 30 years.

Dr. Plunkett doesn't have any experience.

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She's been a consultant dibbling and dabbling with all sorts of things, mostly on the drug side. So what qualifies her as an expert under the Daubert standard to come in here and tell jury what is reasonable for Johnson & Johnson to do? I'm struggling with it.

THE COURT: Well, what they're saying is that it's cosmetic, it's really cosmetic companies, and she has consulted -- I'm being told that she had consulted with this issue of what you put on a label, what you don't put on a label, and then she has also worked with the FDA. And so what she has coming in and saying is that this is what the FDA says, and Johnson & Johnson fell below the standard of care as required by the FDA because they knew their product had become hazardous, and once they knew their product had become hazardous, in accordance with the FDA, they were required to put the labels on their product. They didn't do that.

And so I don't imagine it's that much of a stretch to say -- like she is not coming in and saying that, okay, I work for Johnson & Johnson, or I work for a company like Johnson & Johnson. What she is saying is that there is a standard of care in relation to when labels need to be placed on the

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That standard is really set out with the FDA, which places the responsibility on the manufacturer, and this is what the manufacturer is supposed to do when they become aware. Johnson & Johnson became aware -- and she has to be able to say when she thinks -- based upon the documents that I reviewed, this is when I believe Johnson & Johnson became aware, and Johnson & Johnson should have properly labeled their product once they became aware that it was hazardous. They didn't do it.

I don't know why that is a stretch. Now, I'm not allowing much beyond that, but I'm overruling the objection as to much beyond that, but I am going to allow her to provide the opinion as articulated by counsel and attempted to be articulated by the Court consistent with that.

MS. SCOTT: Could I just?

THE COURT: You can.

MS. SCOTT: Please, Your Honor.

I mean, she has no cosmetic experience. I mean, it would be better if we knew what cosmetic company she actually consulted with, but we don't know that.

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Moreover, Your Honor, if we're talking about if she did a project as a consultant 30 years ago, you got me on threshold issues earlier this morning. Is five enough to be an expert in the cosmetic industry? Is it ten? Surely we don't have five, we don't have ten.

She's not an expert in this field to even opine on what is reasonable. I think that's my hangup, Your Honor, particularly in light of our conversation on Monday. There is no basis for her to give that opinion.

THE COURT: What is she is an expert in?

MS. O'DELL: She is an expert in pharmacology toxicology and regulatory affairs. And we've talked about that in terms of is --

THE COURT: All right, I'm not going to go through it again. We can sit here all day.

MS. SCOTT: One more point, Your Honor, please.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. SCOTT: The court in Echevarria listened to Dr. Plunkett give testimony for two days, and the only thing he said with regard to her FDA opinion that she got out that was salient to him in those two days was that she took a couple of FDA

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| 1 | courses. |
| 2 | THE COURT: That's it? |
| 3 | MS. SCOTT: That's all that's written in the |
| 4 | opinion, Your Honor. In the opinion, he says |
| 5 | THE COURT: So her experience in FDA |
| 6 | regulations is that she took a couple FDA courses? |
| 7 | MS. O'DELL: I would disagree with that, Your |
| 8 | Honor. |
| 9 | MS. SCOTT: That's what was salient to the |
| 10 | court. |
| 11 | THE COURT: Where is the resume? Where is the |
| 12 | curriculum vitae that she is going to tell us about |
| 13 | when she gets on the witness stand and testifies? |
| 14 | MS. O'DELL: Let me get it, Your Honor. |
| 15 | MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, if I may show you the |
| 16 | Echevarria opinion |
| 17 | THE COURT: Who is this from? |
| 18 | MS. SCOTT: It's from a trial court in |
| 19 | California. |
| 20 | THE COURT: Oh, but I don't do anything |
| 21 | with |
| 22 | MS. SCOTT: I know how you feel about trial |
| 23 | courts, Your Honor, but this trial court |
| 24 | THE COURT: I can make an error the same way |
| 25 | they made an error. |

Page 256 1 MS. SCOTT: Understood, Your Honor. 2 MS. O'DELL: Your Honor, that's one case. 3 She's testified in state court in Georgia, state court in Philadelphia, state court in --4 5 THE COURT: Florida? This is the first ovarian cancer MS. O'DELL: 6 7 case in Florida, so she has not testified in Florida yet. She has testified in Florida in other 8 9 cases, but not in a talc/ovarian cancer case. 10 She's testified in Missouri state court. 11 I mean, they are focused on that decision. 12 understand she did testify in that case to much of 13 what we've talked about today. Part of her opinion 14 was not allowed in regard to talking about 740.1, 15 but we believe the court erred --This particular judge said that 16 THE COURT: 17 she's taken a few courses and she may have given 18 advice, but she is not qualified to opine as to FDA 19 regulations or their applicability to labeling. MS. SCOTT: I'll just --2.0 21 MS. O'DELL: We disagree with that opinion, 2.2 Your Honor. 2.3 THE COURT: But there is no basis for it. mean, there is not a lot of detailed explanation as 24 25 to --

Page 257 MS. SCOTT: The basis, Your Honor, was two 1 days of testimony. And I'll also add --3 THE COURT: Oh, this is after he actually took the testimony from the witness? 4 5 MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor. And in addition, what. --6 7 This is at trial or before trial? THE COURT: MS. SCOTT: I believe this is --8 9 MS. O'DELL: Do you have a copy for me? 10 THE COURT: A Daubert motion was filed before 11 trial. So it had to have been because they're 12 saying she may not give a legal opinion, so it 13 couldn't have been -- it had to have been before, 14 because otherwise, it would have said the court is 15 striking the testimony or something like that. MS. O'DELL: And there was a new trial ordered 16 17 in that case after the verdict. But the point, I 18 mean, if you're talking about qualifications --19 THE COURT: Let me just stop you. I'm going to keep my ruling the same, but it's with this 2.0 21 danger, and I keep saying this and lawyers always 2.2 want to test me; they're saying, will he really do 2.3 that? I will. 24 If your witness takes the witness stand and I 25 find that she is not qualified to give the opinion

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that she's given, I will send the jury out. I won't let them start the cross-examine. I will send the jury out and I will tell you what I'm about to do, and when the jury comes back in, she will be gone and I will tell them to disregard everything that she just said.

MS. O'DELL: I understand, Your Honor. What is reflected in her expert report was reflected in her CV is that she has expertise in cosmetics for all the reasons I've said.

THE COURT: I'm allowing you -- the objection is overruled -- well, granted in part, denied in part. I'm allowing you to present her, but it's with that caveat that if I think --

And by the way, I will not grant a mistrial.

I will not -- don't ask me for a mistrial if I strike your witness because this is something that you have total control over. You know what her background is. You know what her experience is.

And I may not know the full breadth of it. I'm assuming you have the transcript from when she's testified in this case, so you know what she testified to.

What year was this?

MS. O'DELL: 2017, I believe.

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THE COURT: Okay, so that was about seven years ago. So you know what it's going to be.

So if it's consistent with what was found in this order, then there is no reason to believe that my decision should be any different. And the only difference is that's done before trial and I'm doing this -- I would be doing this during trial, and you cannot argue to me that you are prejudiced because now one of your key witnesses has just been stricken.

MS. O'DELL: I understand.

THE COURT: Next?

MS. O'DELL: Thank you.

MS. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's go.

MR. OLIVER: We are going to take their motion to exclude Dr. Chan so we can get that out of the way. It's the last one.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CARUSO: Thank you, Your Honor.

We are going to move again to strike the general causation opinion of Dr. Chan on similar grounds, and additional grounds as to what we spoke about with Dr. Ness earlier about the differences between primary peritoneal and ovarian cancer, but

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I don't know if we need to rehash that again.

The next piece that I want to talk about more specifically, and I think more importantly, is his opinions as to Dr. Seskin in this case, his specific cause opinions in this case. And the way Dr. Chan went about concluding that talc was the cause of Dr. Seskin's ovarian cancer, he described as a differential diagnosis or etiology going through the different types of causes ruling them in, ruling them out, and he described his own method as nonmathematical, which is fine.

But it becomes quite apparent what he means by that when you go through what he ruled in, what he ruled out. Understanding that differential etiologies are generally something that we are not going to quibble over as to whether they are a reliable method, but the way he applied it is completely unreliable.

So he himself testified that he ballparks the risk ratio for talc and ovarian cancer between 1.22 and 1.36 is the risk ratio. So 22 to --

THE COURT: What does ballpark mean?

MR. CARUSO: He looked at a group of about five different studies. There's about 40 and he looked at the ultimate risk ratios in there and he

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said generally, they are about 1.22 to 1.36. He didn't describe any further as to how he arrived at that conclusion, but that was his conclusion.

And then he has this process of ruling in. So he rules in talc as one of them. He then rules in her diaphragm usage. So when he says talc is contributing to ovarian cancer, his opinion as to that is perineal usage. So putting it in the underwear, applying it to the genital area, that's perennial usage of talc.

He then says her diaphragm usage of talc put her at an increased -- and even greater risk. He thinks that's up there with the highest risk. And when asked, well, what basis do you have to say that, he says, well, I think it makes intuitive sense, and I have this Penacolinski study from 2018.

THE COURT: He really said it's intuitive?

MR. CARUSO: Yes, he says it's intuitive. And here is the most incredible thing about this: When you go to the study he cites, it does not report an increased risk ratio. It's protected.

There is not a single study out there, not one that you can point to that looks at diaphragm usage and identifies it as a risk. There are nine.

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Eight of them have no statistically significant association, the other most recent one actually finds a statistically significant protective effect.

He has absolutely no basis to say increased risk. That's what he rules in. So he has talc, ballpark, 22 to 36 percent. Diaphragm usage, not even close on data. It's a huge analytical gap.

Then we go, okay, what did you rule out? How did you determine that absent those things, what did you rule out as other potential causes?

Well, let's go through some of them. First, we asked him about hormone replacement therapy, which he didn't even know about. There is a whole body of literature published in Lancet in 2015 --

THE COURT: Did she have hormone replacement therapy?

MR. CARUSO: Yes. There are records here,
Your Honor, I mean, incredible records from her
time getting treated by Dr. Travin, her
gynecologist. So 18 years of hormone replacement
therapy, and this was at the begrudge of some of
her doctors because she took this into her own
hands.

I'm passing up to the Court two different

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medical records one from 2012, one from 2013 where they note --

THE COURT: I can't read that.

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MR. CARUSO: Well, you can read this, Your
Honor, I believe. That says "way too high," and
it's in reference to her hormones; her estrogen,
described there as estradiol, and her testosterone.

And in 2015, the Lancet published a review of 51 different epidemiological studies and they conclude that there was strong suggestive evidence, not just of a correlation, but of a causal relationship between hormone replacement therapy and ovarian cancer. And I can pass up that study to you as well.

Dr. Chan wasn't even aware of this. He didn't know it was a risk. He knew there were some risks confer odd the breast cancer, but he had no clue about ovarian cancer. And to his credit, we don't doubt his credentials as a treater, as a good treating oncologist, but he testified at a deposition in 2020 that, well, I'm not really too good at looking at associations and determining cause.

THE COURT: He's an expert or a treater?

MR. CARUSO: In this case, he is their general

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and specific causation expert. He never treated Dr. Seskin.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. CARUSO: So he admits himself that he's not very good at looking at this type of literature and looking at associations and finding causation evidenced by that.

Then we asked him, okay, so you didn't know about that, what about her history of endometriosis? In your report, Dr. Chan, you cite a study, Saavalainen I believe is how you pronounce it, where individuals with the type of endometriosis that Dr. Seskin had puts you at a 37 percent increased risk of ovarian cancer.

Well, you know, I don't think that applies here. I ruled that one out as a significant cause too, higher than his own risk ratio for talc.

THE COURT: Did he say why he ruled it out?

MR. CARUSO: He says that it's more so for

clear cell cancer, which it does have a higher risk

ratio in that study, but his own study -- so he

dismisses it as less important in the serous type,

which Dr. Seskin had, and more so in the clear

cell, which is fine and true under the terms of

that study, but also in that study, a higher risk

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ratio reported than for his own estimate as to talc. Well, I rule that out. I don't think it's too substantial.

Okay, fine. What about age? Dr. Seskin was 66 years old when she was diagnosed with ovarian cancer. In your own report, Dr. Chan, you cited a paper that for individuals with serous type cancers, there is a 4 percent increase year over year every year above the age of 50.

She was 66 when she was diagnosed; 16 times four is 64 percent increased risk for ovarian cancer. How did you rule that out as a possible cause?

Well, you know, I don't think it's an independent cause. Why not? I just don't think it's an independent cause.

Okay, Dr. Chan. What about protective factors? Because not only are there risk factors for ovarian cancers, there's also protective factors, things that women can have or don't have that reduce their risk. Let's go through some of the things that Dr. Seskin had.

She never had children. Children, so when you have a child, obviously you stop ovulation for a period. The running theory is that is what reduces

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a woman's risk of ovarian cancer because you cease to ovulate for that period of time resulting in lower damages to the ovary, in theory, and that's what reduces it in the literature that he cites in his report. Never had that, so no protective factor there.

Never took oral contraceptives, right?

Another 30 to 40 percent reduction in ovarian cancer. She never took oral contraceptives, undisputed. Well, you know, who cares.

When we have breastfeeding. Never had a child, so obviously never breastfed. Another thing in his report that he just ignores.

So essentially, he has this whole process, this differential etiology of going in -- he rules in talc at 22 to 36 percent chance, he doesn't even acknowledge really that the diaphragm studies are contradicting --

THE COURT: All right, you are going back over it.

What do you want say?

MR. PENDELL: Thank you, Your Honor.

Counsel is being selective with the facts, telling you the things that he thinks are important that support what he's trying to do here and

ignoring everything else.

Okay. So let's start first. Dr. Chan is not really going to talk about general causation other than, obviously, the general causation undergirds. For example, he has read and is familiar with and has given general causation opinions — by the way, in the motion, they like to talk about the Monroe case all the time. Because that's his general causation opinion, that was another case he testified in Georgia. And although I understand Your Honor is free to rule whatever you want because this is Florida, but Georgia does recognize the Daubert standard, it is what they used.

And what they never tell you is he was permitted to testify on general causation in that case. I watched his testimony. I'm happy to send you the link. It's actually quite good.

Some of the things he explains in that case, for example, he talks about age. They like to talk about age. Well, he didn't consider her age.

He did consider her age, and what he says in the Monroe case is, yes, age is a factor, but here is why age is a factor: It's not just because you are old, you get cancer. The longer you live, the longer you are exposed to environmental factors and

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all the other types of things that happen to you.

So age combined with things like talc use, or all these other types of things, that all sort of goes -- that's why in this case he completely rule out age, okay?

THE COURT: He is going to say that in this case, he doesn't rule out age?

MR. PENDELL: He'll say he can't completely rule out age, he absolutely will say that. But here is the good news for me: The standard is not he has to subtract every other possible cause. The rule is a substantial cause, and there can be multiple substantial causes. So even if what counsel is telling you is true, it doesn't mean that talc also was not a substantial cause.

Now, on the endometriosis thing, it is not just -- it is true he is going to tell you, and the literature backs this up, the serous type, the type of endometriosis that they want to suggest that she would have had, is a different cell type. But there's controversy in the records as to whether she even had that.

It's my turn, thank you.

She had a medical record that says they had exploratory surgery to see whether or not she had

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it. We have no pathology report. We have nothing else that says definitively she had it add all.

So he takes that into consideration and says, well, look, I don't know 100 percent that she had this. In any event, it's, to me, something that I can rule out because of the cell type of this cancer that she had, and endometriosis cell types are usually clear, not the serous.

He looks at -- and by the way, Dr. Chan, just a little bit about his background: Not only has he been a doctor, he's a gynecologic oncologist. He treats thousands of women for these very types of conditions, ovarian cancers.

And by the way, ovarian cancers, going back to what was talked about before, if you asked him:

Dr. Chan, as a gynecologic oncologist who does this more multiple years, teaches medical students at

Dartmouth -- very good school -- Stanford -- very good school -- University of California San

Francisco -- pretty good school, not as good as the other two probably -- and he is going to tell you that ovarian cancer at large includes cancer of the fallopian tube, cancer of the ovaries, cancer of the peritoneal.

This is all ovarian cancer. He treats women

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for this. This is what he does.

He is going to say that he looked at all the things that could possibly be causes, he weighed them, and I appreciate that opposing counsel has not satisfied that he has ruled stuff out to the same extent that they would like it to have happen, but he did what doctors do in the real world, which is when you're trying to figure out what causes somebody to have cancer, you have to think about all the things that you know that cause cancer.

So he looked at those studies because he does believe talc causes cancer. He says that not only was he taught that in medical school, he teaches his medical students that. He tells his wife and his daughters not to use talc.

He does say when he treats his own patients, although he doesn't do an epidemiological study -- and by the way, let's step back for a moment on that. They make a lot of hay out of the fact that he says things in his testimony about the studies, well, I'm not very good at doing that. He's not an epidemiologist. He does not get down as an epidemiologist does and write studies about population level data, but that doesn't mean that he is unqualified to do this analysis as a treating

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physician. And if that were the test, as Your Honor knows, having tried tobacco cases and all these other types of cases, no pulmonologist, no cancer doctors would be allowed to testify because they don't do epidemiology. They read and rely on studies, just like everybody else does.

The fact is that they are quibbling with his conclusions, not his methodology. If they have a problem, if they think that there is something that he did not consider as a differential factor that he should have, that's cross-examination.

He explains what he looked at, why he looked at those, what the evidence said about it, and why we could rule them in or rule them out. That is a differential diagnosis.

THE COURT: Do you want to reply?

MR. CARUSO: Yes, I do.

So, first, I want to talk a little bit about what he mentioned about Dr. Chan's testimony as to age and why you get more cancer is because of environmental exposures. He's testified that one of the reasons why it increases is because as you age, DNA is prone to making more errors. More replications occur, which is a known cause of cancers, DNA replication errors.

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Second, he talks about endometriosis being a controversial diagnosis in this case. It is not a controversial diagnosis. The plaintiff's fact sheet, she listed it as a prior medical history. Nobody has quibbled over that in her medical records over 30 years after the diagnosis.

Dr. Chan's point was that there was not a confirmed pathological finding of that, and if we want to go back to pathology, the pathology is --

THE COURT: Well, respond to counsel's argument. I don't want to get bogged down into what he did or didn't testify to, but counsel said something and shook my head and said yeah, but I want you to tell me why it's no.

Counsel said that, okay, these other things may be deemed to be substantial causes, and he may not have maybe even properly considered them, but that does not mean that he cannot testify that the talc was a substantial cause of the injury that is being complained of. So let's assume that you're right and he didn't; you tell the jurors that, you cross-examine him on that, and the jurors can basically say that either based upon what I'm hearing, I don't find that talc was a substantial cause of the injury, or they can find that, well,

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maybe there were these other causes that were substantial causes, but that included talc.

Because it doesn't -- and there is a jury instruction we normally give that talks about although you may identify other causes, if you can still glean that this is a substantial cause -- what's your response?

MR. CARUSO: I have two responses to that,
Your Honor. One, Dr. Chan's mechanism of action in
this case, his theory as to how talc causes cancer
relies on what we describe as an inflammation
theory, right?

So essentially their position is talc is applied to the vaginal area, it goes up through the vagina, up through the reproductive tract, lands on the ovaries, causes inflammation, and that's what induces the cancer. That's the theory.

So we asked Dr. Chan, well, do you have any evidence at all that there was inflammation in Dr. Seskin's body? No, not at all.

Well, how can you come in here and say that inflammation was the cause of it? Well, it's just not in the medical records.

That's fine. Well, okay, not in the medical records, we agree there is no evidence of

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inflammation for Dr. Seskin specifically, and that's fine to have your general causation theory for inflammation, but specifically not for Dr. Seskin.

And then he does not -- so he goes, okay, he concedes none in the medical records, but there are two pathologists in this case who went in and looked for inflammation, and there is no signs of inflammation, and that's sort of independent because he didn't even look at those reports. He had the capacity to go look at the pathology reports and confirm his own theory and he did not do it.

THE COURT: So I don't understand. So are you telling me that I should exclude a witness if they didn't feel it was necessary to review certain types of evidence because their opinion is no longer reliable based upon the facts? I'm trying to understand your argument.

MR. CARUSO: No, the reason to exclude him is because he has -- his whole theory rests on inflammation occurring in Dr. Seskin. Cancer being induced by inflammation. There is no evidence of inflammation in this case. None.

And if he wants to have a general theory as

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to, okay, inflammation causes cancer generally, that's fine, and we'll be happy to have him talk to that as a general causation expert. But as to Dr. Seskin --

THE COURT: All right. So what they're saying is that the problem is that it's not that he is generally speaking about causations of cancer, he is being very specific about what caused the cancer in this case, which was the presence of inflammation?

MR. CARUSO: Correct.

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THE COURT: But counsel is arguing but there is no evidence of any presence of inflammation. I think what counsel is arguing is that he is taking a general theory and he is applying it to the specific facts of this case and saying that the general theory applies to your plaintiff.

MR. PENDELL: Counsel is mixing and matching general causation with specific causation, and as Your Honor has thankfully, I'm very happy you've made abundantly clear since I've known you on Monday, you are not going to allow cumulative testimony.

Dr. Chan is not a general causation expert here. He is not going to get up there and talk

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about general causation.

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And by the way, counsel's statement that there is no evidence that she suffered any inflammation, that's incorrect because Dr. Sitelman is going to -- he is our expert. He is going to get up there and say that he saw it in her pathology slides in the PLM.

THE COURT: There is going to be evidence in the records that she suffered from inflammation?

MR. PENDELL: Correct. He is going to say he saw it in the slides. So that's number one.

Dr. Chan's role here is not to sit here and say this is the mechanism by which cancer is caused because that's general causation and we are not going to give cumulative testimony. His job is after that general testimony has come in, he is going to come in and he is going to say -- now he could do that if we were putting him up as a general causation expert. We are not.

He is going to come in and say I looked at all the things that this lady was exposed to that could have potentially contributed to her cancer; age, endometriosis, the BRCA 1 and 2 genes, talc. Based on all the information I've seen, the testimony, her medical records, I believe that talc

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substantially contributed to her cancer.

Cancer gets caused -- one of the ten key characteristics of a carcinogen, there's a famous doctor that I happen to be friends with who came up with these ten key characteristics of carcinogens, and one of them is if a chemical compound is capable of or causes inflammation in a human being. As part of the general causation analysis, I do expect that you are going to hear that one of the things --

THE COURT: Not from Dr. Chan.

MR. PENDELL: Not from Dr. Chan, but from another doctor, you are going to hear that the talc causes inflammation in parts of this area, and that is what causes the cancer.

THE COURT: Do you want to respond?

MR. CARUSO: Yes.

So I didn't get to the second prong of the significant factor, right? So you said why is it that he can't come in here and say, well, talc is just one of many significant contributing factors.

THE COURT: Substantial.

MR. CARUSO: Substantial. Because it's not reliable for an expert to look at other causes with conceded higher risk ratios than talc and dismiss

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them as substantial causes, and then look at one that he himself identifies as a lower risk and say that one is significant.

You can't hold both of those opinions in your hands at the same time. It's not reliable application of the methodology.

THE COURT: Well, isn't that for -- the jurors can either reject his opinion and his explanation, or they can accept it or they can do any -- I guess anything that's in between. We tell the jurors that.

Just because an expert testifies, they are tree free to accept the opinion, reject it, or give it whatever weight they deem it deserves. And when you cross-examine him and he says I discounted these other substantial causes because I'm attributing this substantial cause, but I can't rule out or I can't include these other substantial causes, the jury can decide whether or not that's appropriate and whether or not they want to make an allowance for that when they award whatever amount of money they award --

MR. CARUSO: Well, that's true, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- whether zero or something

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MR. CARUSO: But what an expert can't do is come and offer testimony that there is such an analytical gap between the information that they are interpreting, such as the diaphragm studies, for example. Ruling that in, he thinks that puts her at an increased risk because it makes intuitive sense.

When you look at the data, it's just not there, and you can't just come in here and offer pure opinion.

THE COURT: You didn't say anything about the diaphragm. I didn't see you say anything about the diaphragm study. He said your doctor is going to come in and testify that as it relates to the diaphragm study and whether or not it's an increased risk, the increased risk ratio, he is going to say it's intuitive.

MR. PENDELL: Well, again, stepping aside from cherry-picking of testimony, and I'd like to look at the testimony again and come back to you tell you exactly what he said. But, look, the use of talc in the vaginal/peritoneum area causes an increase in cancer.

So in addition to using that talc, putting it on, putting it on her diaphragm, collectively all

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those things increased her risk of getting cancer. They are going to say the studies say what they say, our experts are going to say -- there's clearly disagreement what the experts say about --

THE COURT: But I don't understand. An expert is actually going to come in and testify in response to somebody asking the question about their ability to -- or what is the basis for them actually testifying to a set of facts as an expert, and the expert responds, well, it's just intuitive, you've got to explain more. You can't just say it's intuitive, can you? I don't know what that means.

MR. PENDELL: Can I see the testimony?

MR. CARUSO: Yes. I have a copy for you. The

And I have a copy for you as well Your Honor. That's where the testimony begins.

intuitive statement is on page 138.

THE COURT: Well, no, he doesn't say it's just intuitive. He says it's intuitive, and then he explains, "By placing the talc powder closer to the cervix, which is near the diaphragm, on the diaphragm, it would enhance the exposure, increase the risk based on just the anatomical location of the cervix and placement of the diaphragm."

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So what he's saying is -- yeah, he did say it's intuitive, but what he's saying is that you're putting it in closer proximity to the area that is susceptible, that is prone to basically developing cancer.

MR. CARUSO: But that's pure opinion testimony. There is no data. This is the study he relies upon. I'll hand this up. This is pure opinion testimony not permitted under Daubert.

He can't just say it because he thinks that's what's going to happen. That's not what happens, and the evidence shows it. This is a meta-analysis, so there's a total of nine individual studies looking at this diaphragm usage.

So essentially, physicians used to tell patients to dust your diaphragm in talc to keep it clean. That's what Dr. Seskin alleged she did and that's how we get here.

And studies have looked at this, right? Are women who do this, are they at an increased risk of ovarian cancer? They find the opposite. There is risk ratio under one; it sits at about .8. There is not a single study that Dr. Chan can point to that is going to show something different because it doesn't exist. And he can't just say, well, I

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think it should exist. It makes intuitive sense to me.

THE COURT: So what you're saying is that putting the talc on the diaphragm and then inserting the diaphragm to the point that it is closer to the internal organs, that there is no evidence or any study that he can point to that says that that increases the risk of inflammation?

MR. CARUSO: 100 percent correct.

MR. PENDELL: Untrue, Your Honor.

So, again, going back to the actual testimony where he explained why it is -- because you are going to hear about something else in this case, in general causation that, by the way, Dr. Chan is able to talk about and would talk about if we were doing cumulative evidence called migration. what happens is when they put talc in their body, it migrates through that part of the body.

Who is saying this? THE COURT:

MR. PENDELL: All of our medical experts will say this if given the opportunity.

THE COURT: Is Dr. Chan going to say this?

MR. PENDELL: If you let him say that, he absolutely will.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. PENDELL: And there are studies that back it up. Even the FDA agrees that migration is a phenomenon that actually happens.

So the idea you can take it and put it on your diaphragm and put it up there in that cavity, it's absolutely plausible and the science backs it up that it could migrate throughout that part of her body. And you are going to hear evidence of that. He testified to that. That is in his testimony about that phenomenon.

They are quibbling with his conclusions. They don't like his conclusions.

THE COURT: Okay, but the migration occurs.

Does that mean it increases your risk ratio?

MR. PENDELL: Of course it increases your risk ratio, Your Honor, because it's a dose-response relationship. The more you have over the longer period of time, the more your risk goes up. He will talk about that as well.

So the short answer is yes, it increases your risk.

THE COURT: All right. The Court, having heard from all parties, fully considered the arguments of all counsel. The motion is denied.

We only have about ten more minutes, so do the

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substantive motions in limine that have something to do with opening statements or jury selection.

What else do we have?

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, I've got one. Is it our choice or your choice?

THE COURT: It's yours. Go ahead.

MR. OLIVER: Okay. The defendants have moved to exclude evidence of the International Working Group on Asbestos in Consumer Products, it's called the IWGACP. And I think that comes up in opening, I'm trying to remember. I'm not sure.

But the point is this: In, I think, 2020, right after the FDA found asbestos in Johnson's baby powder, they got this group of top scientists together. It was eight separate agencies, federal agencies, EPA, FDA, OSHA, NIOSH, National Institute of Health, and some others, National Geological Service. There is one in there I never even heard of.

But all the agencies got together and they formed this international working group, and the working group was tasked with a couple of things.

One of the things they were tasked with doing -- and I referenced this with Dr. Rigler -- was coming up with some testing methodology.

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What is the standard way that we identify asbestos, right? So they issued a document that recommended the testing procedure that Dr. Rigler used more or less.

THE COURT: Who are these people?

MR. OLIVER: They are top scientists in the country gathered up by the federal agencies. I don't know who they are.

MS. O'DELL: Subject matter experts.

MR. OLIVER: They are just subject matter experts that the FDA reached out to. We have the names of them, that's all publicly available information.

So they get together. They go out and interview people, they ask for comment period, as it typical, and they got comments. Some of the comments they got were from Dr. Rigler. They end up adopting the testing procedure that Dr. Rigler advocated for that some other people advocated for.

They also said that statement that I talked about earlier with regard to this debate between asbestiform fibers and cleavage fragments. They said we think that the majority of the evidence or something -- the quote is in our brief -- the needlelike shape of the product is what matters,

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| 1 | not necessarily its chemical composition. And |
| 2 | that's not the only place that comes up, there is |
| 3 | actually defendant documents that acknowledge that |
| 4 | that is a problem. |
| 5 | THE COURT: Okay. What is the relevance of |
| 6 | this document? |
| 7 | MR. OLIVER: The relevance of this document is |
| 8 | that our experts intend to rely on it and they will |
| 9 | talk about |
| 10 | THE COURT: For what purpose? |
| 11 | MR. OLIVER: So Dr. Rigler will rely on it |
| 12 | because he is going to talk about the fact that the |
| 13 | needlelike shape, as opposed to just the chemical |
| 14 | composition, is one of the reasons asbestos is |
| 15 | dangerous. Because they are going to cross him on |
| 16 | it. They are going to ask him about |
| 17 | THE COURT: Where was this document published |
| 18 | at? |
| 19 | MR. OLIVER: Did you say where? |
| 20 | THE COURT: Where? |
| 21 | MR. OLIVER: I think it's in the federal |
| 22 | register. It's publicly available. |
| 23 | THE COURT: So it's authoritative? |
| 24 | MR. OLIVER: Absolutely. |
| 25 | MS. SCOTT: No, Your Honor. |

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Page 287 1 THE COURT: Who says it's authoritative? MR. OLIVER: Our experts. 3 They say it's authoritative? THE COURT: Yes, they will say it's 4 MR. OLIVER: 5 authoritative. Our experts will, their experts may 6 not. 7 Your Honor, this working group MS. SCOTT: paper was just that; it was a working group, it was 8 9 an executive summary, it's preliminary. I think it 10 expressly says this does not represent the 11 recommendations or the policies of the FDA, I think 12 somewhere else, it might say something like 13 shouldn't be relied on. 14 But it's irrelevant and plaintiffs can't 15 backdoor -- it's also hearsay, Your Honor. 16 not authoritative. It's not a public record. 17 not sure it's even in the federal register, but you 18 might be able to Google it and find it on the internet. 19 Plaintiffs can't backdoor this hearsay, not 2.0 21 authoritative, preliminary working group paper with 2.2 their experts. That's the law. And so we think 2.3 that it needs to be excluded on those bases. 24 THE COURT: So can I ask again: Where is it 25 published? You said it's authoritative.

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MS. O'DELL: It is for sure on the FDA website as an authoritative document that was put together by this group of subject matter experts on testing of asbestos from the federal agencies that Mr. Oliver mentioned.

THE COURT: Ma'am, they are saying that it's on the FDA website as an authoritative source.

MS. SCOTT: It's on the website, but the FDA itself says these aren't our policies, these aren't our recommendations, don't rely on them. So take it for what it's worth.

THE COURT: Is that accurate?

MR. OLIVER: That part is, but can I give some clarification for how we are going to use this?

Because you asked that, Your Honor, and I want to be clear. It's very unlikely that I am -- first of all, I'm not showing this to the jury in opening.

Not the document.

It's very unlikely that I will try to introduce it as substantive evidence directly, but what is going to happen is this issue is going to become relevant because it's part of defendants' defense. They are always going to bring up this cleavage fragments and chemical composition and needlelike shape. They argue about that a lot.

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We don't think it matters our experts will preemptively explain that that doesn't matter. And they may use reference to that; if I say Dr. Rigler, you know, tell me the basis for this, he'll say, well, I was part of this.

THE COURT: I'm excluding it because the FDA says that it is not to be relied upon for any purposes. It's not an authoritative -- they are saying it's not an authoritative source. It should not be relied upon. I don't know how it becomes authoritative.

MR. OLIVER: They didn't say it's not an authoritative source.

THE COURT: Read to me.

MS. SCOTT: It says that it does not represent recommendations or policies of the FDA or any other federal agency or proposed changes any regulations of the U.S. government. It also says that -- the working group itself says neither this executive summary, nor any other presentations at the public meeting by members of the working group, represent proposed or preliminary recommendations or policies of the FDA or any other agency.

I will correct myself and say, since we cited it in our response, it is in the federal register,

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25 it in our resp

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so I do apologize to my colleague, but it is not authoritative. It is a bunch of people got together and said, hey, here are our thoughts, let's write them down.

THE COURT: I know, but that doesn't mean it's not authoritative. Authoritative means that it is somethings that relied upon by the professionals within the industry, and the question -- that's the question. Are professionals going to say we rely upon this?

And I agree with you, I don't think it should come in if the FDA is saying don't rely upon it, but it doesn't sound like the FDA is saying it's not authoritative. Because there could be something that you had a group of reputable people get together, they wrote a series of recommendations; okay, now people within the industry use that as the model for how they actually make these decisions. Whether the FDA chooses to accept it or not, the industry has accepted it and I think then it becomes authoritative.

MS. SCOTT: There is no evidence that the industry has accepted it. And I'll also point out, Your Honor, rule of evidence 706, that

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authoritative publications can only be used during cross-examination. So just because their experts used it doesn't mean it's authoritative.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know how -- I'm not here ruling about how -- counsel said he is preempting and I don't know anything about how he's preempting, but I'm not going to -- and I was inclined to exclude it because you read it to me and I thought, well, how could it come?

But because of the issue of it being an authoritative source, I still think you're saying it's not, counsel is saying it is, I mean, I guess before -- so before you introduce it, I think they have to lay the predicate that it's an authoritative source. And if they lay the predicate it's an authoritative source, I'll allow it. If they fail to lay the predicate as an authoritative source, I'll deny it.

MS. SCOTT: Given, Your Honor, that it needs to have some sort of predicate, this working group paper should not be mentioned in opening statement.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. OLIVER: I actually made a mistake. I wasn't planning on doing that anyway.

THE COURT: Next motion in limine?

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MS. SCOTT: We are going to talk about the voluntary recall.

THE COURT: Johnson & Johnson's voluntary recall?

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor, our motion in limine number seven.

Back in 2018, two years after Ms. Seskin was diagnosed with her primary peritoneal cancer, the FDA, through some testing, found very trace amounts of chrysotile asbestos and a single bottle in one lot of Johnson & Johnson baby powder. Subsequent testing done, independent testing done revealed that there was no asbestos in that lot, that it might have been a contamination error, something of that nature. However, we are seeking to exclude that evidence as irrelevant.

THE COURT: Let me make sure I understand what you just said. The reason for the recall was that a batch of the product was suspected to have been contaminated with asbestos?

MS. SCOTT: They thought one bottle in one lot had trace amounts -- or the FDA thought one bottle in one lot had trace amounts of asbestos.

THE COURT: So there was a recall as to that batch?

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MS. SCOTT: Just to that batch, Your Honor, and it was a batch that was manufactured in 2018. The recall was in 2019. All of this post-dates Dr. Seskin's diagnosis of primary peritoneal cancer, and so for that reason, it is irrelevant.

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THE COURT: Let me ask them how they intend to use it.

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Yes, Your Honor.

First off, it is relevant. It's relevant because it shows defect and control by defendant. So defendants testified just now that they had possession of a lot that when it left their factories, they found trace amounts of asbestos.

And it was the FDA who found it, that was an independent laboratory called AMA Laboratories.

It's actually a dye scientists who they previously hired as an expert.

So they find asbestos, they contact J&J. J&J then goes and tests an aliquot, which is like a sample of a sample. They test that bottle, or they test that sample, and they find asbestos again, and so they recalled this lot.

So that's what we're talking about but I want to be really clear because the motion seems to talk

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about both the FDA testing and the recall. So we are focusing just or not recall right now and why that's relevant. So it's to our defect and it shows their control.

THE COURT: But it happened after your client was diagnosed with --

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Sure, but Your Honor, post-accident evidence is admissible in Florida. So we have Murray v. Alvin Vineyards. That's a Second DCA opinion from 1983. It's a fun opinion.

He was hit in the eye by a champagne bottle, and afterwards, the company put a warning saying don't shoot the champagne this way, and when they got up to say, well, that label has nothing to do with what happened to this gentleman, the plaintiff was able to introduce evidence saying if they get up and they say the product is safe -- which is what they are going to do in this case -- and we are able to impeach them with the evidence that they've had to change the label, that this has happened after the fact and it's relevant.

THE COURT: But I think it's something different. I think if they get up there and they say that we have never had asbestos in our product, then I think you may be able to use that to

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basically impeach them that is not true. In fact, asbestos was found in your product on this time.

But if they basically just deny your allegations without more, I don't think that opens up the door to you introducing the fact that asbestos was found in their product. I think it's how they do it, how they choose to do it and whether or not they open the door. If they don't open the door, I don't think it's relevant.

MS. STEMKOWSKI: Your Honor, we have never been in a case where they have not claimed that their product is asbestos-free and 100 percent safe. So if they get up and they do that, which we anticipate they will, then this recall is absolutely relevant.

THE COURT: As I just said, if they open the door, then I will allow it in. When I say "open the door," you cannot just do it and make the decision that they've opened the door on their own.

You have to request a sidebar and you have to say, Judge Thomas, I believe they've opened the door consistent with your ruling. I now ask for per in addition to go ahead and introduce evidence as it relates to the recall.

MR. OLIVER: Could I do that post their

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| | Page 296 |
|----|---|
| 1 | opening? |
| 2 | THE COURT: I'm sorry? |
| 3 | MR. OLIVER: The problem is I have to open |
| 4 | first as plaintiff and I know they're going to say |
| 5 | it, but when they say it, my opening is over. And |
| 6 | at that point, I can't talk to them. |
| 7 | THE COURT: Well, opening is not evidence |
| 8 | anyway. Opening is just what you believe the facts |
| 9 | are going to show. |
| 10 | Next? |
| 11 | MS. STEMKOWSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. |
| 12 | MR. OLIVER: For our choice, Your Honor, we |
| 13 | are going to do something, the discontinuation of |
| 14 | the marketing of their product in 2020 following |
| 15 | the recall. |
| 16 | MS. SCOTT: I'm sorry, which number is that? |
| 17 | MR. OLIVER: I don't know what number it is. |
| 18 | It's the fact that you guys stopped marketing your |
| 19 | product, stopped selling it, stopped making it, all |
| 20 | that, in the United States. |
| 21 | MS. SCOTT: Okay. |
| 22 | MR. OLIVER: While you are looking for that, |
| 23 | I'll explain it because we don't have a lot of |
| 24 | time. |
| 25 | So in May of 2020, after the recall, Johnson & |

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Johnson announced that it would no longer -- it did not recall all of its existing stock. It announced it would no longer sell talc-based Johnson's baby powder.

In fact, if you go to their website now, or Amazon or anything like that, you look and you say why can't I get talc-based baby powder? Johnson & Johnson has a statement we love your baby, so we've decided it's the best thing in the world and our science says, blah, blah, blah.

The point is this is relevant to the fact of the defect. It makes it more likely that it's defective and it fails the consumer expectation test, because one of the things they are going to show -- and it's in their PowerPoints. They have a bunch of PowerPoints about why they discontinued it.

So they blame the lawyers for that, but they also say --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, they are going to introduce evidence in this case as to why they discontinued the baby powder product?

MR. OLIVER: Yes, they have a PowerPoint and an executive who testifies about that, and she talks about in her PowerPoints there are different

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factors. One of the things they do is they blame the lawyers --

THE COURT: I don't understand. Why then -you are seeking to exclude that or you want to
include that?

MR. OLIVER: They are seeking to exclude it.

If you exclude it, I don't guess they'll talk about it, right? They don't want to talk about it at all.

But why is it relevant to our case affirmatively? It is relevant to our case affirmatively because it makes it more likely one of our elements, which is defect. That's something the jury could look at and say, well, wait, these defendants have gotten up for however long and they've told us this product is perfectly safe and yadda, yadda, yadda, and this finding of --

THE COURT: How is that not subsequent remedial measures? How is that not basically saying that, okay, you brought it to my attention and now we're going to take a corrective action, and you can't use the fact that I've taken a corrective action against me in a litigation?

MR. OLIVER: The reason that it's not subsequent remedial measures is because the case

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law that Ms. Stemkowski cited -- the reason it's not subsequent remedial measures is because the case law Ms. Stemkowski cited says that in Florida, plaintiffs can use evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show things like defect.

Now, if you're --

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MS. SCOTT: That's actually --

MR. OLIVER: You're right, let me look at this. Here is what the statute says: To prove ownership or control or the feasibility of precautionary measures, controversial or impeachment, it allows us to do that for the purpose of impeachment.

So when they come in and say our product was perfectly safe and the FDA tested this a thousand times -- and they say that, right? The FDA started testing powders back in the '70s. Then we are allowed to say, well, the FDA found it.

And when say that introduce those citizens'
petitions and they say the FDA said we didn't have
to warn, I'm allowed to turn around and say the FDA
found asbestos --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I missed something.

MR. OLIVER: -- and you decided to discontinue the product. They are sort of related.

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THE COURT: The whole point was that you wanted to introduce evidence that -- because they voluntarily discontinued use of the product, correct? No one made them do it. They voluntarily did it.

MR. OLIVER: That's not true as to the recall, but it is true as to the discontinuation.

THE COURT: That's my point. There is a difference between maybe a mandatory recall as compared to they are deciding that they are just not going to manufacture the product in the United States. Or anywhere, I don't know.

MR. OLIVER: It's both now.

THE COURT: Okay. So I just don't see -- I just don't see the relevance of that or why -- well, first of all, I think you definitely can't affirmatively use it.

I think depending upon what they say and whether or not, again, they open the door, they potentially may make it an issue, but affirmatively, I don't think it comes in.

MR. OLIVER: And Your Honor, under what circumstances would you say that they open the door? What would they have to say?

THE COURT: I don't know. I can't tell you

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that. I will sit here and listen to the case as
I'm signing orders and you all think I'm not paying
attention but I am, and I think it's really not for
me to say. I think it's for you to flag it.

And then you will -- I will take a break. Why do you think they opened the door? You will tell me -- and I may even say, can you read that back to me, please? I will then make a decision as to whether or not the door was opened or it wasn't.

I will say that when you open the door, I allow them to drive a Mack truck through it because I think if you think you're going to open the door, I think you should say, Judge, can we have a moment? And I don't do lots of moments, by the way. That's the other thing. I don't try cases by, "Can I have a moment?" Because that's why trials end up being three weeks long.

But if you actually are really concerned, hold off in asking that line of questions until you can get to the Court and say, Judge, we just need guidance. I plan on asking this, but I don't want to open the door, okay?

That way I will tell you I think if you ask that question, you are opening the door. You choose how you want to proceed.

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MS. SCOTT: We appreciate the guidance, Your Honor.

MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, I want to put something on the record because I knew I had a case here, and this is simply not it. It's actually 67 So.2d 220 from 1953 from the Florida Supreme Court.

THE COURT: You said 1953?

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MR. OLIVER: Yes, Your Honor. Anyway, I just wanted that on the record because we put it in our papers and my notes on the case -- I am paraphrasing this -- suggest that evidence of the same or similar defect are relevant whether before or after the plaintiff used the product, right, and I think that goes to defect.

I think the fact that they pulled it off the market goes to the consumer expectations test because that's how we prove defect.

THE COURT: And I disagree with you. You don't know why they pulled their product. You want the jury to assume that the reason why they pulled their product was because of a defect.

They could have realized that the liability associated with having to defend all of these cases that could come and so forth is greater than the

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money they were going to make from selling the product, and it didn't necessarily mean -- people make business decisions all the time and I'm not sure whether or not we can speculate as to why they did.

Now, if you have a smoking gun, you have a document from them that says: There's too much asbestos in our product, there is no way for us to manufacture this the way we need to, we've got to stop manufacturing it, we are killing too many people.

MR. OLIVER: Unfortunately, I don't have that. That would be a great case though.

THE COURT: Of course you don't. We've got to stop.

All right. Let me tell you all, I'm going to do this because I want to give you the layout for Monday. Okay. We have two hundred jurors coming in. The plan is we don't have the courtroom for the entire trial, just to let you know. We have the courtroom for jury selection.

So if you have people, logistic people, who are assisting you during the proceedings, they should set up here in this courtroom. They can set up starting Monday. I don't think there is anybody

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using the courtroom. They can come and they can set up their screen, the equipment and the like.

When you arrive on Monday, the first thing you should do when you sit at the lawyers' tables, you should situate yourself so that your back is to the Court, to the bench, because the jurors are going to be this way and I'm going there. You want to be facing them, you don't want to be facing me.

We are going to bring in the jurors. We'll go through the -- we'll bring 50 at a time and we'll tell them -- we'll question them only as to time, how long the trial is going to take.

Of the 50, we may get ten, may get 20, I don't know. We send the ones that cannot stay away; we keep the other 20. And we do that until we get about 60, 70 jurors that you all can then question, okay?

I ask questions, and then after I'm done asking questions, I let you all ask questions, and we obviously do this until we have a jury.

I'm curious, how many strikes per side?

MR. OLIVER: Three is what defendants have said before.

THE COURT: Perfect.

MS. DIOLOMBI: Alternate strike.

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Page 305 1 THE COURT: I'm sorry? "Alternate strike" was all I MS. DIOLOMBI: said, Your Honor. Hassia Diolombi for J&J. 3 4 THE COURT: You said what, I'm sorry? 5 MS. DIOLOMBI: So three strikes for the main panel and then one strike for the alternates? 6 7 THE COURT: Well, I give everybody one strike per alternate. So if I choose three alternates, 8 9 you get three strikes for alternates, okay? 10 But when I say one strike per alternate, that 11 means if you don't use your strike on alternate 12 number one, you lose it. It doesn't carry to alternate number two, okay? 13 14 All right, perfect. Our public relations 15 department sent me an email that they got a request 16 from -- is it CVN? They used to do my asbestos and 17 my tobacco cases. They are great because they set 18 up and you never know they're there. And they 19 don't say anything, they're quiet, they never 2.0 interrupt. 21 So I'm told that they are going to be setting 2.2 up probably on Tuesday or Wednesday, whenever we 2.3 start going the opening statements. 24 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, could I just say one 25 thing about CVN? They have videoed a bunch of

Page 306 1 Our only request would be that the Court would instruct counsel not to refer to the fact 3 that it's being recorded. 4 You mean to the jury? THE COURT: 5 MS. BROWN: Correct. 6 THE COURT: Oh, absolutely. 7 MR. OLIVER: I'm not going to do that. MS. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: No one should make reference. 10 They are like a little fly on the wall that we see 11 but we don't see. 12 MS. BROWN: Thank you. 13 THE COURT: The other thing is that -- and 14 this is important. I need you all to please, 15 please, please pay attention to what I'm about to 16 say. It will make your experience here a lot 17 better. 18 You all see that I'm probably not your typical 19 judge, and I'll accept that, okay, and I take pride 2.0 in that. I'm very direct. When I really am 21 comfortable with what I know what I'm doing, you 2.2 are just going to get rulings, okay? 2.3 You may just know deep in your heart I'm 24 wrong. You are saying the judge is just wrong and 25 you just need to tell me that I'm wrong, but I'm

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not giving you access to me. You're saying, Judge, I need a sidebar. Denied. Judge, I really need a sidebar. Denied, next question.

Just stay calm, okay? The world is not going to open up. We won't release the witness, and the first opportunity that you have to bring it to my attention, if I'm really wrong, I'll correct it. Put the witness back on the witness stand.

And normally when I say "wrong," I wasn't allowing the witness to do something that you thought I should allow the witness to do. When I get the opportunity, I will correct myself if I'm wrong and I'll say call the witness back, and I'll simply tell the jurors, ladies and gentlemen, we have a couple more questions for this witness, okay?

What you cannot do is you cannot attempt to argue with me on the record. Trust me, it's not something you want to do.

You are allowed to object. Hearsay, relevance, asked and answered, that type of thing. That's your objection. Your objection should not be, Judge, she is not qualified to say that, she's only a pharmacist, you know. Judge, objection, Judge, counsel knows better than that. He knows

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the witness didn't say that, okay?

Those are speaking objections, and you get one warning, and then after I give you one warning, I will give you a speaking response in front of the jury, okay? And so I don't want to become a part of this trial, but the good thing about me is if you invite me in, I come willingly, okay?

So if you don't want to me to be a part of the trial, I'll just sit up here and say overruled and sustained while I'm signing my orders, doing what I'm doing. It becomes your case, you get to try your case.

But if you invite me, I'm telling you -- and you all probably get a sense of it -- and I just tell you what I think, okay? And I prefer not to do that.

The other thing is that I take very few breaks, sidebar breaks, okay? If you need a personal break, you just need to say, Judge, can we take a personal break at this time.

When we take a personal break, everybody has to take a personal break at the same time. I'm not taking a personal break at 9:00 and then taking another one at 10:00, okay? If you have some personal situation, you have to eat at a certain

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time, you have to go to the bathroom at a certain time because you have certain personal issues, I don't need to know the specifics of it, but I need to know you have that personal issue, because if you need to take a break and I'm denying you the break, but you really need to go, I need to know that so that I am sensitive to the fact that you have something personal and I'm not just denying it because I have a stronger bladder than you do.

MR. OLIVER: Judge Thomas, at this time, I would like to let you know that my client does have one of those issues and it's serious. He has Crohn's disease. He has advised me that there will be times during this trial that he will have to leave and go to the bathroom. I'm sure you're familiar with the condition.

THE COURT: In that situation, it will be brief situations, and by the way, we'll let the jurors know there are times when the lawyers or the parties may have to exit the courtroom temporarily, but that has nothing to do -- it's more personal and we'll come up with some language so that there is no negative inference from that. And obviously, the Court takes no -- if your client needs to leave, personal representatives need to get up and

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leave, they can get up and leave. Half the time, I don't even know they're there, except when they're called to testify.

And we take breaks every day -- and I'm saying this to the plaintiff because you start off first. Every day, we take breaks at the same time. We take lunch at 1:00 every day, we take 45 minutes to an hour for lunch. Every day, we will break around 4:30, 5:00. That may be adjusted depending what's going on with the jurors or what's going on with the Court, but you should have witnesses available and ready to go up to and including 5:00.

What I suggest you do, if you have deposition testimony, you hold onto it, keep it in your pocket so that if you fall short of a witness and you need to fill the time, you can read a deposition or play a video. That kind of gives you cover.

But please don't put me -- please don't put me in a position where it is 3:00 and you tell me, Judge, everything is going faster than anticipated. We don't have a witness. If you test me, I will rise to the test, okay? I am telling you, you need to have witnesses. You've got to fill that time. I'm only looking at the plaintiff because obviously the pressure is on you because you go first.

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And at the end of every day, I say to the plaintiff: Who are you calling next? That gives you, the defense, an idea of who you need to prepare for, and then when they're done, you will know when to start lining up your witnesses and have witnesses and have people here, okay, so there's no break.

Judge, they finished earlier than we expected, we don't have anybody here until Thursday, okay, that's a problem. And I'm telling you all, it's a problem. And I'm not recessing. I'm going to say call your next witness. Judge, we have nobody. Unfortunately, we need access to the record. You have access to the record.

And you can move for a mistrial. And if you move for a mistrial, whoever causes the mistrial will be responsible for all the fees associated with the other side's preparation of the case if it's your fault for the mistrial.

If the jurors are responsible for the mistrial or the Court is responsible for the mistrial, no harm, no foul. If you are responsible for the mistrial, I will immediately after the end of the trial issue a rule to show cause as to why you should not be responsible for paying all of the

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other side's attorneys' fees and costs for requiring this Court to grant mistrial.

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And I will have an evidentiary hearing, I will make my findings, and you can take it to the Third District Court of Appeal or whoever else you need to take it to if you disagree with the findings that I've made. In other words, you probably don't want a mistrial.

And by the way, mistrial includes doing something that I told you not to do that you did and the other side is forced to ask for a mistrial, okay? You all know what it costs to get this case where it is. Nobody wants to have to do the case all over again. Let the jury make a decision on the merits.

And that includes, by the way, if you don't like the way the case is going. Sometimes, strategically, people want to kind of say, yeah, let's do this again. This is not coming out the way I want it to come out, and so they kind of incite a mistrial. I'll go with you, but there are consequences if you invite a mistrial. I'm just letting you all know that.

This is just me -- I don't know if this is a suggestion. I try not to get involved if there is

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no objection. I'm assuming if there is no objection, everybody is okay with the testimony coming in. If there is an objection, I'll rule on it.

But sometimes y'all don't object when y'all should be objecting, okay? And there is only so much I can take of it. So what I will then do is send the jury out and I will say, what are you doing? I won't do it in front of the jury, but I'll send the jury out because I don't understand.

Judge, there is no objection. I know there is no objection, but under what rule of evidence are you allowed to do that? I'm not sitting here letting you -- ba, ba, ba, ba, ba. That's my guidance to you. It will never be in front jury, but when it happens, sometimes you're wondering what did I do, what exactly just happened? And I'm letting you know what just happened, okay?

I'm trying to think of something else that you all need to know. Before closing arguments, I need you all to let me know how much time you're requesting for closing arguments. I don't necessarily give you the time that you're requesting; I give you the time based upon the length of the trial, the complexity of the case.

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Page 314 1 And I will give you a reasonable amount of time, but if you come in and you tell me, Judge, we need six hours, I can tell you right now that's not 3 happening, but I will give you time that I think is 4 5 reasonable. I think the law says that it can't be 6 7 arbitrary, it has to be based on the complexity of the issues that the jury has to decide, as well as 8 9 the length of the trial, how many witnesses 10 testified and the like. And so hopefully you all 11 will be reasonable. And if you are reasonable, I 12 will try to be equally as reasonable. 13 Do you all have any questions that you want to 14 ask me? 15 MR. OLIVER: Do we have forty-five minutes, an 16 hour for opening? 17 THE COURT: I think that's fair. 18 MR. OLIVER: And then Your Honor, one of the 19

things that's important here, you said we need to have deposition testimony ready to go and we'd like to do that, but we need to figure out how to submit this all to you.

THE COURT: Submit what to me?

MR. OLIVER: The deposition designations.

MS. STEMKOWSKI: How do you want to hear

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objections, Your Honor? If we can't settle something between ourselves, how would you like us to present that you, before the jury, after the jury?

THE COURT: I think what we do is on Monday, you all should give me the actual transcript, I want you to highlight -- I don't care who made the objection. It doesn't matter to me who is objecting, I just want to know the objection.

So what you do is you highlight the objection, tell me what the objection is, and then I will go through those while you're doing your jury selection and I will do the best I can to rule on them, and anything that I was unable to rule on because I don't understand it, I need clarification, then those will be the ones we can take up at the end of the day so that you all can then cut the video or edit the transcript as is necessary. But I just need the transcript, I need it to just be highlighted, and I will then say overruled or sustained.

MR. OLIVER: And how much time will we get with the panel during the voir dire?

THE COURT: How much time do you want?

MR. OLIVER: As much as I'm entitled to, Your

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Honor. I'm committed to getting it all done at the end of the day on Monday, but I would like at least an hour and a half, if not two hours with the panel.

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, can I make a suggestion as to that? Would it be possible -- I know Your Honor looked at the questionnaire we jointly submitted and you had no objections to the substance. I've tried eight of these cases now, and my experience has been with these questionnaires that the actual open panel voir dire is much more productive if we do have some information from them in advance.

Would it be possible to have them fill out the questionnaire or a portion of the questionnaire before we --

THE COURT: They will have a questionnaire.

You will get the questionnaire today. Hopefully
you will get that questionnaire today. Let me get
Brandon.

They normally send out the questionnaire the business day before, but sometimes -- so you should get the questionnaires and have them in your mailboxes, if they are not already there.

Did we get the question mares from jury pool?

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THE BAILIFF: Not yet, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Can you call them and ask them when will we be getting the questionnaires?

THE BAILIFF: Definitely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So he is going to call. Hopefully you'll get them today so you'll have them all weekend. Now, those questionnaires are not as helpful, they are just very basic. They just say have you ever served on a jury, you know, what do you do for a living, spouse, do you have kids, any legal experience, medical experience. You know, it's just basic type of thing.

But just so that you all know -- and I'm saying this because I'm so much more direct than y'all are, y'all are up there and you don't want to offend anybody, I'm not as concerned about that. So I will go through a lot of what's on your questionnaire before you all even get up there.

MS. BROWN: Okay.

THE COURT: I'll knock it out, it's almost going to be like rapid fire, so hopefully you'll have enough people taking notes. And I'm going to tell them I'm asking all of you the same question.

So, for example, I have your questionnaire

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here, and one of the first questions is -- I'm not going to ask have you ever been in the military.

Let me ask something really important. To your knowledge, have you or a family member ever used talc, okay, and I'll just go down every single person. I'll say first row; in the first row, how many people if your family members have ever used talc?

And because the room is a little bit bigger, I may ask them to stand up or we may have a microphone, they will answer the question, I go to the next one, and by the time we get to the end, they'll know what we're doing.

MS. BROWN: Is it paddles with numbers?

THE COURT: No, we are not as sophisticated with the paddles yet. And I actually have a fill-in bailiff and no JA, so we are really going to be a little disjointed on Monday.

MS. BROWN: The jurors will say their number, is that how it will work?

THE COURT: Yes. Well, just so that you know, the first group that comes in, we are really bringing them in hopefully in the order that they appear on the sheet, but the only purpose is for us to just line them up just to get enough jurors that

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you can question, and then those jurors would again be in order based upon the sheet.

I really don't even care how they come in, the first 50, I just need to know, okay, you can't be here, get them out, get enough so you all can question them. Because if we spend all the time lining 200 jurors up, sometimes that becomes -- that takes 45 minutes. Why?

We don't need -- we just need to know they're here. Get them in, who are you, can you stay, can you not stay, and then the people that we ultimately want to question, we will then line those up in the order that they appear on the sheet that you will be given.

We normally give a sheet, but unfortunately, I don't think we're going to be able to do it this way because I don't have a JA. It normally has all the jurors across in the order that they are seated. We probably won't be able to do that.

Any other questions?

MS. BROWN: I have two. Number one, will you hardship for a two-week trial or a three-week trial? I know we have a dispute on how long this will take.

THE COURT: You're telling me it's going to

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Page 320 1 be --MS. BROWN: I say two, Judge. I've done these 3 in seven days. 4 You've done these in seven days? THE COURT: 5 MS. BROWN: With this firm, yes, South Carolina. 6 7 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, they did a mesothelioma trial in a totally different situation 8 9 than this. It was not an ovarian cancer trial, so 10 it's a different case. We've said this is a three-week trial all along. We've looked at our 11 12 calendar and I think at some point Your Honor asked 13 us when we were going to finish and we told you, I 14 believe, that it was going to take us -- we sent an 15 email to Andrew, went back and forth. So we still think it's going to take three 16 17 weeks, that's our best estimate. That includes 18 time for them. Our part is not going to take three 19 weeks. THE COURT: Well, here is what I think we 2.0 21 should do, because I also am suspect of three 2.2 weeks. 2.3 MR. OLIVER: We have a holiday in there too, 24 Judge. 25 THE COURT: You have one day. But I also

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suspect it's not going to be three weeks, but the problem is: What happens if it is, and then a juror cannot stay?

Now, the option is that I think we tell the jurors that the Court -- I say the Court -- the Court anticipates being able to complete this trial in two weeks, but it may -- there may be some situations where it may go over, so we need to know your availability for the next three weeks, okay? That way if somebody has a hardship on the third week, that doesn't automatically disqualify them, but we may have to pick an alternate for everybody that has a concern for the third week so we can have somebody to replace. So instead of normally three alternates, we may want to take five or six alternates so we cover for any lag if we don't get it done in two weeks.

And by the way, the other thing -- and I'm concerned about this and I'll let you all tell me how you feel about it. Whenever you all tell me that the case is going to be three weeks, that causes me to work harder during the day. I cancel my motion calendar because you see how motion calendar goes. It can be like two and a half hours.

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I cancel motion calendars and I just simply say I'm just going to focus on this trial, which means we are starting every day at 8:30. And I tell the jurors that; look, folks, we've got to start at 8:30 just so we're here.

You know, I tell my little one, unfortunately, you've got to go to the library because I'm going to pick you up at 5:00 rather than picking you up at 4:30. And we just work longer.

The concern I have is that some of the evidence in this case can be a little bit challenging for jurors to sit here for seven hours to receive it. And that's my concern.

If this was just an automobile accident case where I say, no, I want to get it done, I may be able to work those hours, but because of the breadth of the testimony, it may be a little more challenging to have people sit there. Because I'm not sure how much of it is going to sink in if you're just sitting here for too long of a time. At some point, you may start daydreaming.

But I'll let you all tell me what you feel about that. And maybe it depends upon how the case is going, you know, because as the case proceeds, within two or three days, you'll have a better

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sense of is it closer to the ten days or is it closer to the third week.

MR. OLIVER: And from plaintiff's perspective, since we are obviously going first, Your Honor, I can make a commitment that after the first three days, after we've put on two witnesses, I'm more than happy to report back to you and say we think this has changed or we think we're right on track and it's taking as long as we think it's going to take.

THE COURT: Or we're behind.

MR. OLIVER: Absolutely. I'm going to tell you whatever is happening.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have anything else?

MS. BROWN: Just one more, Your Honor. In terms of use of documents in opening, is it a situation where it's okay to show documents we have a good faith basis to believe will come into evidence --

THE COURT: You do.

MS. BROWN: -- and we do so at our own peril?

THE COURT: Well, it's not at your own peril.

Here is what I require for opening: I require you
to show any documents you intend to use during

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opening to the other side. The other side then has an opportunity to object to those documents prior to the opening.

If they do not object prior to the opening, I do not break. So if you're 20 minutes into your opening, and all of a sudden, you put a document up and the other side says objection, I'm going to say overruled.

And the reason why I'm saying that is -- now, that's assuming you put on the record, Judge, we've complied with your requirement, we showed the other side our PowerPoint presentation, our documents. They have lodged no objection. Once you do that, as far as I'm concerned, you satisfied any obligation, and if they slept on it, they just slept on it and we just proceed and I'm not breaking up an opening statement because someone decides to object at the eleventh hour to a document.

MR. PENDELL: Your Honor, may I ask a question? Is that rule just for opening?

THE COURT: As compared to what?

MR. PENDELL: In other words, do I have to somehow a document before I have a witness on the stand?

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Page 325 1 THE COURT: You have to show the document to opposing counsel --3 MR. PENDELL: Here in court. THE COURT: -- before you show it to the 4 5 witness. MR. PENDELL: But not prior to that time? 6 7 THE COURT: You all should have had a meet-and-confer. Hopefully you're say staying at 8 9 the same hotel. Your meet-and-confer should have 10 Here are all the documents I intend to 11 introduce, what is your objection? Which ones do 12 you object to? 13 If there is no objection, then you should mark 14 the document -- all your documents should be 15 premarked and given to Rod at the beginning of the 16 trial. But you should then mark -- the document 17 should be handed to Rod so that Rod has the 18 documents and he can mark them, and documents that 19 you object to because predicate or something along that line, then you don't -- obviously you have to 2.0 21 lay the predicate and then you would make a 2.2 contemporaneous objection if you believe that the

But all your documents have to have been reviewed because there is nothing more painful in a

predicate hasn't listen laid, and then will I rule.

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case like this when you all are all of a sudden saying I've never seen that document. They didn't put that on the witness list, okay? Those things are problematic.

MS. BROWN: And I'm happy to confer with counsel. I have some ideas of how we've done it in the past. If we exchange direct documents a sufficient time in advance, I've found we are able to work this all out without what Your Honor is contemplating.

The one thing I do want to clarify with the Court is that documents we are going to use on cross, we of course don't need to show to the other side before cross-examination, right?

THE COURT: Well, not before, but when you go to approach the witness, you need to show the document.

MS. BROWN: I understand, Your Honor.

MR. PENDELL: Your Honor, just to clarify because I heard opposing counsel say something that's different, which is why I asked the question.

In general, we have an exhibit list. We are to exchange exhibit lists, say whether we have objections to certain documents and make them

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before the trial starts so we know ahead of time what everybody is doing. That is different than I have this doctor who is going to testify tomorrow, and here are the document five specific documents off that list that I'm going to use with him.

THE COURT: No, no.

MR. PENDELL: Okay.

THE COURT: I do not require you to, in advance, give the specific documents that you're going to use for a witness in advance. I just require you to have the conversation about all your exhibits, but no, you don't have to identify specific documents you're going to use with each witness.

MS. BROWN: The reason we've done it in the past, Your Honor, like the night before, you send the ten documents you are going to put the doctor on direct is because our exhibit lists are like thousands of documents, and so that's been my experience.

THE COURT: I will say this: I do not require it, but I will encourage it.

MS. BROWN: It just makes it easier, but I'll confer with counsel and see what we can do.

THE COURT: And obviously what applies to one

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| 1 | would apply to the other. |
| 2 | Any other questions? |
| 3 | MR. OLIVER: Anybody on my team? |
| 4 | MS. BROWN: Last one. You would anticipate |
| 5 | opening Tuesday? Monday would be all jury |
| 6 | selection? |
| 7 | THE COURT: What we will do is we will do |
| 8 | Monday all jury selection, and if for some reason |
| 9 | we do finish a little earlier, maybe we can take up |
| 10 | some of these extraneous issues that we haven't |
| 11 | resolved today. So yes, don't plan on opening on |
| 12 | Monday, just plan on jury selection, and then |
| 13 | anything else that's remaining that we need to talk |
| 14 | about. |
| 15 | MS. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor. We |
| 16 | appreciate that. |
| 17 | THE COURT: Anything else? |
| 18 | MR. OLIVER: Thank you, Your Honor. |
| 19 | MS. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honor. |
| 20 | (The hearing was concluded at 4:37 p.m.) |
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Page 329 1 HEARING CERTIFICATE 2 3 I, CHRISTINE SAVOUREUX-MARINER, Florida 4 Professional Reporter, certify that I was authorized 5 to and did stenographically report the foregoing proceedings and that this transcript is a true 6 7 record of the proceedings before the Court. I further certify that I am not a 8 9 relative, employee, attorney, or counsel for any of 10 the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any 11 of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with 12 the action, nor am I financially interested in the 13 action. 14 Dated this 11th day of February, 2024. 15 16 17 CHRISTINE SAVOUREUX-MARINER 18 Florida Professional Reporter 19 20 21 22 23 2.4 25

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[habitual - helpful]

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[helpful - honor]

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[honor - immediately]

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[impact - inflammation]

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[inflammation - invading]

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[investigate - johnson]

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[johnson's - kind]

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[kind - kobayashi]

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[methodology - morrissey]

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